658) XVI: Armenians Lose Sneak Attack On Azerbaijan Land-Grab Attempt Fails : Secrets Of "Christian" Terrorist State Armenia

. . Relations between Armenia and its neighbors, Georgia and Azerbaijan, remained tense for the simple reason that the Armenian bandit leaders were trying every trick they could think of to gobble up their neighbors` lands. Hovannissian, in true Armenian fashion, blames the situation on the Allies. Armenians just have to blame someone else for their own bad behavior. Listen to his excuse for the Armenian leaders` evil actions: "…The failure of the peace conference to regulate the mutual frontiers of the three states strengthened the hand of militants, who insisted that armed force was the only way to bring about the submission of minority elements and firmly incorporate disputed territories” (l).

The only ones creating disputes over territories were the Armenians themselves. It was, after all, the Armenian bandits who continued to want more and more of other people’s lands. All the Armenian leaders had to do was sit down with their neighbors and talk about the disputes, real or imagined, but they never did. Peaceful discussion was not the Armenian way to resolve conflicts, because it was the Armenians who demanded total submission of minorities, such as Muslims, and it was the Armenians who used armed force to "firmly incorporate disputed territories». In plain words, it was the Armenians who coveted their neighbor’s land and launched unprovoked attacks to take what they wanted.

Consider this wild scheme proposed by the Armenian leaders:

Deep friction did exist regarding minority rights in Georgia. Whereas there was virtually no Georgian minority in Armenia, more than 400,000 Armenians lived in territories claimed and controlled by Georgia. The Armenian National Council of Georgia put forward a plan of national cultural autonomy and called upon the Menshevik-dominated government to show that its commitment to democratic, egalitarian principles and cultural freedom extended beyond profuse lip service. Both socialist and right-wing Georgian newspapers scoffed at the Armenian plan, however, labeling it an attempt to create a state within a state (P 114).

Needless to say, the Armenian leaders would never allow such a concept for minorities living inside their territories, because they had lots of Muslims and they certainly would never be given basic rights of any kind, much less “cultural freedom”. Examine how Hovannissian insults Georgia by saying "the Menshevik-dominated government». The Menshevik government had been duly elected in a fair election. What does Hovannissian mean by this slap in the face of Georgians in his so-called history? The Armenians could not say they had conducted fair and open elections. Most political parties in Armenia refused to take part in the dictator’s corrupt and crooked election attempt they claimed established their democratic republic.

Then there was Azerbaijan: The relations between Georgia and Armenia were a cakewalk compared to the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Hovannissian explains the relations in this fashion:

The Amelioration in Armeno-Georgian relations had no counterpart in the agonizing disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In its struggle to attain national independence, Azerbaijan had important potential advantages. The Azerbaijanis, or Azeri Turks (commonly know as Tartars) were the most numerous element in the Caucasus and controlled more territory than any other people. Azerbaijan had inherited the fathomless oil reserves and the petroleum industry of Baku and the Apheron peninsula, as well as the lucrative shipping facilities on the Caspian Sea. The Azerbaijani government had managed to overcome the stigma of its Turkish birth to win the sympathy of influential British military and political officials. In the bitter contest over the highlands of the Elisavetpol province (gubernia), it had registered a major victory by establishing provisional jurisdiction over Mountainous Karabagh (P 116).

Note also how he states Azerbaijan "in the bitter contest over the highlands of the Elisavetpol province (gubernia... had registered a major victory by establishing provisional jurisdiction over Mountainous Karabagh». The truth was, the only road at the time to carry supplies to mountainous Karabagh was from Baku in Azerbaijan. This basic fact apparently escaped the notice of Hovannissian as to just why it was that Azerbaijan had the "jurisdiction" of this region in the first place. A basic supply route within a neighboring country’s sovereignty had nothing to do with how the Armenian leaders coveted and wanted this region. "Bitter contest" is a dishonest way of camouflaging the Armenian expansionist zeal. After all, why would Azerbaijan have any interest in any "contest," much less a bitter one, for a territory already in Azerbaijan?

Armenia, as usual, continued its land-grab attempts by force of arms rather than talks and negotiations. Report after report is given as to Armenian terrorist attacks on scores of defenseless Muslim villages. In just one attack more than ten thousand Muslim villagers had to flee before the marauding Armenian troops (P 122).

The Armenian military activity in the province of Kars aroused a storm of protest. General Karabhekir sent the commander of the 9th Caucasus Division, Lieutenant Colonel Halid across the old boundary to organize the defense of Olti in case of continued Armenian expansion, and he addresses a direct warning to General Nogarbekian about the consequences of Armenian excesses against the peaceful Muslim population. In Tiflis, ZeinalAbdal Zeinclov, a member of the Kars council (shura) that had been dispersed by the British in May 1919, identified himself as the representative of the Muslims of Kars and issued frequent press releases with details of the Armenian excesses and appeals for help received from the population ofChilder, Azhlaba, Zarushat, and Shuragil. Zeinalov petitioned the Allied representatives, particularly British Chief Commissioner Oliver Wardrop for immediate measures to end the atrocities. The Dashnakist leaders of Armenia, Zeinalov declared, had launched a horrendous campaign to extirpate the Muslim population in Yerevan and Kars in order to resettle Armenian exiles from Turkey. Scores of villages had been destroyed during the proceeding year, and thousands of homeless people had been forced to flee. How long, Zeinalov asked, would world powers stand silent witness to the brutal Dashnakist methods of creating "Greater Armenia» (P 123).

The Allies investigated and concluded, that some "dirty work was taking place in Kars» (P l 23) These self-styled Christians were getting rid of Muslims, so the terror campaign was okay in their minds. The same is true today of the horrible terror campaign Armenians are waging to take 20 percent of Azerbaijan and rid the area of more than 1 million Muslims.

Jesus had something to say about such people, didn’t he?

"Beware of false prophets who come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravenous wolves.

"You will know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes from thorn bushes or figs from thistles? Even so, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit. A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. Therefore by their fruits you will know them. Not everyone who says to Me, `Lord, Lord`, will enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of My Father who is in heaven. Many will say to Me in that day, `Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in your name, cast out demons in your name, and done many wonderful works in your name?` And then I will declare to them, `I never knew you; de-pan from Me, you who practice lawlessness» (Matthew 7:15-23)

Christians have to ask themselves if the attacking of defenseless Muslim villages counts as the Lord’s work. Would any Christian want to stand in the "Christian" Armenian leaders` shoes before Christ on judgment day? Consider this revelation by Hovannissian: "The difficulties of the Muslim population focused attention on the role of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or Dashnaksutiun. In European, especially British, diplomatic circles there was intense distrust of the party, which had a history of clandestine operations and political violence. It has managed to push aside moderate and conservative elements.... The fact that the Dashnaksutiun had now become a legal organization and headed the Armenian government did little to improve its image» (P 125).

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation was controlled by nothing more than a gang of thugs who used fraud and violence to obtain and remain in power. It is no wonder European governments, after coming to know them and how they operated, didn’t trust the Armenian leaders.++

One British official reported "that Dashnakist policy had always been to foment unrest between Armenians and Muslims with the object of gaining foreign sympathy and intercession and that the responsibility for the present friction rests primarily at the door of the party» (P 126)

Another British official said, "Apparently it was the Armenians, particularly the Dashnakists, who often disturbed the peace.... Wardrop had confirmed that the Armenians were responsible for most acts of aggression since the beginning of the year; Dro, Hamogasp, and Gialkhamdanian had been directing armed bands against Tatar (Azerbaijani) villages from Zangezur to Kars» (P 128)

Hovannissian writes that "the struggle for Mountainous Karabagh reached tragic proportions during the first quarter of 1920...» (P 131)

Armenia had signed a treaty stating this was to be a part of Azerbaijan. As usual, the Armenian bandits` word was not good and they attempted to take these lands by force of arms. Even Hovannissian admits many Armenians in Karabagh wanted to remain with Azerbaijan. "Most Bolsheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and Populists, together with the merchant and professional classes, admitted that the district was linked economically with eastern Transcaucasia and sought accommodation with the Azerbaijani government as the only way to spare mountainous Karabagh from ruin» (P 133)

The Armenians couldn’t care less if Karabagh was destroyed. It was power and free land they coveted and they were prepared to invade the region just to get their way.

The Armenians prepared to take Karabagh by force of arms.

In Erevan, Dro reported that the preparations for self-defense in Karabagh were still weak and needed to be put on firmer footing. Nonetheless, in a memorandum of February 15 he emphasized the importance of taking control of Karabagh in order to emancipate the quarter of a million Armenians living in the mountainous sections of the former Elisavetpol Gubernia, to prevent Azerbaijan from joining up with Turkey, and to secure for Armenia a strategic, defensible boundary on the Eastern ruin of the Armenian plateau. At the same time, commander in chief Nakachakian wrote that `from a purely strategic point of view the attachment of Karabagh is of great benefit, securing Zangezar from the north and, by taking the Ordubad district, safe guarding Zangezar from the direction ofNekhichevan.` Shave-Nakhichevan, he continued, would thereby became isolated from Azerbaijan, facilitating the reannexation of these districts (P 1 41)

Defense. Protection from attack. No, it Isn’t. This is military adventurism pure and simple. "Armenians activists continued to train in the countryside» (P 142)

"…The Armenian revolt in Karabagh had begun. On March 21, Mikayelian, Mesian, and Dali Ghazer met in the village of Dashushen, where they set the time of the rising for 3 o`clock in the morning on March 23. The decision was closely guarded. When the district liaisons met with Mikayelian at Sawsheu on the evening of March 22, they were not told of the impending action. It was only several hours later that they and the unit commanders were ordered to mobilize and seize their objectives at the assigned time» (P 150)

This is the definition of Armenian self-defense – attack your neighbor with an unprovoked attack for the purpose of gobbling up their lands. "Despite the precision and success along the perimeters of Karabagh, the rising faltered because of weakness and confusion at the center» (P 1 51)

Hovannissian calls this a "rising" in Karabagh. How can this be a "rising" when it was planned and executed by the Armenian leaders from their capital? This was "aggression" not a "rising».

"As anticipated, the Azerbaijani solders were taken by surprise and started surrendering; then Alexan Dayi suddenly opened fire, spurring them to run for their rifles. Alexan’s critical mistake cost him and Layayan their lives and threw the Armenian partisans into disarray. Enveloped in fog, attackers and defenders were unable to tell each other apart. The Armenians soon withdrew northward toward Khnadsakh (in

Khachen), leaving the field guns and ammunition depot in Azerbaijani hands» (P 151)

Leave it to the Armenians to lose even a surprise attack. It is little wonder the Allies had neither respect for nor confidence in Armenian troops. This was some "defense" by the Armenian bandits. "The heart of Mountainous Karabagh was gouged out in swift revenge for a scheme conceived in the Armenian republic» (P 152) Now a second neighbor had very good reason not to trust Armenia. "The Azerbaijani reaction to the Armenian rising was one of outrage. The Baku press called for a national campaign to liquidate `the treacherous adventure.` Mass meetings were held in many cities to denounce the invidious revolt and to enlist hundreds of volunteers for a holy war. A Musavat Party rally on March 30 deplored the fact that, despite all the rights and privileges enjoyed by Armenians in Azerbaijan, the Yerevan government had sponsored this vile attack upon the body of the Azerbaijani republic, necessitating forceful countermeasures» (P 153)

The Azerbaijani Parliament passed a resolution on April 1 that stated:

Having heard the explanations of the Government in regard to the treacherous attack upon our askers [soldiers] in Karabagh and the disorders threatening our freedom and independence, the Parliament demands from the government immediate and decisive squelching of the revolt and the quick undertaking of effective measures for preventing any kind of criminal activity by the forces that are connected with the disorder: In his protests to the Allied representatives, Foreign Minister Khan Khoiskii denied any excesses against the Armenians and asserted that it was the Armenians, led by a handful of bandits, who had organized the treachery on the first night of Novruz Bairam. In these critical days, Khan Khoiskii concluded, Azerbaijan needed internal tranquility and was therefore compelled to take measures to defend the country (P 1 5 4)

What nation wouldn’t respond to the calls for self-defense of its lands and people? Karabagh was legally a part of Azerbaijan. Even Armenia had signed a treaty only a year before stating this fact. Now, bandit Armenians attempted to gobble up free land and lost.

The Armenian word just wasn’t good. Hovannissian writes of the excuses and finger-pointing that was done by the Armenian leaders to explain away their defeat:

In Erevan, too, there was no lack of speeches, resolutions, and protests. The press reviewed the history of the broken promises in Karabagh, the responsibility of the British command in 1919, the violations of the August agreement, the sinister activities of the Young Turk fugitive generals in Azerbaijan, the illegal disarming and rampant looting an killing of Armenian peasants and travelers, and the iniquitous scheme to put an end to Armenian Karabagh. Only in desperation had the peasantry of Karabagh been driven to take arms in defense of their life and honor (P 1 54)

Think back just a few pages wherein the Armenian professionals and business community asked to remain a part of Azerbaijan for the simple reason, that this is where they received their supplies and food. The only road led to Baku, not Erevan. Here, as usual, when they were in a jam, the Armenian leaders began spinning tales that had no basis in fact.

The Armenian bandits were not ready to give up their greedy effort to obtain Azerbaijani Karabagh. They sent their infamous General Dro to again attack Karabagh. "In his initial circular, General Dro declared that he had entered Karabagh at a time when many villages lay in ruin and enemy rifles and bayonets were pointed at the people. Azerbaijan had demonstrated that it had adopted the Turkish goals of seizing Karabagh, crushing Zangezur, and destroying the Armenia republic. In the past, Karabagh had given dedicated heroes in the Armenian emancipatory movement and in the service of the Russian army.

Now, all Armenians would stand against those who wanted to deprive Karabagh of its freedom» (P 158)

The battles continued with the bandit Armenians not making gains; on April 18 a cease-fire agreement was signed. The Armenians began to wring their hands and cry out how "Karabagh was in flames from Askeran to Shushi, and the Azerbaijanis wanted to finish with the Karabagh Armenians before putting the cessation of hostilities on the conference agenda» (P 162) Armenian bandit leaders proclaimed the allied representatives "...were of no help. Colonel William Haskell, the Allied commander for relief in Armenia, had washed his hands of Caucasian affairs and was annoyed with the Armenian government...» (P 16 7)

Is it any wonder this American military officer would be "annoyed" with this gang of thugs?

While talks of peace were going on, a new player entered the game. "...The entry of the Red Army into Baku cast Transcaucasian disputes into an entirely different light. The coup d`etat in Azerbaijan was to have a far-reaching impact on the fate of the territories history contested by Armenia and Azerbaijan.`"(P 172)

Hovannissian writes that the Red Army’s invasion of Azerbaijan "not only ended the independence of the country, but also decisively affected the fate of Karabagh, where General Dro also was poised for an offensive to dislodge the Azerbaijani garrisons from Shushi to Askeran» (P l 73) This is the same General Dro whose claim to fame was sneak attacks on unarmed Muslim villages.

Consider the following Armenian thinking:

The interminable Armeno-Azerbaijani conflict and the vulnerability of the large Christian minority in Azerbaijan caused many Armenians to favor the return of Russian rule to eastern Transcaucasia. The Armenian government intentionally remained aloof from Azerbaijani proposals for confederation in the hope that Russia eventually would reabsorb Baku, with its great petroleum industry and reserves, yet allow the former Russian Armenian provinces to become pan of a united, independent Armenian state. Hence, it was without much regret that Armenian politicians anticipated the Sovietization of Azerbaijan.(P 1 73-174)

This certainly shows that the Armenian leaders were slow learners because they had joined up with the Russians several times in the past in an attempt to overthrow the Ottoman Empire. Each time Armenians thought the Russians would give them land and allow them to be independent country. Each time the Russian intent was to grab Ottoman lands for itself. The Armenians were disappointed time and again and within a few months would be disappointed once again when the Russians would walk in and take over their country without firing a shot.

Any hopes the Armenians might still have held regarding the disposition of Soviet Azerbaijan were dispelled by an ultimatum on April 30: "the worker-peasant government of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic, through its Revolutionary Committee, demands that first, you clear your forces from the territory of Karabagh and Zenzegar, second, withdraw to your boundaries, third cease the inter ethnic massacre. In the contrary event, the Azerbaijani Socialist Soviet Republics Revolutionary Committee will regard itself in a state of war with the Republic of Armenia. Three days are given for an answer to the ultimatum» (P 186)

Even the Russians knew of the widespread Armenian Muslim "massacres" and demanded that such conduct end. As usual, the Armenians bandits tried to talk their way out of the Russian demands. It didn’t work.

"Armenia now faced a crisis and had to act with prudence. Though it was always desirable that a people should be the master of its own destiny, not all had enough power to attain that goal. It was senseless to do battle with the entire world in defense of an idea that could not be achieved. Reality had to be accommodated, which in the case of Armenia meant adaptation to Soviet power» (P 190)

Red Army units began moving up the Baku-Tiflis railroad toward mountainous Karabagh. The stated purpose of this military movement as stated by Hovannissian was "to end the mutual massacres of Armenians and Muslims» (P 195)

The Armenian leaders had directed the sneak attack and invasion of Azerbaijan. Certainly both sides had been guilty of massacres and now the Soviet Army would put an end to the matter. However, Armenia has never acknowledged its bad acts until this day including another sneak attack on Azerbaijan’s Karabagh region in 1992. This time the Armenian thugs were more successful than they were in 1920. In 1992 they had the support of the Russians and more than 1 billion dollars` worth of Russian military supplies and equipment. In addition, the U.S. government has given Armenia more than 1.4 billion dollars in aid – all to help this gang of thugs take 20 percent of Azerbaijan and remove more than a million Muslims, who continue to this day to live in horrible conditions in refugee camps.

The Soviet Army commander "telegraphed Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin that the Red Army would be able to occupy not only Karabagh but also the Oeduhad Nakhichevan-Julfa area without encountering serious Armenian resistance. The Muslims had burned much of Shushi and the Armenian villages in the plain of Karabagh, whereas the Armenians had done the same to the Muslim villages in Zangezur. Hence, both sides were well disposed to accept the introduction of the Red Army» (P 198)

Whereas the Armenian bandits welcomed the Russians, the Georgians "bristled with rage» (P 201] However outraged the Georgians were, there was nothing they could do to prevent the Red Army from moving up to its boundary. Whereas the Armenians looked away during the Red Army’s advance, hoping the Russians would allow them to continue as the dictatorial Armenian state, the Georgians knew better. Time has shown that the Georgians were right, because not much later, the Russians would take both Georgia and Armenia .