631) IV: The Armenian Numbers Game And Their Use Of Two Sets Of Books: Secrets Of "Christian" Terrorist State Armenia

The Armenian Numbers Game And Their Use Of Two Sets Of Books . .

The new countries of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia could no longer enjoy the economic support they once received from Russia. "Furthermore, each of the nascent republics promptly measured political and economic security in terms of area controlled and thus strove to gain the maximum possible land. Territorial disputes loomed as the greatest impediment to satisfactory relations among the republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan» (l).

Armenia would invade both Georgia and Azerbaijan in its land-grab efforts. In fact, Armenia continues such military invasions of neighbor lands to this day by attacking Azerbaijan a short time after it broke away from the Soviet Union in 1992. The Armenians, with more than a billion dollars in military help from Russia, attacked and captured more than 20 percent of Azerbaijan under the pretext of helping Christians, by removing more than 1 million Muslims and claiming this was their Christian “historic homeland”.

The truth of the matter is, Armenia wanted more land to improve its terrible economy. The Azerbaijan refugees, some 1 million of them, have lived in total poverty in tent cities across Azerbaijan for more than ten years. When the Armenians lived in squalor during World War I, they begged the world for handouts. Today, the Armenian lobby in the United States objects to Americans giving aid to Azerbaijan refugees. Isn’t this odd as well as being unfair? Here, Armenia, who "claims" to be the first Christian nation, doesn’t want the poor people of their neighbor helped after they drove them from their homes. This Isn’t what Christ taught.

Hovannissian recalls that for "more than two thousand years Armenians and Georgians had been neighbors, enjoying an extraordinary record of peaceful association. Christian people, they shared numerous traditions, including related erstwhile dynastic families». The Armenians claimed that their excuse to attack Georgia was because Georgia had made deals with the Germans for protection and that they “had abandoned Armenian to the Turkish hordes” (P 66). This is an odd allegation because neither Armenia nor Georgia was an organized state during the times these events took place.

Hovannissian alleges, "The Armenians claimed a `plurality` in the region that became the Georgian capital» (P 66) On the very next page of his book he provides "Table 1 – Population of the Transcaucasian Provinces in 1916».The source he provides is "United States of America, the national archives, Record Group 256, 867 B/10».

The source used by Hovannissian states the total population of Tiflis was 1,473,000. Of that number, Georgians had a population of 580,000 and Armenians made up a population of 411,000. In other words, there were 169,000 more Georgians in their capital than there were Armenians. The conclusion is that Hovannissian is wrong in claiming an "Armenian plurality in Tiflis" just as he is consistently wrong about issue after issue throughout this four-volume history. Although his work may appease his hard-line nationalist brethren in Armenia, it makes rather poor scholarship.

The same Table 1 reveals more interesting facts: The total population of the Transcaucasian provinces that comprised Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in 1916 was 6,670,000.

These are enlightening numbers regarding a plurality because there were more Muslims in this region than any other single group – 2,503,000 of them. This contrasts to the 1,758,999 Armenians and 1,663,400 Georgians. Other groups made up the remaining population. The reader will recall Hovannissian’s assertion in past chapters of how Armenia demanded "their" people and lands be awarded to Armenia. It is interesting to note a plurality of the people are Muslims and Hovannissian refuses to count them as human beings.

Armenians claim the Muslim Turks murdered 1.5 million of their people in 1915. The numbers don’t add up when examining the U.S. government’s 1916 accounting of 1,758,000 Armenians in this region plus many more than 1 million then living within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, there were hundreds of thousands of Armenians in such places as Syria, Iraq, Iran, and so forth. There were just too many Armenian Christians alive in 1916 to have had 1.5 million of them killed in 1915.

Hovannissian complains that "the Georgian government had sealed the escape routes to refugees fleeing before the Turkish armies. Nearly 80,000 Armenians from Akhalkalak alone had been denied sanctuary. Of this destitute mass, stranded in the rugged Bakussiani highland until the end of the World War, some 30,000 perished» (P 68)

Hovannissian has little to say about the hundreds of thousands of Muslims who fled before the attacking Russian army the Armenians helped and supported.

"The Georgians indignantly refuted every accusation, asserting that a nation could not be blamed for saving itself and that, were the circumstances reversed, the Armenians would have followed the same course. Moreover, the Armenians, having found refuge in Georgia for decades past, were now unscrupulously violating the goodwill of the Georgian people by aspiring to dominate the country» (P 68).

These were exactly the acts of Armenians within the Ottoman borders that caused their removal by the Ottomans when Ottomans attempted to save their country in 1915. Any country at that time would have done the same under the circumstances. The Armenians alleged genocide when they joined the Russians in attempting to overthrow the Ottomans and the Ottomans reacted to defend their country. When the Armenians attempted to do the same thing to Georgia and Georgians reacted to defend their country, Georgians were justified. There is no record of "genocide" allegations by Armenians leveled against Georgia. Same agitation and betrayal by Armenians in two neighboring countries; same reaction to Armenians by both countries, and yet Armenians label one "genocide", the other “justified”.

"Georgia was actually teeming with so many thousands of refugees that her economic welfare was in jeopardy. These people roved in lawless, looting bands, stealing, marauding and spreading contagion. It was incumbent upon the Georgian government to protect its citizenship by sealing the borders” (P 68). There is no logical reason why this statement could not be extended to read that it was incumbent upon the Ottoman government to protect its citizenship by sealing the borders. But that would refute the Armenian allegations of genocide, and it would be the plain truth.

This was a time when the Armenian dictator government leaders coveted land claimed by (1) the Ottomans, (2) Georgia, and (3) Azerbaijan. The Armenians had taken sides against the Ottomans and their people paid a terrible price for it. Now, after the war, Armenian leaders schemed to obtain land from each of its neighbors – for free. When the Nationalist Turkish movement began, the Armenian people again paid a price. The same would happen with Armenian land grabbing attempts from both Georgia and Azerbaijan.

For years Armenian leaders fanned the flames of religious hostility between Christians and Muslims. But the true motive was to take land from someone else – for free. This is nothing more than intolerance of non-Christians and continues to this day as Armenia attacked and took possession of 20 percent of neighboring Azerbaijan claiming to be fighting the cause of Christ by riding the area of more than 1 million Muslims. This is the region of Karabagh. It is worthwhile to examine the Armenians view of this land in 1918. It is also interesting to note Russian statistics for 1916 show that Muslims outnumbered Armenians two to one in the gubernia (P rovince). As a result, the Armenian population in mountains and plains was posed off as an absolute majority.

Hovannissian justifies the sneak attack as follows:

Karabagh formed the eastern most component of the Armenian Plateau and, rising several thousand feet above sea level, contrasted sharply with the Azerbaijani steppe land far below. This mountain fastness, rich in mineral deposits, forests, and alpine pastures and renowned for its honey, beeswax, silk and leather products, provided Armenia a natural frontier and guarded the routes of descent to the Araxes valley and the plain of Ararat. Without Karabagh the physical unity of Armenia would be destroyed and equally important, the major barrier between the Muslims of Azerbaijan and the Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire would be eliminated (P 80)

There wasn’t much of a "kingdom" that disappeared in the eleventh century. The best that can be said of this tiny place, even in the eleventh century, was that it was nothing more than a vassal state. Hovannissian alleges that even after Armenia ceased to exist in the eleventh century a separate `principality carried on the Armenian tradition. He claims that this principality lived on in the mountains as a place where Christians could flee from the Muslims. Hovannissian claims this place was Karabagh, although many historians do not agree with this claim.

During the seventeenth century Karabagh gave rise to the pioneers of the Armenian emancipatory struggle, adventurers who attempted to entice the monarchs of Russia and other European powers to embark on a crusade to liberate the great plateau. The first Russian military contingents appeared in the eighteenth century, and finally at the beginning of the nineteenth century, after a series of devastating Muslim incursions, Karabagh was annexed to the Romanoff Empire... The introduction of Russian rule did not fulfill Armenian aspirations, for Karabagh. Instead of regaining autonomy, was absorbed into a succession of larger administrative units.. (P 81)

Hovannissian does admit that Azerbaijan also had a good claim on these lands.

The Azerbaijani case for Karabagh was not unimpressive. The Armenian arguments needed only to be reversed. Though the Armenians had enjoyed a degree of autonomy in the past, the region had nonetheless been included in the Muslim of Khanates Ganja and Karabagh. During the several centuries before the Russian conquest, the Muslims had prevailed throughout Transcaucasia and, in spite of Russian favoritism to the Christians, still outnumbered each of the Christian people taken separately. In the Elisaretpol gubernia Muslims constituted the majority in seven of the eight uezds and, even in the heart of mountainous Karabagh, Tartars, and Kurds formed a significant minority. The Armenians, the Republic of Azerbaijan charged, stove to carve out of Elisavetpol only those districts that were suitable to their political ends, but in doing so they threatened the geographic, economic, and political unity of the region. The addition of pockets of Christian concentrations to Armenia in this manner would be unjust, illogical, and deleterious to the welfare of all concerned.

For Azerbaijan, the steppes and mountains of Elisavetpol were not contrasting entities; on the contrary, they were the complementary components of a single unit, fitting perfectly into the Muslim pastoral economy. If hills and steppes were separated, countless Muslim herdsmen, deprived of summer partners, would face certain ruin…Azerbaijan believed that Karabagh was strategically as vital to her as it was to Armenia. It was a towering natural frontier, which, under the control of another power, would leave Azerbaijan perpetually vulnerable. That the fact the Elisavetpol guebernian was bound to Azerbaijan was clearly demonstrated by the fact that nearly every primary road led eastward toward Baku, not westward to Erevan. The Armenians of Karabagh depended on Baku for a large share of their supplies, and thousands of them were either seasonal laborers or permanent employees in the oil fields and offices of that rapidly expanding metropolis on the Caspian Sea (P 82)

Hovannissian admits that as World War I came to a close, there was "interracial" warfare taking place in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. The actual facts are that the Armenians started this interracial war. However, as soon as the Turkish army withdrew from the region, the Armenians made an all-out attempt to take control of the mountains.

"The Uezd of Zangezur an area of 2,744 square miles... formed the strategic passage way between eastern Transcaucasia and the Yerevan gubernia. Zangegyur, like Karabagh, was inhabited by a mixed population, made up in 1916 of 101,000 Armenians and 120,000 Muslims» (P 86).

Armenia dared not attempt to send troops into this region in the spring of 1918 because Turkish forces were stationed only a few miles from their capital city. However, Armenian "Christian" agents were sent into this region to stir strife. As a result, interracial warfare began in Zangezur.

The underlying current that ran swiftly throughout the Armenian government was simply this basic fact of life: Whatever the cost, whatever the price to be paid with individual lives of both Armenian Christian and Azerbaijani Muslims, “Armenia could not allow Azerbaijan and Turkey to share a common frontier” (P 92).

The Armenian dictator leadership thought it terrible for two Islamic nations to share a common border. The Armenians, then, as now, had a phobia against non-Christians regardless of how well Christians and Muslims had lived together in peace for some five hundred years. These new Armenian dictator warlords sacrificed their own people in their attempt, by force of arms, to establish a tiny country that would never be able to sustain itself without gifts, aid, and help from the United States and other Christian nations throughout the world.

Since 1918 until today, the two major exports of Armenia have been its own people fleeing the "historic state" and terrorism. Since 1918 the number one import of Armenia has been, and continues to be, foreign aid from other nations.