This is truly an invaluable source... coming from such a high Armenian official, contradicting many of the manipulated Armenian claims that are now widely accepted as the truth.
Followed by "A Neighbor's Thoughts on a Katchaznouni Act "
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do any more.
The Manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni, First Prime Minister of the Independant Armenian Republic
Translated from the Original by Matthew A. Callender
Edited by John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian)
Published by the
Armenian Information Service
Suite 7D, 471 Park Ave.
New York 22
1955
***
This is a summary of an important book, entitled « The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Any More ». The author is Hovhannes Katchaznouni (1), the first Prime Minister of the independent Armenian Republic. It is actually a manifesto which he had presented to the Convention of foreign branches of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation convened in April 1923 in Bucharest, Romania. Convinced that the questions raised there would be subject to serious consideration of, not only the members of the Dashnag (Dashnak) Party, but also of other Armenians as well, Hovhannes Katchaznouni thought it was his duty to have the manifesto published and thereby made public property.
The Armenian version of the book was published in Vienna by the Mihitarian Press in the year 1923. The English version appeared in New York in 1955 through the Armenian Information Service. It was translated from the original by Matthew A Callender and edited by John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian).
One small detail worthy of remark is the fact that it is rather difficult, even impossible, to find it nowadays in the libraries of the world. On account of what the former Prime Minister says of the Dashnag experience, it is quite possible that certain Armenian circles prefer it to be dropped from the list of acquisitions of libraries. In some libraries it appears in the card catalogues, but cannot be found in the stacks.
In his « Introduction » to the English version, the editor states that « historical truth cannot be subverted forever » and that « however hard Dashnag propagandists may try to twist and bury the truth and glorify the failure of their Independent Armenian Republic, truth must eventually prevail. » He rightfully presents the author as « a pillar of the Dashnagtzoutiun.» He adds that « few were in a position to know more, nor to express themselves with greater clarity, logic and foresight than Hovhannes Katchaznouni. » (p. 3)
The English version is a condensation of Katchaznouni’s parting words to the Dashnags. The first seven-and-a-half pages are « translated verbatim », but from there on, the text is only « excerpts of his arguments. » (p. 8) Apparently, the Armenian version is the complete text. As well expressed by the editor, « Katchaznouni’s work is a basic source of Dashnag history. » (p. 3) Therefore, this booklet will mainly quote or restate the arguments of the author and thus make available to the reader a publication now difficult to find.
* * *
During its two-and-a-half years of existence, the independent Armenian Republic had four prime ministers and seven cabinets. Hovhannes Katchaznouni was the Premier of the First Cabinet, in which A. Manoogian served as the Minister of the Interior, A. Khatissian the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Hakhverdian the Minister of War and K. Gardjigian the Minister of Finance.
Katchaznouni had given « deliberate and serious consideration » (p. 4) to the matters that he discussed at the Convention. He asked the party members to « approach the matters with an open mind. » In an attempt to give a concise commentary from the beginning of the First World War to the Lausanne Conference, he formulated the initial attitude of the Armenian bands in the following words :
« At the beginning of the Fall of 1914 when Turkey had not yet entered the war but had already been making preparations, Armenian revolutionary bands began to be formed in Transcaucasia with great enthusiasm and, with especially, much uproar. Contrary to the decision taken during their general meeting at Erzurum only a few weeks before, the A.R.F. had [actively participated] in the formation of the bands and their future military action against Turkey.
« In an undertaking of such gravity, fraught with most serious consequences, individual agents of the Transcaucasian A.R.F. acted against the wiIl of our superior authority, against the will of the General Meeting of the Party... In the Fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain… from organizing and… fighting. This was (in) [sic.] an inevitable result of a psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation : that mentality should have found its expression, and did so. » (p. 5)
...The Armenians had embraced Russia whole heartedly...
Katchaznouni believes that « the formation of bands was wrong » and that the Armenians had participated in that movement to the greatest extent « contrary to the decision and the will of the General Meeting of the Party. » He wrote that the Armenians « had embraced Russia whole heartedly without any compunction. » (p. 6) He declares :
« We had created a dense atmosphere of illusion in our minds. We had implanted our own desires into the minds of others ; we had lost our sense of reality and were carried away with our dreams… Attention was called to some kind of a letter by Vorontzov-Dashkov to the Catholicos... with... generalities which might be interpreted in any manner... »
Katchaznouni says that they had « overestimated the ability of the Armenian people. » This is, of course, in the sense of « political and military power... the extent and importance of the services [the Armenians] rendered to the Russians. » He adds : « And by overestimating our very modest worth and merit we were naturally exaggerating our hopes and expectations. » He admits that the cause of the Dashnags was « an incidental and trivial phase for the Russians. » (p. 7) They had drawn such conclusions as though the Armenian issue was « the center of gravity of the Great War, its cause and purpose. » He declares : « When the Russians were advancing, we used to say from the depths of our subconscious mind that they were coming to save us. »
Katchaznouni also asserts, however, that one of the main aspects of what he calls Armenian « national psychology... [is] to seek external causes for [Armenian ] misfortune. » He says : « One might think we found a spiritual consolation in the conviction that the Russians behaved villainously towards us (later it would be the turn of the French, the Americans, the British, the Georgians, Bolsheviks — the whole world — to be so blamed.) » (p. 8)
The territory of the Armenian Republic was formerly a part of one of the outlying provinces of the Tsarist Russian Empire, namely Transcaucasia. Following the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in the Spring of 1917, the then Provisional Government of Kerensky created there a special administrative body called the Commissariat of Transcaucasia. When the Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky government, the Commissariat declared itself on November 28, 1917 to be the supreme authority there. In February 1918, the Seim, or the legislative assembly of Transcaucasia convened in Tiflis, accepted the resignation of the Commissariat and created in its place a temporary government. On April 22, 1918, the Federal Democratic Republic of Transcaucasia was formed. The three principal peoples of Transcaucasia were the Azerbaijanis, the Georgians and the Armenians. The federal republic lasted about five weeks ; on May 26, 1918, it was terminated. Georgia declared its independence the same day, and Azerbaijan and Armenia followed, two days later. The Treaty of Batum was signed on June 4, 1918 between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Republics.
Armenia was based upon a republican form of government. It had a législative branch, consisting of an elected Parliament and an executive branch, which was the Cabinet. It did not have a President, whose powers were exercised in part by the Parliament and in part by the Cabinet. Sovereignty resided in an 80 member Parliament of one house, composed of representatives from the four political parties. Voting was direct and secret, and the elections were based on the system of proportional representation. The Cabinet was composed of eight ministers. The Prime Minister, elected by the Parliament, was at the head of the government. He designated the ministers, but presented them for the approval of the Parliament, to which the Cabinet as a whole was responsible.
Katchaznouni says, in his book, however, that « this was the form. But the reality was otherwise. » (p. 8) In a Memorandum, dated October 28, 1919, to the United States Government, the same Katchaznouni had described the Armenian Republic as a democracy. (2) Later in the book, he concludes :
« ln practice our Party tended to subject to itself, to control, the legislative body and the government. We did not have the courage, nor the ability to declare an open dictatorship...There was no Parliament ; it was an empty form without content The problems of state were being discussed and solved behind closed doors... In reality, there was not even a parliamentary faction, because this latter was under the very strict supervision of the Dashnag Bureau and was obliged to carry out its orders. There was not a government either. This, also, was subject to the Bureau ; it was a kind of executive body for the Bureau in the state. » (pp. 8-9)
The Parliament of the independent Armenian Republic opened on August 1, 1919. It looked like a body composed of the people’s representatives. Katchaznouni writes : « ...It was strange and disheartening that 72 out of 80 members were Dashnags, with only four members from the other parties. There was no opposition party to act as a check... It was not a Parliament, but a caricature of a Parliament. » (p. 9) The Party Bureau had « replaced the Parliament with its own dictatorial rule. »
The fifth Cabinet under A. Khadissian had resigned and the sixth under H. Ohanchanian was formed on the orders of the Bureau. The latter presented the already prepared list of ministers to the Parliament, which was indefinitely recessed. Katchaznouni sums up : « The Armenian Parliament had given a dictatorial government to the Dashnagtzoutiun - to the Bureau. »
The war between the Turks and the Armenians broke out in the Fall of 1920. The crushed Turkey of 1918 was no more. Atatürk’s British biographer writes : « [Mustafa Kemâl’s] foreign policy was based not on expansion but on retraction of frontiers ; his home policy on the foundation of a political system which could survive his own time. It was in this realistic spirit that he regenerated his country, transforming the old sprawling Ottoman Empire into a compact new Turkish Republic. » (3) The Turks formed a representative government in Ankara at the same time the Dashnags were trying to do the same in the Caucasus. The Ankara experiment was a novelty in many ways. The idea of representative government and republic was ever present in Mustafa Kemâl’s mind. As early as the second constitutional régime (1908), he believed in eradicating the Sultanate. Several Turkish memoirs reveal his early statements while on duty in Salonica (his birthplace) and later in Aleppo (Syria), on the dire necessity to establish a republican form of government. (4)
Considering the conditions prevalent at the end of the First World War, an independent Turkish state, based on national sovereignty, seemed to be the only alternative to the newly-dismembered Ottoman Empire. The old capital was occupied, the former members of the Union and Progress had fled and the Sultan was powerless. A new government had to be formed; its task necessitated the active support of the people at large ; and success depended upon the nation’s democratic participation in the struggle. Apart from the theoretical considerations, republicanism seemed the only practical alternative. The new Ankara government was based on the republican régime even before the official proclamation on October 29, 1923.
In the newly-established government in Ankara, there was no higher authority than the Grand National Assembly, any member of which could pose questions and cross-examine, not only the government members, but Mustafa Kemâl himself — even on his tactical military moves. (5) This right of scrunity, this resolute interrogation, this solemn convassing was not mere theory ; discussion and perusal were the order of the day even in the most critical hours. Mustafa Kemâl, as Speaker of the Grand National Assembly and as acting Commander-in-Chief, was replying to questions even on minute details when the roar of enemy artillery could be heard from the assembly hall.
The two parties ... thus closed the doors forever for reparations.
On the war with Turkey , Katchaznouni says :
« The war with us was inevitable... We had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks...We had no information about the real strength of the Turks and relied on ours. This was the fundamental error. We were not afraid of war because we thought we could win... When the skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and confer. We did not do so and defied them. Our army was well fed and well armed and [clothed] but it did not fight. The troops were constantly retreating and deserting their positions; they threw away their arms and dispersed in the villages. Our army was demoralized during the period of internal strife, the inane destruction and the pillage that went [on] without punishment. It was demoralized and tired. The system of roving bands, which was especially encouraged by the Bureau government, was destroying the unity of the military organization... » (pp. 9-10)
In spite of the fact that the Armenians had better material and better support, their armies lost. Although Armenian politicians and writers had, for years, criticized the Ottoman Government for not making military service obligatory for the Armenians, there were no Moslems in the army of the Armenian Republic. (6) And the advancing Turks fought only against the regular soldiers ; they did not carry the battle to the civilian sector. Edward Fox, the American District Commander at Kars, in a telegram, dated October 31, 1920, (7) to Admiral Bristol, the U.S. High Commissioner in Istanbul, wrote that the Americans were continuing their work of looking after the Armenian children as before, that the Turkish soldiers were well-disciplined and that there had not been any massacres. Such missionary and philantropic establishments protected only the children of Armenians, and never the thousands of Turkish children, who had become orphans on account of Armenian massacres of their parents and families. (8)
When on November 2, 1920, the armies of Kâzim Karabekir Pasha reached Gümrü (Alexandropol, now Leninakan), the Bureau-government presented its resignation. Simultaneously, within a few hours of each other, while one Dashnag delegation headed by the retiring Prime Minister was negotiating with the Soviets, another Dashnag delegation led by a former Prime Minister negotiated with the Turks It was decided that those who negotiated should be new men. A government under Simon Vratzian was formed.
Talks with the Turks led to the Treaty of Gümrü (9), signed on December 2, 1920. It states that the Turkish and the Armenian Governments, « for the purpose of putting an end to the hostilities and to find a basis of agreement, have sat down for an examination of the facts. » Kâzim Karabekir Pasha (Commander on the Eastern Front) on behalf of the Turks, and Alexander Khadissian (Prime Minister) on behalf of the Armenians, participated.
The discussions resulted in the following agreement : The state of war between Turkey and the Armenian Republic was to be ended. The frontier between Turkey and Armenia was established. The territories designated for Turkey were to remain as such « by irrefutable historical, ethnic and legal rights. » The two parties agreed to the return of refugees across the old boundaries, with the exception of those who, during the First World War, went over to the enemy’s army and those who crossed occupied territories and participated in massacres. Those claims of the refugees who do not return within one year after the ratification of the Treaty would not be heard. The two parties agreed « to forego their rights to ask for damages. » They had thus closed the doors forever for reparations. The cancellation of damages also included the great expenses of Turkey incurred during two years because of the urgency of the war it had to wage against Armenia. The Erevan Government declared the Treaty of Sèvres null and void. It promised to recall « delegations who have been tools in the hands of the imperialist countries » and to keep away from such men « who are after imperialist aims. » Armenia agreed to consider null and void all treaties signed by the Armenian Republic with any country that related to Turkey or were harmful to Turkish interests.
In the meantime, the Armenian Bolsheviks entered Itchevan and Dilijan. « Was there an understanding between the Bolsheviks and the Turks ? » asks Katchaznouni and replies : « In our ranks that conviction was widespread. I think, however, that it was wrong… The plot of the Bolsheviks was not the reason of our defeat, nor the power of the Turks... but our own [ineptitude] ! Of course the Bolsheviks benefited from our defeat and that was very natural, but it was not essential that they should have come to an understanding with the Turks for that purpose. » (p. 11 )
The day the Vratzian government signed an agreement with the Turks, it resigned and relinquished power to the Bolsheviks. Katchaznouni says :
« The Bolsheviks entered Armenia without meeting any resistance. This was the decision of our Party. There were two reasons for acting this way : first, we could not resist even if we wanted to... ; second, we hoped that the Soviet authorities, backed by Russia, would be able to introduce some order in the state — a thing which we, all alone, had failed to do, and it was very plain already that we would not be able to do. It was our desire to let the Bolsheviks rule the country without any obstruction, to remain loyal to the new government, to cooperate with their useful work. » (p. 11)
The decision was, of course, not unanimous. There were some who opposed the Bolsheviks, « even though defeat was inevitable. » Their number was small and when their proposal was refused, they left the country. There was another minority, a so-called « Leftist Dashnags », whom the Bolsheviks distrusted and discarded. But in a final effort to displace the Soviets, the Dashnags staged on February 18, 1921, a counter-revolt against them. Simon Vratzian, the last Prime Minister, sent the following note, dated March 18, 1921, to Bahaeddin Bey, Turkey’s representative in Erevan :
« Please forward the present request promptly to your high authorities... The Armenian Government requests the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, that... it... give the Armenian army some ammunition... [and] communicate with us, if the Government of the Grand National Assembly finds it possible to send military aid to Armenia, and if able to do so, to what extent and when ?... » (p.24)
The Treaty of Sevres was obsolete even before it was ready for signature.
The Ankara Government did not help the Dashnags, and the Soviets ejected them from Armenian soil in April 1921. Vratzian sought asylum in Iran, where he set out for Europe via Istanbul, finally became a U.S. citizen and died in Beirut. (10)
***
Katchaznouni implores : « What had been our diplomatic activity with the outer world... and what were the results ? » (p. 12). In the Spring of 1919, the Paris Delegation of the Armenian Republic, jointly with the Delegation of Turkish Armenians, presented a Memorandum of Armenian demands to the Peace Conference. According to that memorandum, the frontiers of the Armenian State would include : the Caucasian Republic with enlarged territory, including Kars ; the seven Ottoman provinces in Eastern and Southern Anatolia (namely, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Harput, Sivas, Erzurum and Trabzon) ; and the four sanjaks of Cilicia (Maras, Sis, Cebel-i Bereket and Adana) plus Alexandretta. It is instructive to read Katchaznouni’s evaluation of the Armenian demands in respect to frontiers :
« A vast state was being organized and demanded -a great Armenia from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from the mountains of Karabagh to the Arabian Desert, [From] where did that imperial, amazing demand emanate ?… How did it happen that our Delegation signed [the] ‘from Sea to Sea’ demand ? It was told that they did not demand those fascinating frontiers, the Turkish Armenians (through their National Delegation) would sever their cause from that of the ‘Republic of Ararat’ and will apply to the powers accordingly. Our delegation was also told that America would not accept a mandate over a small Armenia but would accept one over a ‘from Sea to Sea’ Armenia… The Paris Memorandum, of course, thrilled us. A kind of mentality was created according to which the drawing of frontiers on paper actually gave us those territories. To doubt it was a treachery… » (p, 12)
Then followed, in the words of Katchaznouni, « the rude awakening ». The Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920, which could not have been enforced on the Turks, had to be abandoned, Lord Kinross writes that it was « an early product of that ‘circus’ of Allied conferences which… followed the signatures of the Treaty of Versailles. » (11) The Ottoman Empire was broken up into a series of small states and foreign spheres of interest, Turkey was to lose, not only Arab possessions (to which she was already resigned), but also the Greeks were to receive the whole of Thrace, Smyrna and its hinterland as well as eight Aegean islands (the Dodecanese going to Italy). Apart from an independent Armenia, much of Anatolia was partitioned into French and Italian zones of influence. The Turkish Straits being placed under international control, Istanbul had become a mere enclave of European-occupied territory. The hated Capitulations were extended and Turkey’s finances were to be directed by the Allies. Turkey itself was to become an inland state, with a shadow of a sovereignty. The Turkish army was to be a token force under foreign supervision, and even the limited gendarmerie would be officered by foreigners. When the Greeks advanced along the shores of the Sea of Marmara, the enthusiastic British Prime Minister Lloyd George thought that the Turks were beaten and « fleeing with their forces towards Mecca (sic). » When « Ankara » corrected his Foreign Secretary, Lloyd George replied : « Lord Curzon is good enough to admonish me on a triviality. » (12) The British Premier, who was ignorant of basic knowledge in terms of Turkish geography, pretended to be a driving force in the partition of the country.
The Treaty of Sevres was obsolete even before it was ready for signature. The Allied Conferences, with continuous rounds of entertainment, had no way of reinforcing the grant of an independent Armenian state by any form of military action. Nor could any country under a Mandate. When President Wilson announced that he was ready to arbitrate on its frontiers, the « award » had no relation whatsoever to realities. The Treaty of Gümrü, the first international agreement to be contracted by the Ankara Government, restored to Turkey its traditional eastern frontier along the banks of the Rivers Aras and Arpacay. The Bolsheviks, who had defeated Wrangel’s army, entered Erevan, without a shot fired. The Ankara Government and Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921, 13 drawing a line across the map which survives as the boundary between the two neighbours today. This is the frontier that is here to stay. The Treaty of Kars, 14 dated October 13, 1921, ratified generally the provisions of the Moscow Treaty. Repeating the territorial clauses regarding the Northeastern boundary of Turkey, it reaffirmed the establishment of the Nakhichevan under the sovereignty of Azerbaijan. Appendix 1 of the Treaty of Kars describes the boundary line between Soviet Georgia, Soviet Armenia, Nakhichevan and Turkey. On December 30, 1922, all three Transcaucasian Soviet Republics merged into the Soviet Union.
Had the Bolsheviks delayed their arrival, we ourselves would have asked them to come
What were the reactions of some Armenians to these inevitable developments ? Katchaznouni writes : «... There were the usual complaints that the powers were unfair, did not appreciate us and did not compensate us according to what we deserved. » (p. 13) It is common knowledge that the Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923, replaced the Treaty of Sevres. While the French signed with the Ankara Government an agreement on October 20, 1921 (which amounted to something like a separate peace between Turkey and France) and the U.S. Senate turned down a Mandate (whose frontiers drawn by President Wilson had not satisfied the Armenians), Chicherin (according to Katchaznouni) « offered in the name of [the] Soviet Russia to locate the Armenians of Turkey in [the] Crimea, on the shores of [the] Volga [and] in Siberia. » (p. 13)
Katchaznouni enquires at this point « Was the arrival of the Bolsheviks a calamity for our country ? » He retorts : « The Bolsheviks are necessary in Armenia... There is no other force that could take their place. This is the truth. » (p. 14) He adds :
« We had exhausted all our resources, had come to an impasse as government and as Party in the Fall of 1920. Had the Bolsheviks delayed their arrival, we ourselves would have asked them to come... »
* * *
Katchaznouni concludes that the « European cities are full of emigrant malcontents of all kinds who publish newspapers, write books, call protest meetings... » He ends his book, saying : « It is here that I shall state the very grave word, which I know will embarrass you but which must be said at last and said simply, without concealment or attenuation : « The Armenian Revolutionary Federation has nothing to do any more. » He proposed « dissolution of the party », having nothing else to do anymore « neither at the present time, nor in the future » (p. 16). After a trip to the United States of America, Katchaznouni himself returned to Armenia and spent his last years there.
Kamuran Gürün adds in THE ARMENIAN FILE, regarding Katchaznouni's book: "It is known that this book, which was published in Armenia in 1923 by the Mekhitarian Printing Press in Vienna, was translated into English. Its record has been found in investigations made in the national libraries of various countries, but it has been determined that both the English and Armenian versions of the book had been checked out and not returned..."
The Armenian Diaspora hard at work, always attempting to obscure the truth.
(1) - Also spelled as Hovanness Kadjaznouni.
(2) - « A Memorandum on the Recognition of the Government of the Independent Republic of Armenia », The Armenian Review, Boston. Vol. XXI. No 2-82 (Summer 1968), pp-10 11.
(3) - Lord Kinross Ataturk : the Rebirth of a Nation, Nicosia. Rustem, 1981, p. xvii.
(4) - Anil Cecen Ataturk ve Cumhuriyet, Ankara, Türkiye Is Bankasi. 1981.
(5) - Seref Gözübüyük and Zekâi Sezgin, 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Görüsmeleri, Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1957.
(6) - The Armenian Review, op. cit., p 11.
(7) - Kâzim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz, Istanbul, Türkiye Yayinevi, 1960, pp. 897-898.
(8) - Ibid. pp. 914-915;
(9) - T.C. Kültür Bakanligi, Atatürk‘ün Milli Dis Politikasi. 1919- 1923, Vol I, Ankara, Eroglu Matbaacilik, 1981, pp. 517-528.
(10) - Richard G. Hovannisian. « Simon Vratzian and Armenian Nationalism », The Armenian Review, Boston. Vol. XXIII, No.1-89 (Spring 1970), pp. 3-35.
(11) - Kinross, op. cit., p. 231.
(12) - Ibid., p 234.
(13) - Atatürk’ün Milli Dis Politikasi, op. cit., pp 536-554.
(14) - Ibid., pp 555-579.
A Neighbor's Thoughts on a Katchaznouni Act
"...On December 17, 1918...when the 'Armenian invasion' was well under way. Premier Noizhordonia of Georgia spoke to his people: 'There has taken place that which should not have taken place. Regretfully, Armenia had incited rebellion and then had brought up her regular army. The present Armenian government, in instigating this shameful conflict, has precipitated that which has never before occurred — war between Georgia and Armenia: Who had ever heard of war over a few incidents in a village or two? The real explanation could be found in the character of Kachaznuni's government, which, like the wolf, eats the calf because such is its nature. That government could not live in peace and was obsessed with battling one or another of its neighbors, for like the wolf, it had to devour everything. Should not the Armenians have realized that, in view of their hostile relations with the Muslims, they must at least cling to the friendship of (Christian) Georgia? But instead they had now burned this bridge as well...' "
As reported by Professor Richard Hovannisian in his book, The Republic of Armenia, Vol. 1, on Armenian's aggression, when on December 14, 1918, by a surprise and unprovoked attack on its neighbor, Georgia, Armenia attempted a land grab attempt.
An Armenian-written Biography:
Kachaznouni, Hovhannes (Roupen) (1868-1938)
Born in Akhaltskha (Georgia), Kachaznouni was an architect in Baku, where he joined the ARF. He was a member of the Armenian National Council in 1917. A Dashnaktsakan deputy in the Transcaucasian Sefm (parliament) until 1918, he was a member of the delegations in Trebizond and Batum for peace talks with the Turks. Minister of Social Affairs in Chkhengeli's Transcaucasian government, he became the first Prime Minister of independent Armenia (July 1918 to August 1919). Arrested by the Bolsheviks after Sovietization, he was saved by the February 1921 uprising. However, in Bucharest in 1923, he published a pamphlet expressing a change of heart: "Dashnaktsutiun no longer has anything to do". He then returned to Soviet Armenia, retired from political life and worked as an architect. He died in 1938, probably a victim of Stalin's purges.
From legaman.com, which deals with A.R.F. (Dashnak) history. Go there and learn about how the poor, innocent Armenians engaged in "self-defense." Oh.
And what's that about a "change of heart"?
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© Holdwater
tallarmeniantale.com/1923Manifesto-Hovhannes.htm
www.tallarmeniantale.com/1923Manifesto-record.htm
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Tall Armenian Tale is a site that has much to do regarding Armenia, and the genocide that is found so captivating by Armenians. This is known as the Armenian genocide. It involves massacre (or massacres), deportation, atrocities, and is a kind of holocaust. Turkey is not quick to embrace this view. During the days of the Ottoman Empire, in the region known as Anatolia, and before Ataturk came to power, the Young Turks ruled the land. In the curriculum of many schools, you won't learn much about this. What you might learn is that they were responsible for Armenian massacres, generally in the year 1915. The Near East Relief was there to help out, particularly after the Armenian deportations came into full force. This was during the years of World War One, but these events continued after World War I. Was this a genocide? Should the curriculum of schools have genocide studies? And what about human rights..? This Armenian question was one that weighed heavily in plenty of minds. For example, Henry Morgenthau. Man, did he love the Armenians. Perhaps not as much as President Woodrow Wilson, however. They painted Enver Pasha as a villain, but the real evil fellow was Talaat Pasha... so they say. Jemal Pasha didn't get much respect. Admiral Mark Bristol, had other ideas.... particularly after the Treaty of Sevres failed to get ratified, and the Lausanne treaty took its place. Karabakh is another troubled area involving Armenians, better known as Nagorno-Karabakh, where Ethnic Cleansing of Azeris took place within the Occupied Azerbajani Territories. Ararat can be seen from Armenia. Heath Lowry is a professor the Armenians hate, with Justin McCarthy following close behind. However, they love Richard Hovannasian, much more than they do Dennis Papazian... but maybe not as much as Vahakn Dadrian. Bernard Lewis won't win any popularity contests with the Armenians, and they positively hate Sam Weems. Armenians feel much more comfortable with lies and deceit, involving forged documentation by the likes of Aram Andonian, and books like The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, written by Franz Werfel. Forget about books from Erich Feigl, such as The Myth of Terror. Forget even testimony from Armenians like Boghos Nubar, if they don't affirm the Armenian Genocide. They much prefer to cuddle up to Turcophobes like Britain's Lloyd George.
What's below is the complete edition of the 1955 booklet released by the Armenian Information Service, offering a record of Hovhannes Katchaznouni's parting words to the Dashnagtzoutiun, given in the form of an address to the Party congress in 1923 Bucharest. Holdwater's reflections follow.
Hovannes Kachaznouni (as alternately spelled in some Armenian sources) lived from 1868-1938, and was First Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1919.
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing to Do Any More
(The Manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni, First Prime Minister of the Independent Armenian Republic)
Translated from the Original by Matthew A. Callender
Edited by John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian)
Published by the
Armenian Information Service
Suite 7D, 471 Park Ave.
New York 22
1955 Price 75c
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INTRODUCTION
However the propagandist may try, historical truth cannot be subverted forever in a free country. However hard Dashnag propagandists may try to twist and bury the truth, and glorify the failure of their Independent Armenian Republic, truth must eventually prevail. Now, for the first time in English, is a deep and incisive self-study by a competent Dashnag observer.
The author was a pillar of Dashnagtzoutiun. He was the first prime minister of the Republic. He knew every Party secret before, during, and after the founding of the ill-fated Republic. Few were in a position to know more, nor to express themselves with greater clarity, logic and foresight than Hovhannes Katchaznouni.
Unlike most Dashnag leaders who were revolutionists, and reared in the early Russian socialist-revolutionary schools, Katchaznouni was born in Akhaltzkha in the Caucasus, the son of a revered Armenian priest. He was graduated from the Architectural School of the University of Moscow. His notable works include the magnificent Cathedral at Baku, among many others.
This booklet is a condensation of his parting words to Dashnagtzoutiun, given in the form of an address to the Party congress in 1923—words which proved remarkably prophetic, and currently are as true as when they were first spoken.
In reprinting Katchaznouni’s address neither the translator nor the editor are assumed to agree or disagree with his views. Katchaznouni’s work is published at this time as a refutation to the grandiose, exaggerated and even outrageously false claims of the Dashnag leadership today, mouthed by men who for the most part were mere party functionaries during the days of the Republic, but through the years have blown up themselves into intellectual giants, saviors of Armenia, etc.
Katchaznouni’s work is a basic source of Dashnag history, and the Armenian Information Service considers it a privilege to be able to present, for the first time, the writings of this Armenian patriot and prophet to an American audience.
August, 1965 JOHN ROY CARLSON (Arthur A. Derounian)
TO THE READER
This is a manifesto which I am presenting to the Convention of foreign branches of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation convened during this month of April, 1923.
Deeply convinced that all the questions raised here will be subjected to the most serious consideration of not only the members of the Party but also of every single Armenian, I thought it was my duty to have this manifesto published and thereby make it public property.
I am having it printed complete and without any alterations* except the final three or four pages which contain concrete proposals that are reserved to the governing bodies of the Party.
Bucharest, July, 1923
HOVHANNES KATCHAZNOUNI
The first man who led the Republic of Armenia
Comrades:
These matters have had my deliberate and serious consideration. I do not know whether you, too, have arrived at the same conclusions. Allow me to say more: I am afraid that my final conclusion—those very difficult words which I shall here state with all singleness of heart—will cause general embarrassment, perhaps resentment, in the Convention.
I am prepared for that.
I only ask that you believe: a) that it is more difficult for me to write and sign those words than for you to listen to them from my own lips; b) that those words are not the result of thoughtless or petty, transient dispositions or hasty resolve. I beg of you therefore that you be patient and approach the matters with an open mind, unhampered—something which is not easy for men who have lived a Party life and have thought from a Party angle.
Let me now proceed with my subject.
In order to present my conclusions in proper sequence I feel it is necessary for me to refresh your memory with the various phases of the Armenian Cause — from the Great War to the Lausanne Conference [1] — and the role played by the Dashnagtzoutune during that period. So that I may not abuse your attention, I shall curtail my speech and present to you a concise yet accurate commentary.
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* Except for abridgements, made for the sake of brevity by the translator and the editor, Katchaznouni’s utterances appear verbatim.
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At the beginning of the Fall of 1914 when Turkey had not yet entered the war but bad already been making preparations, Armenian revolutionary bands began to be formed in Transcaucasia with great enthusiasm and, especially, with much uproar. Contrary to the decision taken during their general meeting at Erzeroum only a few weeks before, the A.R.F. had active participation in the formation of the bands and their future military action against Turkey.
In an undertaking of such gravity, frought with most serious consequences, individual agents of the Transcaucasian A.R..F. acted against the will of our superior authority, against the will of the General Meeting of the Party. Why? This example urges us to recall that the A.R.F. in Transcaucasia in the past had been a follower rather than an originator of movements that had their inception beyond their control. Thus it was in 1903 (rebellions and demonstrations on the ocassion of the seizure of Church properties); thus it was in the year 1905-1906 (bloody encounters between Tartars and Armenians); and thus it was also during the first big movements of the laboring classes (1903-1906) when the A.R.F. was being led at Baku, Tiflis and Batoum by the policies of foreign socialistic parties.
The same characteristic line of action appears, as we see a little later, in the conduct we pursued afterwards generally.
It would be useless to argue today whether our bands of volunteers should have entered the field or not. Historical events have their irrefutable logic. In the Fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselves from organizing and refrain themselves from fighting. This was in an inevitable result of a psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation: that mentality should have found its expression, and did so.
And it was not the A.R.F. that would stop the movement even if it wished to do so. It was able to utilize the existing conditions, give effect and issue to the accumulated desires, hopes and frenzy, organize the ready forces — it bad that much ability and authority. But to go against the current and push forward its own plan — it was unfit, especially unfit for one particular reason: the A.R..F. is a people’s mass strong in instinct but weak in comprehension.
If the formation of bands was wrong, the root of that error must be sought much further and more deeply. At the present time it is important to register only the evidence that we did participate In that volunteer movement to the largest extent and we did that contrary to the decision and the will of the General Meeting of the Party.
The Winter of 1914 and the Spring of 1915 were the periods of greatest enthusiasm and hope for all the Armenians in the Caucasus, including, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun. We had no doubt the war would end with the complete victory of the Allies; Turkey would be defeated and dismembered, and its Armenian population would at last be liberated.
We had embraced Russia whole-heartedly without any compunction. Without any positive basis of fact we believed that the Tzarist government would grant us a more-or-less broad self-government in the Caucasus and in the Armenian vilayets liberated from Turkey as a reward for our loyalty, our efforts and assistance.
We had created a dense atmosphere of illusion in our minds. We had implanted our own desires into the minds of others; we had lost our sense of reality and were carried away with our dreams. From mouth to mouth, from ear to ear passed mysterious words purported to have been spoken in the palace of the Viceroy; attention was called to some kind of a letter by Vorontzov-Dashkov to the Catholicos as an important document in our hands to use in the presentation of our rights and claims — a cleverly composed letter with very indefinite sentences and generalities which might be interpreted in any manner, according to one’s desire.
We overestimated the ability of the Armenian people, its political and military power, and overestimated the extent and importance of the services our people rendered to the Russians. And by overestimating our very modest worth and merit we were naturally exaggerating our hopes and expectations.
The deportations and mass exiles and massacres which took place during the Summer and Autumn of 1915 were mortal blows to the Armenian Cause. Half of historical Armenia —the same half where the foundations of our independence would be laid according to traditions inherited from the early eighties and as the result of the course adopted by European diplomacy — that half was denuded of Armenians: the Armenian provinces of Turkey were without Armenians. The Turks knew what they were doing and have no reason to regret today. It was the most decisive method of extirpating the Armenian Question from Turkey.
Again, it would be useless to ask today to what extent the participation of volunteers in the war was a contributory cause of the Armenian calamity. No one can claim that the savage persecutions would not have taken place if our behavior on this side of the frontier was different, as no one can claim the contrary, that the persecutions would have been the same even if we had not shown hostility to the Turks. This is a matter about which it is possible to have many different opinions.
The proof is, however — and this is essential — that the struggle begun decades ago against the Turkish government brought about the deportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and the desolation of Turkish Armenia. This was the terrible fact!
Civilized humanity might very well be shaken with rage in the face of this unspeakable crime. Statesmen might utter menacing words against criminal Turkey. “Blue”, “yellow”, “orange” books and papers might be published condemning them. Divine, punishment against the criminals might be invoked in churches by clergymen of all denominations. The press of all countries might be filled with horrible descriptions and details and the testimony of eye-witnesses. . . . Let them say this or that .. . but the work was already done and words would not revive the corpses fallen in the Arabian deserts, rebuild the ruined hearths, repopulate the country now become desolate. The Turks knew what they ought to do and did it.
The second half of 1915 and the entire year of 1916 were periods of hopelessness, desperation and mourning for us. The refugees, all those who had survived the holocaust, were filling Russian provinces by tens and hundreds of thousands. They were famished, naked, sick, horrified and desperate floods of humanity, flooding our villages and cities. They had come to a country which was itself ruined and famished. They piled upon each other, before our own eyes, on our thresholds dying of famine and sickness
And we were unable to save those precious lives. Angered and terrified, we sought the culprits and quickly found them: the deceitful politics of the Russian government. With the politically immature mind peculiar to inconsequential men, we fell from one extreme to another. Just as unfounded was our faith in the Russian government yesterday, our condemnation of them today was equally blind and groundless.
By an extraordinary mental aberration, we, a political party, were forgetting that our Cause was an incidental and trivial phase for the Russians, so trivial that if necessary, they would trample on our corpses without a moment’s hesitation.
I am not saying that we did not know the circumstances. Of course we knew and understood and so we stated when it was necessary to explain the situation. Deep down in our hearts, however, we did not grasp the full meaning of that word-formula; we forgot what we already knew and we drew such conclusions as though our Cause was the center of gravity of the Great War, its cause and its purpose. When the Russians were advancing, we used to say from the depths of our subconscious minds that they were coming to save us; and when they were withdrawing, we said they are retreating so that they allow us to be massacred. . . .
In both cases we misinterpreted the consequence with the purpose and intention. We sought proofs of Russian treachery and of course we found them — exactly as we sought and found proofs of the same Russians’ undeniable benevolence six months before. To complain bitterly about our bad luck and to seek external causes for our misfortune —. that is one of the main aspects of our national psychology from which, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun is not free.
One might think we found a spiritual consolation in the conviction that the Russians behaved villainously towards us (later it would be the turn of the French, the Americans, the British, the Georgians, Bolsheviks — the whole world — to be so blamed). One might think that, because we were so naive and so lacking in foresight, we placed ourselves in such a position and considered it a great virtue to let anyone’ who so desired to betray us, massacre us and let others massacre us.
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TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Up to this point the words of the author have been translated verbatim in order to give an idea of Mr. Katchaznouni’s logical mind and the exposition of the facts that drove him to present his “Manifesto” to his colleagues at the 1923 Convention. From here on, and solely for the sake of brevity, we shall quote excerpts of his arguments which led to his decision as to why the Dashnagtzoutiun, in his opinion, should “decisively end its existence” because “there is no work for the Party.”
THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC
Armenia was a Democratic Republic. It had the proper organs of a democratic-parliamentarian government: a legislative body composed of the people’s representatives and a responsible administration. The Parliament was composed of representatives from the four existing Parties and minorities with the widest true democratic principles. The government received its authority from the legislative body and was responsible to it. This was the form. But the reality was otherwise!
In practice our Party tended to subject to itself, to control, the legislative body and the government. We did not have the courage, nor the ability to declare an open dictatorship, but did not wish to remain within parliamentarian limits either and tried to establish in Armenia the Ittihad [2] system — a party dictatorship disguised as a democracy. An intolerable dualism resulted from it — on the surface the Parliament and the government; behind the scenes, invisible, the Party and its organs.
There was no Parliament; it was an empty form without content. The problems of state were being discussed and solved behind closed doors, in the rooms of the Dashnag faction, and then declared from the rostrum of the Parliament.
In reality, there was not even a parliamentary faction, because this latter was under the very strict supervision of the Dashnag Bureau, and was obliged to carry out its orders. There was not a government either. This, also, was subject to the Bureau; it was a kind of executive body for the Bureau in the state. This was the Bolshevistic system. But what the Bolsheviks are doing openly and consistently, we were attempting to veil under democratic forms.
The Armenian Parliament opened on August 1, 1919. The elections took place in accordance with the democratic procedure — general, equal, direct and secret balloting — but it was strange and disheartening that 72 out of 80 members were Dashnags, with only four members from the other parties. There was no opposition party to act as a check. We Dashnags seemed to be victorious but did not understand that it was not a Parliament but the caricature of a Parliament.
Following the Bolshevik rebellious efforts of May 1920, there was a "coup d’etat" and the A.R.F. Bureau (the so-called “Bureau Government”) replaced the Parliament with its own dictatorial rule. By order of the Bureau the resignation of prime minister A. Khadissian was accepted on May 5, and by order of the Bureau Dr. H. Ohanchanian was ordered to form a new cabinet; the latter presented the already-prepared list of ministers in the same meeting in which he was ordered to form a new cabinet. That was the Bureau itself. Parliament was ordered indefinitely recessed. The Armenian Parliament had given a dictatorial government to the Dashnagtzoutiun —to the Bureau.
This was against the decision of the 9th General Meeting of the A.R.F. and had many disadvantages, but it also had the advantage of coming out in the open in its true form and color.
The Armenian-Turkish war which broke our back began in the Fall of 1920. Would it have been possible to evade it? Probably not. The crushed Turkey of 1918 had recovered during the two years. There came forward patriotic, young officers who formed a new army in Asia Minor. They saw the necessity of attacking in the Northeast, and also in the Southwest against the Greeks which they could not do without first crushing their flank on the Armenian front. One cannot say that the Turks really had such a plan, but it is possible that they did and it was also probable that the war with us was inevitable.
Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact. That we had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks whether we succeeded or not, and we did not do it. We did not do it for the simple reason — no less culpable —that we had no information about the real strength of the Turks and relied on ours. This was the fundamental error. We were not afraid of war because we thought we would win. With the carelessness of inexperienced and ignorant men we did not know what forces Turkey had mustered on our frontiers. When the skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and confer. We did not do so and defied them.
Our army was well fed and well armed and dressed but it did not fight. The troops were constantly retreating and deserting their positions; they threw away their arms and dispersed in the villages.
Our army was demoralized during the period of internal strife, the inane destructions and the pillages that went without punishment. It was demoralized and tired. The system of roving bands, which was especially encouraged by the Bureau-government, was destroying the unity Of the military organization. The instruction of the army, its military spirit, its organization and discipline, and therefore its power for defense had deteriorated to. the last degree, and that was a surprise to the government: the government and the ministers of war did not know their own army. [3]
And then the government made a fatal mistake. Intending to increase the number of troops, it called under arms additional men who were past middle age and tired, overburdened with family and financial burdens. They were made to put on the military uniforms in a great hurry; rifles were put into their hands and instantly sent to the front. These were ready-made deserters which caused additional defections and demoralization in the ranks of the army.
When on November 2 [1920] the victorious armies of KaraBekir had reached Alexandropol, the Bureau-government presented its resignation. It could not stay in power any longer; it was beaten, and on account of its defeat it had been discredited. [4]
Was there an understanding between the Bolsheviks and the Turks? In our ranks that conviction was widespread. I think, however, that it was wrong; at all events there is no positive proof.
Then it became necessary to begin negotiations with the Turks and it became necessary that those who negotiated should be new faces. After a short indecision, the government of Simon Vratzian was formed, composed of Dashnags and social revolutionaries. Dashnag ministers belonged to the “Left” wing of the Party, while he, the prime minister [Vratzian] was known to be a man of the Russian orientation, and the socialist revolutionaries bad personal ties in the Armenian Bolshevik circles. There was a remote hope that in the event the Bolsheviks came to power (a fact we were beginning to understand was inescapable) a government with such a composition would be able to find a common language with the new comers.
The Turks had already occupied Alexandropol. In the meantime the Armenian Bolsheviks at the head of the Red troops entered Itchevan and Dilijan. Was there an understanding between the Bolsheviks and the Turks? In our ranks that conviction was widespread. I think, however, that it was wrong; at all events there is no positive proof. It is probable that the Bolshevik agents (or individuals with Bolshevik leanings) were trying to destroy our Army from the inside, but for that it was not necessary to have an agreement with the Turks.
The plot of the Bolsheviks was not the reason for our defeat, nor the power of the Turks (which was not important at that time), but our own ineptness! Of course the Bolsheviks benefited from our defeat and that was very natural, but it was not essential that they should have come to an understanding with the Turks for that purpose.
On December 1 (or November 30) our delegates signed an agreement with the Turks in Alexandropol [5] which was not much different from the cruel treaty of Batoum. On December 1 that same Vratzian government resigned and relinquished its power to the Bolsheviks.
The Bolsheviks entered Armenia without meeting any resistance. This was the decision of our Party. There were two reasons for acting this way; first, we could not resist it even if we wanted to — we were defeated; second, we hoped that the Soviet authorities, backed by Russia, would he able to introduce some order in the state — a thing which we, all alone, had failed to do, and it was very plain already that we would not be able to do.
It was our desire to let the Bolsheviks rule the country without any obstruction to remain loyal to the new government, to cooperate with their useful work. This decision was not unanimous. There was irreconcilables who did not expect anything good from the Bolsheviks; they demanded opposition and fighting, even though the defeat was inevitable. Small was their number; when the proposal was refused those most in opposition left the country and fled.
There was also another minority, opposed to the first one: this one wanted to approach the Bolsheviks as a party matter and form a political block with them. These were segregated and came to be known as Leftist Dashnags, and made declarations in Bolshevik spirit. They did not succeed. The Bolsheviks with reason distrusted them, and discarded them.
THE PARIS MEMORANDUM
In the meanwhile, what had been our diplomatic activity with the outer world during our liberty as an independent nation — Constantinople, Europe and America — and what were the results? In the Spring of 1919, the Paris Delegation of our Republic presented a Memorandum of our demands to the Peace Conference at Paris jointly with the National Delegation of the Armenians in Turkey. According to that Memorandum the frontiers of the Armenian State would include:
A. The Caucasian Republic with enlarged territory (the entire district of Erevan, the districts of Kars without the northern part Ardahan, the southern section of the Tiflis terirtory, the south-western part of Kantzag);
B. The seven vilayets of Turkish Armenia (Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Harpout, Sivas, Erzeroum and Trebizonde, excluding only the southern section of Diarhekir and the western section of Sivas);
C. The four sanjaks of Cilicia (Marash, Sis, Djebel-Bereket and Adana with Alexandretta).
A vast state was being organized and demanded — a great Armenia from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from the mountains of Karabagh to the Arabian Desert. Where did that imperial, amazing demand emanate? Neither the government of Armenia nor the Dashnagtzoutiun had envisaged such a childish and foolish plan. On the contrary, our Delegation had carried with it from Erevan very moderate demands, commensurate with our very modest ability.
How did it happen that our Delegation signed the “From Sea to Sea” demand? It was told that if they did not demand those fascinating frontiers, the Turkish-Armenians (through their National Delegation) would sever their Cause from that of the “Republic of Ararat” and will apply to the Powers accordingly. Our Delegation was also told that America would not accept a mandate over a small Armenia but would accept one over a “From Sea to Sea” Armenia. Because it would have been dangerous to proceed with the defense of our Cause with two separate bodies, each with a contradictory demand, and because the American mandate was what we wanted, our delegates signed the Memorandum and presented it to the Powers.
I wish [therefore] to prove once more that our Party has not managed national affairs, has not had a strong will, has not followed our own program, but it has been led by others and has allowed the others to lead our Party.
The Paris Memorandum of course thrilled us. A kind of mentality was created according to which the drawing of frontiers on paper actually gave us those territories. To doubt it was a treachery. Of course there followed the rude awakening — the Treaty of Sevres; [6] the refusal of the Senate of the United States to accept the mandate; even the frontiers drawn by President Wilson did not satisfy us. We thought he could have demanded a larger territory . . . . There were the usual complaints that the powers were unfair1 did not appreciate us and did not compensate us according to what we deserved.
THE AGONY BEGINS
The agony of the Armenian Cause began in 1922. At the London Conference [7] was heard for the first time the word "Home". The Treaty of Sevres was entirely forgotten. There was no question of an independent Armenian State. Only a doubtful "Home" in someone else’s home. This was the blow dealt us in March. Things got worse at Lausanne toward the end of the year. No "Home" was demanded for us. The Turks politely refused everything. The Great Allies, in a desperate gesture, confessed and bewailed that they had done everything possible to help the Armenians but could not do anything.
Then, here came comrade Tchicherin and offered in the name of Soviet Russia to locate the Armenians of Turkey in Crimea, on the shores of Volga, in Siberia. Thus, the “State” was reduced to a “Home”, and the “Home” was converted into colonies in Siberia. The mountain did not even give birth to a mouse. . . . This was the past.
If we are to evaluate the work we did and the results we obtained, we must confess that we have nothing to boast about from the time we declared the independence of our Republic. We must admit that our burden to organize a State and lead it was far beyond our strength.
We have always miscalculated and have always encountered with unpredictable situations because we have been unable to foresee them. And it is evident, to me at least, that it was on account of our ineptness, individually, that prevented us from conducting affairs of state properly. We have been unable to distinguish the State from the Party and have introduced party mentality into matters of state. We have not been statesmen.
Let no one take offense from these words which are not spoken with any malice but are a mere self-estimation. Is it not true that I myself have been among the incompetents on the front line, your collaborator, equally responsible in our defeat?
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What is the present?
We have a small Republic today between the River Araxe and Lake Sevan, nominally free, but in reality one of the fringe countries of the re-established sovereign Russian Empire. There is no Turkish-Armenia, neither State nor Home, not even an international political Question any more, killed and buried at Lausanne. Generally speaking, the Armenians in the Dispersion are not a political element for Armenia today.
The immediate subject of solicitude for the Armenian political mind must be the existing Republic, the Armenians who live in it and around it. I underscore this sentence vigorously and call it to your special attention, for that will be the starting point of our future action.
The Armenian Republic is a Soviet and the Armenian government today is a Communist dictatura. Is it possible to come to an agreement with the Bolsheviks? We have tried and have been refused. The fact is that the Bolsheviks do not wish to recognize our importance.
Let me go a step further to explain my thoughts. I ask myself: if, by a miracle, the existence of Bolsheviks in Armenia depended on myself, if it were possible for me to remove them from Armenia in a single second, by the movement of a single finger of mine, would I make that movement? I answer without hesitation that I would not. Not only would I not do it, but I would cut off my entire hand so that even in my dream, by mistake or inadvertently, I might not be able to make that dangerous movement!
Was the arrival of the Bolsheviks a calamity for our country? This is an unexpected question coming from a Dashnag. The Bolsheviks are necessary in Armenia under the present political conditions and there is no other force that could take their place. This is the truth. Let us not be carried by narrow political ideas.
We had exhausted all our resources, had come to an impasse as Government and as Party in the fall of 1920. Had the Bolsheviks delayed their arrival, we, ourselves, would have asked them to come because we were so weakened and powerless and there was no other force in the country to replace us.
Look at the consequences of their coming:
We governed our country for two and a half years; it is nearly two and a half years the Bolsheviks have governed it. We had wars with Georgia, Azerbeijan and Turkey. The Bolsheviks have had none. We had continual internal fights — Agapapa, Zot, Zanki-Bazar, Vedi-Bazar, the valleys of Milli, Sharour, Nakhichevan, Zangezour. The Bolsheviks have had no internal fights, except those in connection with the “Februarian” revolt. We had kept the entire country under arms, in constant fighting, we had kept all working hands on the battlefields at a time when there was the greatest demand for construction work. The Bolsheviks have freed the people from that calamity, from that heavy burden.
In our time the people were decimated or exhausted from famine. We destroyed bread-producing lands like Sharour and Veti, cattlelands like Agapapa, wantonly and without benefit to us. We gave to the armies of Kiazim Kara-Bekir (along with much other wealth) the harvest of 1920 — the only abundant one since the famine years. Today, I hear Armenia is not hungry any more, is not clamoring for bread, one might say, and I believe it because the people had time to sow and to reap.
We tried hard to re-establish communication with the outer world but did not succeed. The Bolsheviks did it. During our time Armenia groped in darkness, all movement and activity ceased half an hour after sunset because we had no means for providing lighting. The Bolsheviks brought much kerosene from Baku and saved the country from the slavery of darkness. Of course these things are not very important you might say, but is it not a fact that we could not achieve even that little? The Bolsheviks were necessary for Armenia then and they are necessary for Armenia today.
Nevertheless the Bolshevik system in its entirety is not acceptable for us. But what can we do? Perhaps, fight it from without?
THE FUTURE
European cities are full of emigrant malcontents of all kinds who publish newspapers, write books, call protest meetings, threaten, curse the Bolsheviks. . .. I know of no other “work” that is more futile and miserable than what is being done Is it with these thundering words that they will blow off Soviet heads? That is not a fight nor a struggle but an exposition of a despicable stupidity. The fighters against the Bolsheviks must fight from within so that the blow may tell; but to hith behind the frontiers and show one’s fist from a safe distance — it is gesture which, at all events, is not worthy of Dashnagtzoutune.
To fight from without, to carry on an anti-Bolshevik propaganda from abroad, when our words are not heard inside this country, is an inane and indecent thing. What are we to do then?
It is here that I shall state the very grave word, which, I know will embarrass you, but which must be said at last, and said simply, without concealment or attenuation: THE ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION HAS NOTHING TO DO ANY MORE.
Our Party has done everything it could do and is exhausted. New conditions of existence present new demands and we are unfit to respond. We must therefore leave the field to others abler than ourselves.
Is it necessary to repeat again the new conditions? Here they are: Turkish Armenia does not exist anymore; half the Armenian people have been massacred, others are dispersed in the four corners of the world, the other half is homeless and bleeding, in need of long rest and recuperation; the Armenian Republic is united with Communist Russia as an autonomous state; to separate our State from Russia we cannot, even if we wish — and we must not wish it, even if we were able to do so; the Party is beaten and has lost its authority, has been expelled from the country, cannot return home, while in the colonies it has no work.
This is the situation today.
The Party cannot say “I shall therefore create work for me” no matter what kind of work. That “therefore” is a mistake of logic. The sentence must be reversed to: because I have no work to do I must cease to exist. Work is not for the existence of the Party, but it is the Party that must exist to do the work, and where there is no work for the Party, there can be no Party.
When I said the Dashnagtzoutune has nothing to do any more, I did not express myself correctly. It has one more final thing to do, a supreme duty to the Armenian Cause and toward its own past. It must, and by its own decision, with full cognizance, decisively end its existence.
I ask you, would the political liberation of our country, which has been our aim and work thus far, die with us? It would be extreme megalomania on our part to think so — not only megalomania but a very naive conception of historical facts. It is for the very purpose of assuring our National Cause, not to do any harm to it, that I propose the dissolution of our Party.
The Dashnagtzoutune cannot assist the Bolsheviks. It is necessary that it may not be overthrown, and in order that it may not be upset the Dashnagtzoutune has only one means — to depart from the scene. And since the Dashnagtzoutune has nothing else to do anymore — neither at the present time nor in the future, it must end its existence. Our Party has lost its “raison d’etre,” its reason for existence. This is the bitter truth. Shall we have the courage to confess the truth and arrive at the proper conclusion?
And the only conclusion is that we must end our existence.
With comradely salutations,
HOVHANNES KATCHAZNOUNI
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Editor’s Note: Although highly critical, Katchaznouni has also been merciful toward the Dashnags by omitting the all-important historical fact that Armenian Independence was by no means due to Dashnag efforts or heroics, but rather, it was forced upon them by the Turks. The event came about as the Turks— plotting to conquer Armenia at a later date, but first wishing to sever Armenia from Russia as her possible ally — gave the Dashnags a 72-hour ultimatum to declare Armenia a free and independent state or face immediate invasion. These revelations are found in Appendix V.
FOOTNOTES
1. In the Treaty of Lausanne, signed July 24, 1923 between the Allies and Turkey, reference was no longer made to Armenia or Armenians. Both had ceased to exist in the eyes of both Turkey and the Allies. Thus the “Armenian Question” and the question of Armenians was buried in the grave of diplomatic silence.
2.The Ittihad (The Committee of Union and Progress) represented the resurgence of the Young Turk movement in 1909 against the oppressions of Sultan Hamid. It started as a revolutionary movement friendly to the Dashnags and Dashnag aspirations, but it soon followed, the established pattern of massacre, bloodshed and rabid Turkish fanaticism.
3. For corroboration see Appendix 1.
4.For the proclamation of Surrender see Appendix II.
5. See Appendix III for provisions of the humiliating Treaty signed by the Dashnags under the tragic and ill-fated Vratzian regime.
6.Under Article 88-93, Section VI of this treaty signed between the Allies and Turkey on August 10, 1920 Armenia was formally recognized by Turkey and the Allies as a “free and independent” state—a state more of the mind than of fact—which was promptly deserted by the Allies, rescinded by the Turks, abused and misgoverned by the Dashnage, and finally put to rout by the waiting Soviets.
7. As a result, Italy entered the war on the Allied side, May 23, 1915.
APPENDIX I
The ARF emblem includes a terroristic symbol of violence
ARF leaders are wont to boast of their “glorious” independent Republic. Katchaznouni’s testimony is fully corroborated by the testimony of another eyewitness, Leon Z. Surmelian, an author now residing In California, who in his autobiography “I Ask You Ladies and Gentlemen” (E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1945), made the following observations:
“Father heaped again his scorn and sarcasm on the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. ‘It’s destroying our nation! It has ruined our schools, disunited our people. What do your leaders know about international politics? Wasn’t it all this revolutionary foolishness that caused the Massacre?’ “—Page 63.
“Going to Armenia was like going to war. Onnik, Eugenia and I had our picture taken; I might never see them again. Turks, Tartars and even Soviet Russian troops were attacking our new-born Republic from all sides, and its population was dying of famine and epidemic diseases.” —Page 206.
“I ate an apple and one of the soldiers picked up the core I threw away, and swallowed it greedily. Oh, my God, our soldiers were hungry. I recalled Napoleon’s statement; an army marches on its stomach, and was plunged into gloomy thoughts. How could we stop the Turkish Army with hungry men?
But hunger was not the only reason for their glum, dour expressions. The officers called them ‘Donkey’s head!’ ‘Stupid creatures!’ and such uncomplimentary names. Products of Russian military colleges with their social and mar tial traditions, these Russianized officers were using the methods employed in the old Tsarist army. No wonder communist propaganda had made so much headway among our troops.”—Page 216.
“‘For two months I have been breathing the free air of independent Hayastan,’ he [Nurikhan] said, cynically. He was disillusioned, like many Armenians who had come to Erivan to see the miracle of independent Haynstan with their own eyes. He wanted to go back to Tiflis. I suffered one disillusionment after another. Our army, as I saw it, was incompetent or in utterly indifferent hands. We just did not have the right men, we did not have real Armenians at the head of our troops.”
—Page 217.
“We were told Kars could hold out for at least six months. The Armenian Army, even though it numbered only about thirty thousand men, and was ill-fed and ill-clothed, was considered quite capable of coping with anything the Turks had to offer. We had heard and read much about our army’s victories at Sardarabad, Nakhichevan, Olti, Zankezur, Karabagh.
Kars fell. The Turkish occupation of this key fortress meant the collapse of our front, but the Chief-of-Staff did not seem to be affected by the debacle at all: he came to his office promptly at ten o’clock, drank his cocoa promptly at eleven o’clock, and left promptly at three o’clock Things continued as usual in the ministry of war; the same old indifferent expressions on the faces of generals and colonels.
It was practically a hopeless struggle from the very beginning, but I thought with the right leadership we could have kept Kars either by a successful resistance or through the intervention of Soviet Russia, which professed friendship for our people: all we had to do was to adopt a pro-Soviet policy. Politically we were a naive and inexperienced nation.”
—Pages 209, 220.
“The Turks had won the war, and further resistance was futile. Armenia sued for peace. The Grand National Assembly of Ankara, speaking through its ‘People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs,’ demanded, and got, half of the territory of our Republic, and almost all the arms, ammunition, mules and rolling stock Armenia had. And while negotiations for a suicidal peace treaty were going on at Alexandropol, the government sent us to Nor Bayazet, to resume our agricultural studies.”—Page 220-1.
“The Armenian Government had signed an agreement with Soviet Russia and withdrawn from power. Armenia had to choose between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey, which under the circumstances was tantamount to choosing between life and death. What disturbed me was the attitude of the natives toward this sudden change in regime; they were too glad about it.”—Page 231.
APPENDIX II
After about 2 1/2 years of mismanagement and corruption, in the course of which it underwent four regimes, the Armenian Republic finally breathed its last. Torn within itself, distraught, tortured, with the populace clamoring for “bread and peace” which the Bolsheviks promised, the Dashnags surrendered Armenia meekly, without a fight—abjectly, humbly, and in some instances even gratefully. A large number of leaders and followers, sharing Katchaznouni’s views, remained behind to become citizens of the new State.
H.H. ARMENIAN REPUBLIC
December 2, 1920 Erivan
PROCLAMATION
In view of the situation created by the external conditions, the Government of the Armenian Republic decided at its session of December 2, 1920, to resign from power, and to turn the whole military and civil authority over to the Supreme Commander of the Army to which office is appointed War Minister Dro.
[Signed]
S. VRATZIAN
President of the Council of Ministers
Ministers:
A. HOVHANNISIAN
A. KHONTGARIAN
H. DERDERIAN
DRO GANAYAN
Certified copy of the Original:
[Signed] H. TOUMANIANTZ
Chief Executive [of Council of Ministers]
APPENDIX III
Simultaneously, within a few hours of each other, while one Dashnag delegation headed by the retiring prime minister was negotiating with the Soviets at Erivan, another delegation headed by a former prime minister, negotiated with the Turks at Alexandropol — surrendering Armenia first, from the point of view of chronology, to the Soviets, then some hours later (with the participation of ministers who had already resigned from office) to the Turks: by all odds a masterful though asinine effort at double-dealing. Soviets do not recognize this treaty.
Highly significant Is Article 8, wherein Dashnags agreed “to forego their rights to ask for damages . . . as a result of the general war,” thus closing the doors FOREVER to reparations for the enormous destruction of Armenian life and property.
Now revealed for the first time in English are the provisions, in their entirety, of the secret Treaty of Alexandropol, signed on December 2, 1920. It is a humiliating treaty, whose contents heretofore have never been divulged by the ARF. A reproduction of. the original treaty in Turkish, together with a translation into modern Turkish, appeared in Vol. II, No. 1 of “Die Welt Des Islams” (“The World of Islam”), published by the well-known book firm, E. J. Brill, Leiden, Holland.
“THlS IS THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA AT GUMRU [ALEXANDROPOL]"
On the one part the Turkish Government and on the other part the Armenian Republic, for the purpose of putting an end to the hostilities and to find a thesis of agreement, have sat down for an examination of the facts.
On the part of the Turkish Government:
General Kazim Kara-Bekir Pasha, Commander on the Easbern Front
Hamid Boy, Vali of Erzeroum
Suleyman Negati Bey of Erzeroum
On the part of the Armenian Republic:
Alexander Khadissian, Prime Minister
Avram Gulhandanian, Minister of Finance
Stepan Gorganian, Minister of the Interior
After due verification of their powers of attorney and the validity of their certificates of authority, the discussions have resulted in the following agreement:
1. State of war between Turkey and the Armenian Republic has been ended.
2. The frontier between Turkey and Armenia, as seen on the attached map (starting from the mouth of the Lower Karasou, the River Araxe, the Arpatchai, north to Kekatch, from thence to the valley of Karahan, eastern Teghnis, eastern Great Kemel, Kiziltash, major Aghbaba Mountains) is the limit, The final determination of the frontier will he decided by a mixed commission on the spot two weeks after the signature.
Armenia will not interfere in the administrative form to be chosen by general election and that administration’s jurisdiction in Mount Kouki 10,282 - 8022 - Mount Gamasour, 8160 - the village of Koutoulak - Mount Saat, 7868, - the houses in Arpatchai, 3080, Mount Kemourlu, 6930 - Sarayboulak, 8071 - the station Ararat - the southern part of the estuary of the Lower Karasou on the Araxe River (Nakhitchevan, Shahtakhti, Shamour) and the administration of this zone shall be under Turkish protection. [The numerals above are those on a military map of the time.]
3. The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey may be able to consider the wishes of the Armenian Republic about the relocation of the entire native population back into the territories designated in the second article, existing in the old Ottoman boundaries which shall remain to Turkey, by irrefutable historical, ethnic and legalistic rights accepts their return by a general election within those territories, within three years after the ratification of this treaty. A mixed commission will decide the form of this.
4. So that the possibility of villainous activities and movements resulting from the incitements of imperialistic governments be once for all and permanently prevented and disallowed the Republic of Erevan undertakes not to maintain any military organization beyond a gendarmerie corps of 1500 riflemen with 8 mountain or field guns and 20 machine guns for the protection of its internal peace. There will be no military conscription in Armenia any more. The Armenian Republic is free to build fortifications and place in them as many heavy artillery pieces as it wishes for the protection of the country against external enemies. In this heavy artillery are 15 cm. shells and 15 cm. long rifles that can be used, and lesser ones used in field armies. No larger guns will be found.
5. After the peace the Government Erevan accepts to permit the Turkish representative or ambassador in Erevan to be free to investigate all these matters at any time. In return for that the Grand National Assembly promises military assistance to Armenia in any internal or external trouble.
6. The two parties permit the return of refugees to their hearths across the old boundaries with the exception of those who, during the general war, went to the enemy’s army and took arms, and those who crossed occupied territories and participated in massacres, and mutually assure the privileges of minorities obtained in the most-civilized countries to those who repatriate themselves.
7. Those of the refugees mentioned in Article 6 who do not return to their hearths within the limit of one year after the ratification of this treaty, besides not being able to benefit from the generosity of the said article, their legal claims also will not be heard.
8. Despite the great expenses which the Grand Assembly of Turkey incurred for its army during two years because of the urgency of the war it had to wage against Armenia, it renounces its right to demand lawful damages, and in the same manner the two parties forego their rights to ask for damages because of the changes which took place as a result of the general war.
9. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey promises to render assistance in the most sincere manner for the complete formulation and defense of the Armenian Republic mentioned in the Second Article with utmost integrity.
10. The Erevan Government declares and considers void and null the Treaty (of Sevres) which was absolutely rejected by the National Grand Assembly of Turkey, and by recalling the delegations who have been tools in the hands of the imperialist countries and their government circles in the purlieus of Europe and America, promises its determination to eliminate all kinds of misunderstandings between the two countries; the Republic of Erevan promises to keep away from government circles those pugnacious men who run after imperialist aims and play havoc with the peace of the two nations so that it may give proof of its sincerity for the maintenance of peace and tranquility and the rights of Turkey as a good neighbor.
11. The Armenian Republic admits and vouchsafes the authority of the vicar of the chief of Sheri of the National Grand Assembly of Turkey to ratify the appointment of the chief Mufti, elected by the direct vote of muftis as well as the organization and enactment of the rights of the people living in the country for the realization of their aspirations and religious sentiments. [The chief Mufti and muftis were to be quartered in Armenia for the benefit of Moslems living there].
12. The two contracting parties mutually promise not to hinder the free passage of any person or any merchandise belonging to any person on all routes (also of Armenia and Iran), from side to side, by sea and between any country in transit operations. The Turkish government assures the freedom of transit operations between Sharour, Nakhitchevan, Shahtakht, and Djoulfa via Iran, Magou and Armenia.
The Armenian government promises not to impede general transit operations of merchandise, carriages, railroad wagons between Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia and Turkey.
The Turkish State will take all railroads and transportation routes in the Erevan Republic under its own control in order to prevent treacherous acts against its integrity and totality by imperialists until complete peace is established and the two parties will forbid the official and unofficial agents of imperialist (Entente) powers from causing any damage or disturbance inside the Republic.
13. The government of the National Grand Assembly can take temporary military preventive measures in Armenia against attacks that may threaten its territorial integrity on condition that such measures do not disturb the rights of the Republic of Erevan conceded in this territory.
14. All treaties signed by the Republic of Erevan with any country that relate to Turkey or are harmful to the interests of Turkey, the said Republic agrees to consider absolutely null and void.
15. Commercial relations between the two parties will begin and ambassadors and consuls will be exchanged upon the signature of the treaty.
16. Regulations for telegraphic, postal, telephone, consular and commercial relations will be established by mixed commissions according to the provisions of this treaty. Meanwhile Turkey will be authorized by the State to resume telegraphic, postal and railroad communications between Armenia and occupied territories as soon as the treaty is signed.
17. In accordance with this treaty, concerning Armenia, by the provisions of the special treaty for the evacuation of territories under Turkish occupation and the repatriation and exchange of prisoners, the determination of the frontiers of the Armenian Republic will immediately be put into effect. The civilians and notables held will be delivered. The exchange of prisoners will be effected by a mixed commission.
18. This treaty is subject to ratification within a month. The ratified copies will be exchanged at Ankara. The plenipotentiary high representatives have signed this treaty of peace and frontier demarcation. This treaty, being in two copies, has been constituted at Kumru-Alexandropol on the date 2/12/1336*. In the case of any dispute agreement can be arrived at by reference to the Turkish text.”
* December 2, 1921. The Turkish year 1336 corresponds to 1921 A.D
(Holdwater: taking a moment here to mention other treaties/decrees where the Armenians renounced claims [as with Article 8, above], and where Armenian refugees were allowed to return [as with Article 7, above], and where the nation of Armenia was recognized.
ADDENDUM, 5-07: The beginning of this section contained corrupt information, and has now been corrected. Apologies.
Following the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (March 3, 1918), when the Soviets were forced to make territorial concessions to the Central Powers, the Transcaucasian Federation came into being, but lasted only some three months. Georgia declared independence on May 26, and Armenia and Azerbaijan followed on May 28.
Avetis Aharonian
1) The Treaty of Batum (June 4, 1918): "If we remember that the existing Republic was recognized by the Turks under the Treaty of Batoum, in which the Russian-Armenian envoys renounced all territorial claims over Western Armenia, we can readily comprehend why the Turks regarded the Act of May 28, 1919, as a provocation of war" (K. S. Papazian, "Patriotism Perverted," 1934, p.45) The Ottoman Empire was the FIRST nation to recognize the Republic of Armenia, after the Armenians declared their independence on May 28-29. ("...[T]he Armenian nation would never forget that it was the Ottoman Government which first conceived the idea of founding an independent Armenia, and recognized it." Telegram, Sept. 9, 1918, Avetis Aharonian to Prime Minister Kachaznuni; Feigl, "The Myth of Terror," 1986, p. 97. Aharonian's "gratitide" would not prevent him from signing a treaty (Sevres) dismembering the Ottoman Empire in August, 1920)
2) The Ottoman Empire issued a decree on December 31, 1918, which allowed the Armenians to return to their homes (if necessary vacating the homes that were occupied by others), and those converted to Islam would be Christian again. The Armenian Patriarch reported to the British that there were 625,000 Armenians in what was left of the empire, before the implementation of Sèvres. (Details of this decree may be found on "p. 138," or the 30th page of this PDF file.)
3) The Treaty of Kars (Oct. 13, 1921) "contains a clause, legally signed — even by Armenia — which reads as follows: '15. The governments signatory to the agreement (Russian S. S. R., Armenian S. S. R., Azerbaijan S. S. R., Georgian S. S. R. and Turkey) are engaged in declaring a general amnesty restricted to the citizens of the other side "pour tous les meurtes et délits commie en temps de guerre" (for all the murders and offenses committed in time of war)...'." (Feigl, "The Myth of Terror," 1986, p. 109.).
4) The Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923). "...[E]very former citizen of the Ottoman Empire... could come to Turkey as a Turkish citizen anytime within two years. Article 31 naturally applied to all the Ottoman-Armenian citizens who had been relocated during the war [and]... was tailor-made for the Armenians who... now wanted to move back to Turkey. ...[E]very Armenian who had once been an Ottoman citizen had until July 24, 1925 to come to Turkey as a Turkish citizen with the same rights as other Turkish citizens." (Feigl, "The Myth of Terror," 1986, p. 116.) Lausanne also permitted claims for compensation by a deadline and set up mixed courts for this purpose. The right for compensation was thus exercised.
As a point of interest, the Gumru-Alexandropol Treaty was signed three months after its first (Dec. 2-3, 1920) signing, in Moscow. It was signed a third time in Kars on Sept. 22, 1921, after approval by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
Copy of the actual Gumru-Alexandropol Treaty
APPENDIX IV
Armenians look upon former Turkish regimes as Jewry looks upon Nazi Germany. Some Armenians, as do some Jews, believe that their former tormentors “will never change.” Apparently not so with Dashnag leaders. Though the Turks had just bled the nation white and the Anatolian deserts were still strewn with the bleached bones of a million martyrs, Dashnags sought help and protection from Turkey as provided in the Treaty of Alexandropol. This shameless act placed the ARF on record as willful collaborators with the assassins of their Armenian brethren in return for the mere promise to govern an “independent Armenia” under Turkish tutelage.
Simon Vratsian
In a final effort to displace the Soviets (to whom they bad surrenders Armenia on Dec. 2, 1920) and occupy the country with Turkish help, the Dashnags on February 18, 1921 staged a well-planned counter-revolt against the Bolsheviks. But soon finding themselves in urgent need of help, Simon Vratzian the last prime minister and symbol of Dashnag failure and chicanery, sent the following desperate note to Behaeddln, representative in Erivan of the Turkish high command.
“Please forward the present request promptly to your high authorities, and as I have explained to you, urge them for an immediate answer.
The fight of Armenia against the bolsheviks, and for its own freedom and independence, serves, as we are convinced, not only Armenia itself, but also the interests of all the nations of the Near East.
For this reason, Armenia hopes, that during this fight she will receive help from her neighbors, and first of all the interests of the Turkish people also require that Armenia should come victorious out of this fight and remain independent.
Relying on this conviction, the Armenian government requests the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, that, in the name of the mutual interest of the two peoples and as speedily as possible, it:
1. Return the Armenian war prisoners that are now on the war front of Erivan.
2. Give the Armenian army some ammunition under certain conditions; first of all cartridges for Russian three-lined rifles and for Turkish mausers; or else rifles of the Russian and Lepel system.
3. Communicate with us, if the government of the Grand National Assembly finds it possible to send military aid to Armenia, and if able to do so, to what extent and when?
In making this appeal, the Armenian government relies on the friendly relations that have been established with the treaty of Alexandropol, and which were disturbed during the bolshevik rule.”
Respecfully,
SIMON VRATZIAN
President of the Armenian Republic
Erivan, March 18, 1921.
Distrustful, the Turks refused to help their Dashnag allies. The Soviets finally ejected them from Armenian soil in April, 1921.
APPENDIX V
The highly complex sequence of historical events which preceded the formation of an independent Armenia on May 28, 1918 may be delineated as follows.
Following the October, 1917 revolution the Bolsheviks relaxed their interest and withdrew from the Caucasus region, turning over to the Armenians their munitions, and leaving them in possession of a relatively large territory including the vilayets of Trobizond, Moush, Erzeroum and the regions of Kars, Ardahan, Karabagh and Nakhitchevan — a total area which later became known as “Wilsonian Armenia.”
The Caucasus was then governed by a Trans-Caucasian Federation composed of Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijan nationals, with a representative assembly, the Seym. In December, 1917 Turkey signed an armistice with the Seym and, together with the Russian withdrawal hostilities ceased.
In the meanwhile, and in order to resist further intrusion by the Allies — which the Bolsheviks and Turks jointly feared — Turkey entered into a common pact with the Russians. Under these conditions the pan-Turkish dream of expansion eastward remained dormant. But in May, 1918 she had recovered sufficiently and begun a bloody march eastward. Turkey now feared that a continued advance on the Caucasus might involve her with Russia so she demanded that Armenia, Georgia and Aberbaijan dissolve the Seym and declare themselves free and independent states so she could deal with them individually at her convenience. The Soviets were in no position to interfere as they were busy with the aftermath of the October revolution.
Christian Georgia and Moslem Azerbaijan acquiesced readily, leaving the Armenians to shift for themselves. The Armenians resisted, forcing Turkey to grant the Dashnags a 72-hour ultimatum from “eight o’clock in the evening of May 26.” This, and subsequent events are narrated in graphic detail in “The Armenian Republic” by Simon Vratzian (Imprimerie Navarre, Paris, 1928) from which the following excerpts are taken:
Pages 127, 129: “Unfortunately the Caucasian Federation does not exist Therefore the Seym has resigned. . . - The Armenians are left in the middle, alone, without friends, without protection, abandoned by all, victims to the treachery of their neighbors. A more horrible condition is difficult to imagine. What to do? To whom to apply? Where to seek salvation?”
Page 131: “The declaration of independence came more on account of external pressure rather than from the will of the National Council, Vratzian wrote. He then noted that the declaration was actually made on May 30th (instead of May 28th as celebrated by the Dashnags) when negotiations with the Turks began. On June 4, 1918 a formal Treaty of Peace was signed between Turkey and the Armenian Republic.
What was Armenian Independence like? Vratzian paints a graphic picture. Page 155: “Thus passing between the fire and the sword, Armenia was called an independent state. Its independence was not received with applause and acclamation. On the contrary, by many it was considered a misfortune, like a mother who has born a sick child, the Armenians beat their heads in grief.
Yes, the independence of Armenia was born from the sea of suffering and tears. Many did not believe it. The words ‘Independence’ and ‘Republic’ were used in quotation marks. And the reasons for believing thus were strong, truly horrifying were the conditions; independence under these conditions seemed a mockery.
In reality there remained in Armenian hands only a small sliver of territory — hardly 12,000 square kilometers, poor and half -demolished. Snuggled among arid mountains in a deaf corner of the world, overburdened with refugees and orphans, surrounded with teeth-gnashing enemies, without bread, without medicine, without help. Famine and sickness, ruined and looted, tears and poverty, the terror of massacre!
And on the other side, the victorious army of Enver, energized by pan-Turkish dreams which were trampling on the body of Armenians in their march toward Apsheron [the oil wells of Baku, and the Caspian Sea] and Turkestan.”
Page 175: “Around November 20th the government was transferred from Tiflis and enthusiastically reforms were made. . . . But this enthusiasm did not last long, and behold the escape of people and ministers from Erivan, where living conditions were desperate for those not used to black bread, sleeping on floors and lice. . . . Thus a situation was created where Armenia had three ministers of food—and yet no food!”
In another book, “Independent and United Armenia,” Vratzian added:
“Tears, misery and chaos were everywhere. Who had the heart to think of independence under these circumstances? Who was going to realize and protect that independence? . . . For an Armenian intellectual under the existing conditions independence was equivalent to a return of Turkish tyranny, to a new era of martyrdom, and by this is explained that session of the Armenian Council which considered ‘independence’ more like a home in mourning where lay a dead body.”
When, in final desperation — with Turkey again threatening to loot, massacre and rape survivors of the holocaust since 1915 — the populace accepted Soviet rule [to which Dashnag leaders themselves offered no resistance] thousands of Dashnags remained behind to become citizens of the new state, On November 20, 1923 they met in Erivan. The stenographic minutes of the “Convention of Former Dashnags of Armenia” were published in 1924. The report showed the presence of 247 delegates, the time. After a trip to the United States Katchaznouni returned to Armenia, and spent his last years on native Armenian soil.
The Armenian Information Service
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in addition to a list of booklets just initiated, The Armenian Information Service publishes the “Armenian Reporter” which seeks to enlighten and interpret, in the light of our history and our future here, those problems which personally concern American citizens of Armenian background.
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“Record of Dashnag Collaboration with Arab Diplomatic Officials.”
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Holdwater Reflects
Prof. Turkkaya Ataov had given a rundown of this report in The 1923 Manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni; it was exciting to have the chance to read the work in its entirety.
The appendixes contained valuable information as well, an added bonus.
Since Armenians are as single-willed a monolithic people as ever may have existed, what I found most interesting was digging into the personalities of both Mr. Katchaznouni and the editor, Armenian-American author John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian). These two appeared to have broken ranks with the mandatory Armenian line, and indeed I've encountered Armenian attempts to discredit both... the fate of all Armenians who dare to venture away from 100% agreement with the fanatical genocidal viewpoint, where all Turks must be presented as monsters, and all Armenians must be presented as innocent victims. (The other common punishment has historically been worse than a smear campaign directed against the character of those who dare disagree. Ka-pow! Ka-pow!)
However, now that I've had a chance to get greater insight into both Katchaznouni and John Roy Carlson, I can see neither were traitors to the Armenian cause. They both plainly regard the Turks in the same way as do most Armenians who venture opinions publicly; the Turks are the evil blight whose purpose has been to make the Armenians' lives hell on earth.
The difference is, both men were courageous enough and had enough of a sense of honor to admit what lay at the root of the Armenians' fate. This is what makes them so dangerous to the Armenian genocide industry, and why this booklet has been systematically picked off the shelves of the world's libraries, by members of the Diaspora faithful. (Little could they predict the coming of the Internet; what the "censors" wished would go away is now available to many at the click of a button.)
Note how Katchaznouni presents the following picture:
Again, it would be useless to ask today to what extent the participation of volunteers in the war was a contributory cause of the Armenian calamity. No one can claim that the savage persecutions would not have taken place if our behavior on this side of the frontier was different, as no one can claim the contrary, that the persecutions would have been the same even if we had not shown hostility to the Turks. This is a matter about which it is possible to have many different opinions.
Did he really believe that? Or was he making concessions to his Dashnak audience?
For what possible reason would the Armenians have been treated to the disastrous resettlement program, other than their having treacherously rebelled against their country, in their country's darkest hour? Did Katchaznouni actually believe in the phony reasons supported by the Hovannisians and Dadrians of his time, Pan-Turanism, Muslims hate Christians, and the looting of Armenian wealth?
All of a sudden, the Turks were going to "exterminate" the Armenians, at the worst stage of the Ottoman Empire's life... while engaged in a mortal struggle, with manpower and resources in desperate shortage? Then why did the Turks not "exterminate" Ottoman Jews? Ottoman Jews were not racially Turkic (Khazar theories likely unknown); the Jews were not Muslim. The Jews had wealth.
Answer: the Ottoman Jews were loyal to their nation.
Regardless, Katchaznouni was MAN enough to admit:
The proof is, however — and this is essential — that the struggle begun decades ago against the Turkish government brought about the deportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and the desolation of Turkish Armenia. This was the terrible fact!
Translation: we bore the act, and we must bear the responsibility... the way a MAN must. (Well, half a translation; Katchaznouni still couldn't resist desiring to blame the Turks, just in case.)
Similarly, author and true Armenian patriot John Roy Carlson, also derisively looks down his nose at the evil Turks: "Turkey again threatening to loot, massacre and rape survivors of the holocaust since 1915." However, Carlson/Derounian has come to understand the disgusting nature of the Dashnaks, whose fanatical, murderous and despicable ways was the root cause of the catastrophe that was brought upon the Armenian people. Sure, as an Armenian, he too suffers from the common psychological ailment of his people that Katchaznouni spells out so eloquently:
"[One of the main aspects of Armenian] "national psychology... [is] to seek external causes for [Armenian ] misfortune."
... However, at least Carlson was not completely blind. Carlson was probably aware that if the Armenian revolutionary committees did not start up circa 1880, none of these "massacres" would have ever happened. However, it would have taken real guts to come out and say that. And practically the only Armenian who has had the courage and integrity (that I'm aware of; without forgetting brave Armenian-Turk Artin Penik) to have publicly taken the truth all the way has been Edward Tashji... paying a heavy price, having been accused by his single-minded brethren of being recruited/bought, and always aware of a whizzing bullet that may not be far away. (ADDENDUM: Since this writing, Edward Tashji has sadly passed away, in 2005.)
What has been presented was a condensed version of Katchaznouni's speech. The original has been consulted, from the Russian archives
Complete Katchaznouni Manifesto:
1 comments:
Katchaznouni, the prime minister of Armenia said the truth. We are bored with the Armenian hostile campaigns, awful strategies and lies..
It is impossible for Turkish people to make genocide while the people are in a struggle for independence.. While 1 million Armenian people dies, 2 million Turkish people dies in Anatolia between 1910 and 1923 and more died in Balkan region.
Turkish people not only had war with Armenians but Greek, French and England people all attack Turkey and innocent people died in the war for independence..
Turkey was not industrialized to make a genocide.. Armenians had to learn more about the definition of 'genocide'. You can not say to people 'genociders' if people make you to go from the borders because of your attack to innocent people..
Armenians speak about the migration and their looses in the road because of cold. You can not say this 'genocide'. You should blame other nations who did not help you in migration. Turkish people could not help you because they already were in a war with 8 nations. Ottoman was separated. It is a big story. And Turkish people was not the reason of those wars. Why A nation want to trust to a lie? There are many Armenians living in turkey still.. You have to think them.. You give harm to them with your wrong claims.
Ilkay
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