2473) Georgia, Armenia, & Azerbaijan in Cold War Through Armenian, Georgian, Mongolian, Bulgarian, Chinese & US State Archives Docs

Cold War in the Caucasus: Notes and Documents from a Conference by Svetlana Savranskaya and Vladislav Zubok
A Cold War Odyssey: The Oswald Files by Max Holland
Mongolian Archives by Sergey Radchenko
Todor Zhivkov and the Cold War: Revelations from His Personal Papers
New Central and East European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia by Yvette Chin, Gregory Domber, Malgorzata Gnoniska and Mircea Munteanu

Document 1:
Memorandum, “About the Mood of a Part of the Armenians Repatriated From Foreign Countries,” from Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Grigory Arutinov to Soviet Leader Josef Stalin, 22 May 1947

[Source: National Armenian Archives. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]


Out of 50,945 Armenians, who arrived from foreign countries, 20,900 are able to work; they all were given employment at industrial enterprises, construction, in the teams of craft cooperation, and the peasants—in the collective and state farms.

The main mass of repatriated Armenians adjusted to their jobs and takes an active part in productive activities. A significant part participates in the socialist competition for early fulfillment of the plans, and many of those exhibit high standards in their work. . .

There is a small part of the repatriated, who initially switched from one job to another and subsequently engaged in trade and speculation on the markets. The number of [those individuals] reaches 600 to 700 people.

Among the members of this group exists a sentiment in favor of re-emigration. According to our information, 21 per-sons crossed the state border into Turkey at various times. 110 people were detained in the border zone for violations of the border regulations, and they are charged with attempting to cross the border [illegaly]. In addition to that, we know of up to 300 people who are inclined to re-emigrate. Usually, under interrogation, the detained persons explain their motivation to flee the Soviet Union as due to economic factors.

The analysis of their situation on the part of the CC CP(b) of Armenia shows that all of them were given employ-ment upon their arrival, were provided with housing, and received assistance at their workplaces both in food and money. All this notwithstanding, they have not settled into their jobs, but engaged in sales on the market.

The majority of these persons are between 18 and 27 years of age. According to the statements of their parents and family members, they did not work anywhere before their arrival in Armenia and were “separated” from their families. The repatriated almost unanimously condemn the be-havior of this group of repatriates and call them traitors. Taking into account the material difficulties of the first years after relocation, the government of Armenia provides systematic assistance to the needy.

Besides the provision of bread on the ration card system for all relocated Armenians and members of their families, they are periodically given [other] food products—flour, ce-reals, sugar—and other goods—kerosene, soap, footwear etc.—above the usual provision.

The government of Armenia provided 2,300 thousand rubles from the financial assistance fund to those repatriates who have large families and are needy.

Up to 30 million rubles was provided already for con-struction of individual houses from state credit. The repatri-ated persons are building 3,890 houses, and further selection of plots for such construction is in progress.

The CC CP(b) of Armenia and the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR outlined measures to strengthen the border regime in order to prevent border crossings. Among those measures in the relocation of the repatriates, who settled in the villages adjacent to the line of the state border, to deeper regions of the republic.

Those people who express re-emigration sentiments are being relocated from the border regions and the city of Leninakan to the deep regions of the republic. It was decided not to settle arriving Armenians in the villages located in the 5-kilometer border zone in the future. Joint measures for increasing the number of border posts and checkpoints, as well as the number of border personnel, were outlined to the USSR Ministry of Interior. We are undertaking measures for strengthening political work among the repatriated Armenians.


Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Zhelesnikov, Head of the Special Department of the KGB at the USSR Council of Ministers for Transcaucasus Military District, to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Comrade P.V. Kovanov, 19 September 1956

[Source: Georgian Presidential Archive Fond 14, opis (finding aid) 31, delo (file) 297. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

Special Department For The Transcaucasian Military Districtof The Committee Of State Security At The Ussr Council Of Ministers 19 September 1956 No. 2/8098 Tbilisi

Top Secret
Copy No. 2 To The Secretary Of The Central Committee Of The Communist Party Of Georgia

Comrade Kovanov P. V.
I report that the last months of 1956 were characterized by an increase infiltrations by Western agents from Turkey across the land border into the areas of deployment of the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District, and by an in-crease in [the number of] visits to the Transcaucasus, and mainly the areas of troop deployment, by foreign tourists and officials of capitalist diplomatic missions among whom persons engaged in intelligence work were noted.

Over the course of June, July and August, two Turkish agents and two American intelligence agents were dispatched from the Turkish side across the state border. All of them received meeting quarters on the territory of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

In addition, on 11 August of this year, an unimpeded crossing of the border from Turkey by four unknown crimi-nals took place in the area of Akhaltsikhe in the Georgian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. On 22 August they crossed back into Turkey approximately in the same area. In the exchange of fire, which occurred when they were returning from the USSR, one violator was killed. Fake docu-ments, with which agents of foreign intelligence [services] are usually equipped, were found on him.

Military identity card number series GD No. 694861 is-sued by the Leninakan City Military Committee and passport series U-OF No. 676430 issued by the First Police Depart-ment of Kutaisi were confiscated from the body.

This attests to the fact that the Turkish intelligence [service] knows well the procedures of preparation and issuing of documents in the area.

The analysis of the instructions received by the above-mentioned three agents from the Turkish and the American intelligence [services] shows that the intelligence [services] exhibit serious interest in obtaining detailed information about the location, number and equipment of the military units, and also pay attention not only to the general information, such as in what area a certain group [of forces] is located, but to detailed reports on the location of particular units.

For example, agent “VOLGIN,” who arrived from Tur-key in July of this year, pointed out that the Turkish intelligence [service], which had information about the location of the 4th army battalions, instructed him to find out precisely in which settlements the units of those battalions were quar-tered and with what weapons they were equipped with. Agent Sochlyan, who arrived from Turkey at approximately the same time, was instructed to carry out reconnais-sance of the units of the Yerevan garrison.

The [Western] intelligence [services] devote great at-tention to the collection of information about the air force units and to the changes in their equipment, which are taking place at the present time.

For example, the same Turkish agent “C” received an assignment to find out whether new secret airports were be-ing built in the neighborhood of Yerevan.

The American agent Moroz, who was deployed in the area of Leninakan in July of this year, had orders to find the airport near the settlement Saganlugi (Tbilisi region), and to find out what kind of aviation was based at that airport, and to what extent this airport was equipped to handle modern aviation. He was also ordered to obtain by any means (to steal or to pressure the servicemen to sell to him) a catalog with the description of the front section of the MIG-17 air-plane.

Regarding the issue of the [Soviet] Navy, these agents received the following instructions: agent “M” was instructed to go to Baku and collect information about submarines, and in particular, about missile and radar equipment on them. Turkish intelligence instructed agent “B,” mentioned above, to establish the location of the Navy headquarters in Baku, and as well as the types of ships based in the port of Baku.

It was recommended to the agents that they collect that information both by means of personal observation and from conversations with people who possess the relevant infor-mation.

For example, it was suggested to agent “B” that while he collected information about the number [of troops in] a certain unit, quartered in the winter accommodations, he should also determine the length and width of the barracks, the num-ber of floors, the number of windows, and how many guards were on duty. If [the troops] were quartered in camp condi-tions—to count the number of tents.

It was recommended to determine the types of naval vessels by means of visual observation. For this purpose, the agent was shown pictures of various types of Soviet ships at the intelligence [service] offices, including several types of our submarines.

As was mentioned above, it was suggested to the Ameri-can agent “M” that he should not hesitate to use violence or bribery of servicemen in order to obtain the catalog descrip-tion of the MIG-17 plane.

All of the above-mentioned agents received the assign-ment to identify morally unstable people and individuals dissatisfied with the Soviet regime to encourage them to cross into Turkish territory, or to use them for intelligence pur-poses on our territory.

For example, Turkish agent “C” received an assignment to select such people from among those previously tried for various crimes, to collect biographical and personal informa-tion from them, to report it to Turkish intelligence, to encour-age the most adversarily inclined of them to cross into Turkey, and to supply them with a pretext for that.

Agent “B” was assigned to escort one person to Tur-key, to collect information about two residents of Baku, including one officer of the 4th Army, and to prepare one other person for subsequent relocation to the Crimea with an as-signment from Turkish intelligence. It is characteristic that it was recommended to the agent that he should arrange his first meeting with the person under consideration [in order] to get to know him in a restaurant with some drinking, but to follow him beforehand by the means of outside surveillance. The same agent had the assignment to study the public mood of the population in connection with the struggle against the Stalin’s personality cult and condemnation of Bagirov. The efforts of Turkish intelligence to encourage Soviet citizens to betray their Motherland is expressed in other ways as well.

In 1955, and especially in the summer of 1956, numer-ous incidents were registered in which Turkish servicemen, and in some cases civilians as well, struck up conversations with soldiers of our border forces soldiers, and in the course of such conversations conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and encouraged them to cross over into Turkish territory, promising them safety and guarantees that these people would not be transferred back to the USSR.

Those facts were most often noted with regard to bor-der troops units 38 and 39 on the section [between] Akhaltsikhe and Leninakan. Similar incidents were also noted on the section of the border with Iran. In certain cases those actions succeed, which was proven by the escape to Iran of three servicemen of the Azerbaijan border troop district be-tween May and August, 1956. As interrogations of the trai-tors of the Motherland ROTANOV, BONDAREV, and GORBUNOV have shown, all of them were subjected to intelligence interrogations in Turkey, and they have given the foreign intelligence [services] sensitive information about the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District. It is char-acteristic that all these persons were encouraged to cooper-ate with Turkish, American, and British intelligence [agencies].

Some unstable elements and adversarily inclined per-sons from among the Soviet citizenry also show an interest in the Soviet-Turkish border–they arrive at the villages lo-cated close to the border, including the areas of troop deployments, with treacherous designs and search for ways to cross into Turkey or Iran. Such incidents are most often, registered in the regions of Batumi, Akhaltsikhe, Leninakan, Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Lenkoran.

During the eight months of 1956, 22 people who attempted to betray their Motherland were detained in those areas. In 1955, and especially 1956, the influx of various for-eign tourist and other groups and of official representatives of capitalist diplomatic missions, who systematically visit various regions of the Transcaucasus, has increased.

Most often, such foreigners are representatives of the United States, France, England, Turkey, and some other countries. These individuals, and especially diplomatic person-nel, make visits to mainly strategically important regions of Sukhumi-Tbilisi, Kutaisi-Yerevan-Baku, and Leninakan-Batumi. Groups of troops are stationed in those regions and along the highways leading to those [regions].

Observation of foreigners has registered their intention to collect information about the troops by means of visual observation, photography, and use of other technology. The foreigners devote great attention to investigation of high-ways important from the military point of view, such as the Georgian military road, the road through the Suram and other mountain ridges.

There were some noted incidents of meetings between the foreigners and re-émigrés, and people who moved to establish permanent residency in the Transcaucasus republics from countries in the Middle East, from France, and other countries, and who mainly settled in the Armenian territory. A large number of tourists visit the region of the Black Sea Coast, where in August of this year packages with NLF (National Labor Front) anti-Soviet literature were discovered, addressed to the population and servicemen of the Soviet Army.

The circumstances described above were pointed out to all KGB Special Departments in the region. They were instructed to conduct counterintelligence work taking into ac-count the information presented above.

Head Of Special Department Of The Kgb At The Ussr Council Of Ministers For Transcaucasus Military District
Lieutenant General (ZHELEZNIKOV)

Report by the Chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic A. Yuzbashyan, 14 March 1979

[Source: Armenian National Archives. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

Top secret
Copy No. 1
(presented at the session of the Bureau of the CC CP of Armenia on 6 March 1979)

Under the influence of the most aggressive forces of imperialism, the foreign policy course of the United States government and its allies clearly exhibits a tendency toward returning to a policy “from the position of strength” and to the “cold war.” The current leadership of the PRC [People’s Republic of China], who unleashed undisguised aggression against socialist Vietnam in February of this year, has practi-cally merged with the forces of imperialism in its anti-Soviet aspirations. Therefore there clearly exists an attempt by our enemies to create a united anti-Communist front.

In the implementation of the aggressive course against the countries of the socialist commonwealth, and mainly against the Soviet Union, an important role is given to the special services and the anti-Soviet foreign centers, the sub-versive activity of which has acquired a global character.

One would like to especially emphasize the fact that the enemy, without giving up its final strategic goals, has ad-justed its tactics [and] focused on conducting ideological subversion which has as its goal “exploding” socialism from within. A powerful, multi-branch apparatus has been put in service for ideological subversion. And the imperialist coun-tries long ago raised this line of subversive activity to the level of state policy.

By acting in skillful and diverse ways, and by actively using specific features of different regions of the USSR all the channels through which people travel in and out [of the Soviet Union], and the mass media, the enemy often achieves his dirty goals. Under the influence of hostile Western pro-paganda, negatively inclined individuals inside the country, including those in the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Re-public], still commit anti-state, and anti-Soviet crimes. Notwithstanding the absence of a social base in the coun-try for anti-Soviet activity there are certain marginalized individuals who choose the criminal way [of life]. This kind of person also exists in our republic.

Protecting Soviet society from the overtures of the reac-tionary imperialist forces is the main task of the organs of state security, which they successfully fulfill under the un-wavering control and daily leadership of our Party. All the people, the widest strata of our society, take part in fulfilling that noble task. And it is precisely in this connec-tion that we should consider the CC CPSU Resolution of 23 May 1977, “About Raising the Vigilance of the Soviet People.” Even taking into account the obvious exceptional char-acter of this crime, it appears that the case of the “Bombers,” which was presented today to the Bureau of the CC CP of Armenia bears clear traces of all these processes and phe-nomena, so to speak, of the external and internal order, which were mentioned above.

Brief summary of the case:

During the evening of 8 January, in various public places in the city of Moscow, criminal elements carried out explo-sions of hand-made bombs, resulting in human casualties, destruction and damage to state property. The explosions occurred in the metro train, in grocery store No. 15, and next to the window of grocery store No. 5. As a result of the explosions, 7 people were killed, and 37 people were injured to varying degrees.

At the end of October 1977, criminals were preparing to detonate new explosives, this time at the Kursky Railway Terminal. However, the measures for ensuring safety in pub-lic places, undertaken jointly by the organs of the KGB and MVD, scared the criminals, and they fled hurriedly leaving behind a bag with the explosives.

As a result of the additional measures which were un-dertaken the operative group of the Armenian SSR KGB, working in coordination with the USSR KGB, succeeded in capturing the criminals at the beginning of November 1977. They turned out to be: S[tepan] S. Zatikyan, head of the group, born in 1946 in Yerevan, and resident of Yerevan, non-affiliated, married, did not complete higher education; A. V. Stepanyan, born 1947 in Yerevan, resident of Yerevan, with a secondary education; Z. M. Bagdasaryan, born 1954 in the village of Kanachut in the Artashatsky region, and resident of Kanachut, with a secondary education.

From 16 to 24 January 1979, the Collegium for Criminal Offenses of the USSR Supreme Soviet held an open trial ses-sion to consider the criminal case charging S. S. Zatikyan and his two accomplices with anti-Soviet activities and committing a subversive act.

During the course of the trial the information received earlier by the KGB organs was fully confirmed with regard to the fact that Zatikyan, having served a four-year sentence for anti-Soviet activities, did not disarm ideologically, and, moreover, chose the road of extremist methods of struggle against the Soviet state. After being indoctrinated in a hos-tile spirit, he involved his accomplices in the preparation and implementation of the subversive acts.

In the course of the investigation and trial in this case, a large amount of material and other evidence was collected. Approximately 750 victims and witnesses were questioned, 140 expert tests were made, and over 100 searches were con-ducted; persuasive evidence was collected in the residences of the criminals, linking them to the explosions. This gave [the investigation] the opportunity fully to reveal Zatikyan’s and his accomplices’ roles in the crimes they prepared and committed, even during the preliminary investigation. In particular, Zatikyan stated during the preliminary investigation the following: “I did not testify against my own will, I told the truth that I built the explosive devices … that my actions … represent just one method of struggle against the regime that exists in the Soviet Union.” Later, during the trial, Zatikyan refused to give testimony. How-ever, his accomplices gave extensive testimony about the circumstances of preparing and carrying out the new subver-sive acts. Zatikyan was fully implicated by his accomplices and other witnesses, by the conclusions of the experts, as the main ideological and practical organizer of the subver-sive acts and the main actor in building the explosive de-vices.

Taking into account the exceptional danger and the grave consequences of the crimes committed by him, the court sen-tenced Zatikyan and his accomplices to the ultimate measure of punishment—the death sentence. The verdict was re-ceived with approval by the numerous representatives of the Soviet public who were present in the courtroom, including representatives from our republic. By the way, one of the jurors and all three defense lawyers were also from our re-public. The sentence was carried out.

Using the Zatikyan case as an example it would be in-structive to trace how he came to his evil design and who and what helped him in that.

Brief background:

Over the last 12 years, the Armenian KGB has uncov-ered and liquidated more than 20 illegal anti-Soviet nationalist groups created under the influence of hostile Western propaganda. Altogether, about 1,400 people were engaged in anti-Soviet activities in some form or another. In accordance with the Party’s principles, the organs of state security have given and continue to give preference to preventive and prophylactic measures, and consider arrest an extreme measure only. Those arrested represented only 4.3% of the individuals who were proven to have engaged in anti-Soviet activities. Zatikyan was one of them—he was a member of one of the anti-Soviet nationalist groups, which pompously named itself NUP (National United Party). It was created by the unaffiliated artist Khachatryan Aikaz, born in 1918 (in 1978 he was sentenced to 1.5 years of prison for a common crime), who, upon learning about Zatikyan’s role in the explosions in Moscow, called himself his “spiritual father.”

In 1968, Zatikyan was arrested and sentenced, as was already mentioned, to four years in prison. At his arrest, they confiscated a document written by Zatikyan––“Terror and Terrorists”—in which he made an effort to justify the meth-ods of extremism and means of struggle against the Soviet state.

During his stay at the correctional labor colony, and then in prison (where he was transferred because he system-atically violated the regime, and negatively influenced other inmates, who chose the road of improvement), Zatikyan not only did not change his ways, but, on the contrary, nursed thoughts about even more extreme methods of hostile activity.

One should also note that Zatikyan admired the Dashnaks [Armenian Revolutionary Federation, an ultra-na-ionalist movement whose territorial ambitions include the Karabakh region and those parts of “Greater Armenia” cur-rently within the borders of Turkey and Georgia]. In the course of the investigation, and during his trial, he called the Dashnaks a “sacred party.”

One of Zatikyan’s accomplices—Stepanyan—partici-pated in an anti-Soviet nationalist gathering. For that, in 1974, he was served an official warning in accordance with he Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 25 December 1972. However, that official warning did not bring Stepanyan to his senses, did not stop him from commit-ing the crime.

The USSR KGB gave a positive assessment to the in-vestigative and trial measures undertaken by the organs of state security of the USSR. The Armenian KGB also took an active part in that work.

However, all this took place after the first series of explo-sions had occurred in Moscow. And the second series of explosions had already been prepared. There should have been no explosions at all. In any case, after the explosions, he criminals should have been quickly discovered and ar-rested. However, that did not happen. We realize that we have obviously made some mistakes here. The republican KGB drew the following lessons from the “Bombers” case. One can name the following reasons [as those] that con-ributed to the emergence of the “Bombers:”

1. Enemy influence from the abroad in the framework of the ideological subversion carried out by the adver-sary.

2. Negative influence by some hostile individuals on the young people.

3. As was already mentioned, mistakes in our work, in the work of the Armenian KGB.

4. Loss of sharpness of political vigilance among some categories of the population, as a consequence of a cer-tain weakening of the ideological work.

In addition to that, there is some concern about persons who are not involved in productive labor, as well as such aliens to our social regime [who practice] phenomena such as bribery, theft of socialist property, petty crime, and vicious systematic libel against honest Soviet people in the form of anonymous letters and statements.

All this not only darkens the general moral and political climate in the republic, but also represents potential fertile grounds for marginalized elements, who then slide toward anti-Soviet activities.

Foreign Armenian colonies represent a special concern for us. Let us dwell on just one question out of the whole system of issues related to this situation. The processes and developments occurring in the colonies, taking into account heir various connections with the republic, influence the situation here. The enemy, primarily the United States, acively works with the foreign Armenian colonies they use

all means to encourage persons of Armenian nationality to move and establish permanent residency in their country. Today already 600,000 Armenians reside in the United States. An Armenian Bureau was created and is now function-ing in the State Department, and Columbia University is plan-ning to create an Armenian Cultural Center.

All these events unquestionably serve the same anti-Soviet goals. There are plans to increase the Armenian diaspora in the United States to one million people. This could have serious consequences for us. The best organized force in the foreign Armenian colonies is the anti-Soviet nationalist party Dashnaktsutyun. It is the most dangerous for us due to a number of circumstances (experience, knowledge of the situ-ation, absence of language barrier, etc.).

That is why the CPSU CC resolution of 27 December 1978 about strengthening our work with the Armenians re-siding abroad has a great significance in trying to interfere with the efforts of the American administration to extend its influence on the foreign Armenian colony.

The KGB of the Armenian SSR reports its suggestions regarding the realization of the above-mentioned CPSU CC resolution to the Armenian CP CC separately.

Dashnak propaganda is being skillfully and inventively carried out, and it reaches its addressees more often than other kinds of propaganda. We have to give them credit— they choose topics for ideological attacks against us in a fine and clever manner.

Take for example slogans like “Great and united and in-dependent Armenia.” Or the way they threw in the so-called “land issues” (both internal and external). It is natural that the Dashnaks did not pass by Sero Khanzadyan’s letter, did not miss the clearly non-scholarly polemics between Z. Buniatov and some of our scholars. They did not shy away from the case of Zatikyan and his accomplices either. In addition, every time the Dashnaks choose the most skillful and at the same time innocent forms for their propaganda (for example about the “purity” of the Armenian language, about creation of genuinely Armenian families, etc.), which repre-sents nothing other than acts of ideological subversion.

Of course, the current situation, the growing might of the socialist forces, and, first of all, of our country, could not but affect the Dashnak strategy, but their essence, their stra-tegic designs remained unchanged, and we should start from that assumption in our work. Naturally, we should also work against the Dashnaks—to try to limit, decrease their practical anti-Soviet activity.

It is necessary to point out that lately the enemy has been devoting more attention to the socio-political sphere in his intelligence endeavors. In our republic, they are inter-ested in such issues as the attitude of the local people to the Russians, Azerbaijani, and other peoples of the Soviet Union, to the “land” problem (both internal and external), to Turkey, and to the United States. [They are interested in] how the genocide is taught in schools, what kind of nationalist out-bursts happen in the republic, and how the nationalities is-sue is being resolved, and how the authorities treat the socalled dissidents, etc.

It is not hard to notice where the enemy is aiming—this is not just an expression of idle interest! The enemy is trying to weaken, and if possible to undermine, the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union—the basis of our power.

In our republic, to some extent, the acts of ideological subversion, which are conducted now within the framework of the campaign for the so-called “defense of human rights” have made their impact. There emerged the so-called “Group of Assistance for the Helsinki Accords” (the group was dis-solved, its leader—Nazaryan—was sentenced to 5 years in prison at the end of 1978). There also emerged an all-Union “leader” of the so-called “Free Labor Unions”—some Oganesyan [in our republic]. As a result of the prophylactic work, he renounced his unbecoming activity.

The actions named above did not bring success to the enemy. They are not that dangerous for our republic. The Dashnak propaganda, and everything that originates in the Armenian foreign colonies is a different issue. The Dashnaks exploit the nationalist feelings of the people, speculate on them. The Armenian KGB constantly takes that fact into account in its work.

Information in the Soviet press and on the radio about the trial and the sentence in the case of the “terrorists” caused sharp indignation against the criminal actions taken by Zatikyan and his accomplices in the entire Soviet Union, in all the strata of population of the republic. The people through-out the republic condemned those actions and approved the sentence of the USSR Supreme Soviet, emphasizing that those criminals have nothing in common with the Armenian people, which owes all its accomplishments, and its very existence in the Soviet state, to the great Russian people.

At the same time, we should not close our eyes to the fact that there are some hostile individuals with anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments, who are nursing thoughts about separating Soviet Armenia from the USSR, express extremist sentiments (read excerpts).

For example, an unidentified person called the USSR KGB in Moscow after Zatikyan and his accomplices’ sentence was carried out, and expressed a threat to “avenge” the sentenced. The KGB of Armenia sees this main task as follows: to prevent and to interdict in a timely manner all extremist and other adversarial expressions on the part of the negative ele-ments.

In this, we are starting from the assumption that in the current conditions, only politically well-prepared Communist members of the security organs can carry out the demanding tasks of ensuring state security, of protecting Soviet society from the subversive actions of the enemy’s special services, from the foreign anti-Soviet centers, and from some hostile individuals inside the country. We believe that no Commu-nist can have any kind of neutral, or passive position in is-sues of ideology.

The issues of ideological and political preparation and internationalist education of the personnel have been and will remain at the center of attention of the Collegium, the Party Committee of the KGB of the republic, and the party organizations of the [KGB] units.

The Armenian KGB works under the direct control of and direction of the CP CC of Armenia, and it constantly feels the assistance and support of the Central Committee and the government of the republic.

Officers of the Armenian KGB assure the CC CP of Arme-nia that they will apply all their skills and power to fulfill the tasks entrusted to them.

Chairman of the Committee for State Security Of the Armenian SSR

M. A. Yuzbashyan
14 March 1979

Downloadable Pdf version will be added here soon


Cold War in the Caucasus: Notes and Documents from a Conference by Svetlana Savranskaya and Vladislav Zubok

A Cold War Odyssey: The Oswald Files By Max Holland

Mongolian Archives By Sergey Radchenko

Todor Zhivkov and the Cold War: Revelations from His Personal Papers

New Central and East European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia Conference Report by Yvette Chin, Gregory Domber, Malgorzata Gnoniska, and Mircea Munteanu