798) The Armenian Diaspora And Turkey-Armenia Relations

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kamer Kasım·

 

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

 

From an international relations angle the great powers have always displayed an interest in the Armenian problem which was carried into the international arena with the 1878 Berlin Treaty. When the Ottoman Empire started to disintegrate those countries that wanted to have a say in the Ottoman lands and/or to speed up that disintegration process formulated Armenian-oriented policies. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the Armenian problem continued to be an issue in international relations, this time in the context of the Caucasian policies and the Diaspora Armenians. Since 1965 the Armenian allegations have been voiced more often at international platforms and this process has gained momentum. At the end of the Cold War Armenia gained independence and this process has thus gained a new identity.

 

Ethnic Armenians living in various parts of the world have set up a variety of organizations in an attempt to influence the foreign policy of the countries they live in. Some of these organizations, although they are called political parties, are institutions peculiar to the Armenians. All these organizations play a role in the realm of foreign relations and this role must be studied.

 

When Armenia became independent in 1991 the Armenian problem gained an “Armenia dimension” as well. Armenian independence is important in two respects: firstly, from the standpoint of that country’s relations with Turkey and the way the Armenian problem affects these relations, and, secondly, from the standpoint of Armenia’s relations with the Armenian Diaspora or, to put it differently, the Diaspora’s efforts to set the direction of Armenia’s foreign policy.

 

In this section the Armenian problem’s international relations dimension will be analyzed. To be able to understand the current developments related to the Armenian problem one needs to know about the historical background together with the Armenian community’s activities and organizations in various countries of the world, and analyze Armenia’s foreign policy and the factors that affect it. In this article the developments in the Turkey-Armenia relations and the role the Diaspora plays in carrying the Armenian problem into the international arena will be discussed.

 

II. THE ARMENIAN COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND ITS ROLE IN THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM

 

Armenians living in various parts of the world founded organizations in these countries to meet their needs as a community and, also, to influence the political and social structure in these countries. Along with associations for mutual assistance they founded certain organizations that call themselves political parties. After Armenia gained independence these Diaspora organizations began having a say in Armenia’s policies as well. The Armenian organizations exert a negative influence on Turkey’s relations with the rest of the world with their lobbying activities vis-à-vis the US administration, and with their efforts to promote their genocide allegations in the international arena. The Diaspora influence on Armenia is one of the main factors preventing the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia that are neighboring countries.  This issue will be addressed in detail when discussing the Turkey-Armenia relations and the Armenian foreign policy. Before that it would be better to briefly identify the Armenian Diaspora and its fields of activity.

 

In countries that have a sizable Armenian community such as the USA, France, Canada, Lebanon, Russia, Australia, Iran and Britain, the kind of structures called Diaspora organizations have been created. Diaspora organizations operate in a wide range of fields including education, health, religious services and politics. Some of the Diaspora organizations, namely, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (more commonly known as the Dashnaks), Social Democratic Huntchak Party and Armenian Liberal Democratic Organizations also known as Ramgavar, define themselves as political parties.

 

The Armenian Diaspora in the world consists of four to five million people.[1] Some 750,000 Armenians live in the USA and around 50,000 in Canada. In Europe, France boasts the biggest Armenian population with 300,000. In the Middle East, Iran and Lebanon lead with 200,000 each. Australia has an Armenian community of some 30,000. In the USA, France and the Middle Eastern countries Armenian presence goes back a long time. In Australia and Canada settlement of Armenians is a more recent phenomenon. Widespread Armenian migration to Australia, for example, began in the 1960s.

 

Diaspora organizations can be roughly classified as research organizations, aid organizations and culture and sports organizations. In addition to these there exist in almost every country the aforementioned organizations that call themselves political parties, namely, Dashnak, Huntchak and Ramgavar. Also, in many countries there are the organizational structures called Armenian National Committees: the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), the Armenian National Committee of Australia etc. Furthermore, the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) has branch offices in many countries.

 

The Armenian Diaspora organizations push the genocide allegations into the foreground, pursuing a line aimed at orienting in this regard the governments of the countries where they operate. The research organizations (some of which are nongovernmental organizations while others operate as institutions affiliated with universities) stage symposiums, panels and conferences to promote the genocide allegations. The Armenian National Committees make efforts to ensure that Armenians would take part in the political activities wherever they live and that the Armenian community’s views would be reflected by the media. Aid organizations such as the AGBU and certain cultural organizations operate with the aim of meeting the economic and cultural needs of the Armenians in various parts of the world. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), Huntchaks, Ramgavar, the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) and the Armenian National Committees focus entirely on political issues. The AAA and the ANCA are the driving force that carries the Armenian genocide allegations into the US Congress. These are the main components of the Armenian lobby in the USA. The American Armenian lobby’s primary goals include the following: preventing US aid and arms sales to Turkey, blocking US aid to Azerbaijan and ensuring US support for Armenia in every field. The Armenian organizations in European countries too engage in similar activities. The genocide allegations and the rallying of the Armenian community around this common cause are the raison d’etre of the Diaspora organizations. In fact, a “genocide industry” has been created. Meanwhile, by rallying the Armenian community around a common cause and forming a lobby, the Diaspora gains an advantageous position in the political field in the countries in question. This can be seen clearly in the case of the USA.

 

As we will explain below when referring to Armenia’s foreign policy, when it comes to promoting the genocide allegations in the international arena and on issues related to Turkey-Armenia relations, the Armenian Diaspora acts much more radically than some political groups in Armenia do.  However, there are differences of view among the Diaspora organizations in the way they view Turkey and, also, on the strategy to be followed to keep the genocide allegations alive on the agenda. For example, the ANCA which the Dashnaks support, rejects all kinds of dialogue with Turkey, pursuing a much more radical line than the other groups. The AAA, on the other hand, is not against a dialogue with Turkey in principle. This point will be discussed below in relation to the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC). 

 

III.TURKISH-ARMENIAN RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

 

Certain “civil diplomacy” attempts have been made between the two sides, that is, the Turks and the Armenians, to enable them to discuss one another’s views. Journalists of the two sides come together at regular intervals and put the existing problems on the table. Aside from that, the most serious step taken to build a dialogue was the creation of the TARC.

 

The TARC was formed formally on July 9, 2001 with the participation of six Turkish and four Armenian figures. Its aims were explained in the document titled “Terms of Reference” in the following vein: “The TARC seeks to promote mutual understanding and goodwill between Turks and Armenians and to encourage improved relations between Armenia and Turkey. It hopes, through its efforts, to build on the increasing readiness for reconciliation among Turkish and Armenian civil societies including members of Diaspora communities. It supports contact, dialogue and cooperation between Armenian and Turkish civil societies. It will directly undertake activities and catalyze projects by other organizations. It will develop recommendations to be submitted to the governments concerned. It will support collaborative track two activities in the fields of business, tourism, culture, education and research, environment, media and confidence building. It will secure expertise based on project requirements, and may include specialists on historical, psychological and legal matters.”[2]

 

When we look at the way the TARC was assessed by the Armenian side, especially by the Diaspora, we see that one segment of the Diaspora had definitely not been ready to have a dialogue, unwilling even to have research conducted on the allegations they were putting forth.

 

The TARC was a case of civil diplomacy since its members did not have official duties or titles.[3] It was extensively debated and assessed both in Armenia and in the Diaspora. With certain exceptions it can be said that the Armenian view of the TARC was a negative one. The harshest criticism came from the ANCA, which is one of the Dashnak organizations in the USA, and from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, also a Dashnak organization. The Dashnaks described the TARC as an initiative of unauthorized persons, saying that it was ordered by foreigners and that it would not serve Armenian interests. For the Dashnaks Turkish recognition of the alleged genocide was a precondition for any talks. They were concerned mainly because the activities of the TARC constituted an obstacle to their efforts to win international recognition for the Armenian genocide allegations and caused division in the ranks of the Armenians. Considering the quarrels that took place among the Armenians, the TARC worries about “division” were not groundless.

 

The TARC was bitterly criticized by those circles in Armenia that were Anti-AAA and that had opposed the Armenian National Movement that had been in power in Armenia during the Ter- Petrosyan era. That was because of the fact that the TARC’s Armenian members had served at important positions during the Petrosyan era. For example, Arzoumanian, one of the members, had been Ter-Petrosyan’s foreign minister. Another member, Hovhannissian, had served as Armenian ambassador to Syria during the same era.

 

The ANCA and some other Armenian Diaspora organizations criticized the US State Department for supporting the creation of the TARC. [4]  The State Department had expressed support for the TARC initiative. There had even been press reports saying that the State Department was giving the commission material support.[5] TARC’s Armenian members, however, stressed that they knew nothing about any material support from the US Administration.[6]

 

Unlike the ANCA, the AAA expressed support for the TARC. Creation of such a commission sharpened the rivalry between the ANCA and the AAA, two US-based big Armenian organizations. It affected these two Diaspora organizations’ joint lobbying efforts in the USA. Also, it made an impact on those countries where the Armenians were promoting their genocide allegations. The European Parliament underlined the importance of the climate of dialogue created by the TARC while making no reference to the Armenian genocide allegations in its report on Turkey.[7] The German Parliament too refused to debate a motion concerning the Armenian genocide allegations, pointing out that contacts had begun between the Turkish and Armenian nongovernmental organizations.[8]

 

Creation of the TARC affected also the relations between the Dashnaks and the Armenian Government. With the conviction that the Armenian Government had played a part in the creation of the TARC, the EDF voted against a bill envisaging privatization of the electricity distribution company. In a statement issued on July 13, the Armenian Foreign Ministry said the ministry had nothing to do with the creation of the TARC while stating that Armenia always favored all kinds of contact and dialogue between the Turkish and Armenian peoples in encouragement of open discussion of the existing problems. The ministry stressed that the TARC activities could be no replacement for talks at a government-to-government level.[9] Despite that statement ten political parties in Armenia issued a joint communiqué in which they denounced the TARC.[10] The communiqué made an impact on the Armenian Foreign Ministry’s views on the TARC. On Aug. 1, 2001 the Ministry issued a new statement, this time making a reference to the political parties’ communiqué and stressing that the TARC could not cause the Armenian authorities to deviate from their path of striving to win international recognition of the “genocide”.[11] The change in the Armenian Foreign Ministry’s stance obviously resulted from the negative reaction of the political parties in Armenia. In Armenia the main worry was that the TARC would try to play a part in Turkey-Armenia relations, replacing the authorities to this effect. Indeed, Armenian President Kocharyan declared that the Armenia-Turkey relations should be discussed at government level.[12]  Another criticism the Armenians directed at the TARC involved its composition. They complained about the TARC consisting of four Armenians and six Turks. Also, they said that the Turkish members of the TARC were hardliners.[13]

 

Although creation of TARC did not cause as much excitement among the Turks as among the Armenians, the Turks had a positive reaction to the establishment of a Turkish-Armenian dialogue via the TARC. Generally speaking, they saw that as a step taken at the right time to ease tension between the two societies.[14]  Turkish Armenians too saw that as a positive step. Agos newspaper columnist Markar Eseyan described the TARC as a small step for the two peoples but a big one for friendship and civilization; and he complained that the western countries were exploiting the Armenian problem in order to obtain concessions from Turkey.[15]

 

The TARC decided to obtain the legal opinion of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a nongovernmental organization, on whether the UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide that took effect in 1951 could be applied retroactively to the incidents that had occurred in the early 20^th Century. The ICTJ issued its report in February 2003, saying that the convention cannot be implemented retroactively. It stressed that since the convention is not retroactive no claims could be made as a result of the Armenian allegations. However, the ICTJ did not stop there. It went on to make a statement supportive of the Armenian stance regarding the events that were the subject matter of the Armenian allegations, a statement that was not based on any scientific study or research.

 

The TARC, which was an initiative aimed at creating a climate of dialogue between the two societies, disintegrated after the ICTJ presented its report. Although it went on for some more time with different members it lost its function. Here, the basic problem is the way the Armenians –and, in this context, the Diaspora organizations— choose as their main field of activity the efforts aimed at winning international recognition for their genocide allegations.

 

IV. TURKEY-ARMENIA RELATIONS

 

In 1991 Armenia gained independence and thus the “Armenia phenomenon” joined the loop in the Armenian problem. The Armenian problem’s international relations dimension has come up to the foreground due to the aforementioned ties between Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora and, also, because of the path the Turkey-Armenia relations have taken.

 

When examining the relations between these two neighboring countries one has to take into consideration, along with the parameters specific to the Caucasus, the “effects” originating from the Armenian Diaspora and from the political structure in Armenia. Turkey recognized Armenia as an independent country in 1991 together with the other newly independent former Soviet republics. However, normal diplomatic relations could not be established between the two countries. There are three main obstacles to the establishment of normal diplomatic relations: Firstly, the Armenian administration is striving to have the genocide allegations recognized on an international plane. Secondly, the Armenians make the kind of statements (as can be seen in the text of Armenia’s Declaration of Independence) that amount to saying that they consider part of Turkish territories “Western Armenia” and believe that Turkey’s territorial integrity and the existing Turkish-Armenian border must not be recognized by Armenia. Thirdly, there is the Nagorno Karabakh problem.

 

Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence issued on Aug. 23, 1990 says, “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.” And the Armenian Constitution adopted in 1995 refers to the Declaration of Independence.[16]  Furthermore, from time to time the Armenian Parliament witnesses speeches in the vein of, “The 1921 Kars Treaty must not be recognized.”[17]  The current border between Turkey and Armenia was determined by the Kars Treaty. In 1992 Armenia became a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) whose name was changed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994. Considering the fact that by becoming a member of this organization Armenia has accepted the inviolability of the existing borders, the reference to “Western Armenia” in its Declaration of Independence and the way it questions the Kars Treaty, conflict with Armenia’s international obligations. Significantly, after it gained independence, Armenia refused to sign a joint declaration with Turkey on such issues as good-neighborly relations, inviolability of the borders and territorial integrity.[18]

 

Armenia’s first president, Ter-Petrosyan, adopted a policy of trying to improve his country’s relations with Turkey rather than voicing the genocide allegations at international platforms. He served as president until 1998. However, Turkey-Armenia relations could not develop during the Ter-Petrosyan period either. That was because of the influence the Armenian Diaspora exerted on Armenia’s foreign policy and, also, due to Armenia’s failure to take the necessary steps regarding Karabakh. For landlocked Armenia, Turkey is like a gate that would give access to the West; and if Armenia developed its relations with Turkey that would, from the economic and political angle, exert a stabilizing effect on Armenia. Its tense relations with Turkey render Armenia dependent on Russia, harming its sovereignty. In fact, Armenia is the only country where Russia manages to maintain military bases in an almost unopposed manner.[19]

 

Armenia would benefit more greatly than Turkey would from a normalization of the Turkey-Armenia relations. Armenia is conducting an unrealistic foreign policy that fails to take into consideration the country’s capacity. This policy is imposed on Armenia by the Armenian Diaspora and by those political parties in Armenia that represent the Diaspora. Since Armenia became independent the Diaspora organizations –especially those that are being called the Diaspora parties— have carried the Diaspora’s agenda into Armenia and this has adversely affected Armenia’s relations with Turkey. In fact, Armenia’s first president, Ter-Petrosyan, was forced to resign due to the pressure exerted by the radical groups in the Diaspora and Kocharyan became his successor in the 1998 presidential election.[20]  After Kocharyan became president, tension in Turkey-Armenia relations grew further. The Diaspora had already been employing the genocide allegations as a tool for preserving the Armenian identity. Now Armenian Administration too attempted to use the genocide allegations to manipulate Armenia’s relations with Turkey and, especially, Turkey’s relations with third countries. The resolution the French Parliament passed in 2001 resulted partly from the Kocharyan Administration’s efforts.[21]

 

The Nagorno Karabakh problem is another issue affecting the Turkey-Armenia relations. The problem which began in 1988 still continues though a ceasefire was declared in 1994. The Armenians living in Azerbaijan’s Nagorno Karabakh region wanted to annex the enclave to Armenia. That led to clashes and, as a result, Armenian forces occupied 20 percent of the Azerbaijani territories. Efforts made to solve the dispute in the framework of the OSCE have been futile. The Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani soil conflicts with the obligations Armenia has as an OSCE and Council of Europe member. Meanwhile, Armenia strives to make its occupation of the Azerbaijani lands permanent.[22]  It has been argued that Armenia is conducting an irredentist policy regarding Georgia’s Javakhety region where there is an ethnic Armenian community, even trying to create another Nagorno Karabakh inside Georgia.[23]  However, the developments taking place in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 and the fact that Georgia’s territorial integrity is now more important for the USA than it had been in the past, lessen the possibility of a Karabakh-type clash in Georgia.[24]

 

Latest Developments in Turkey-Armenia Relations

 

As stated above Turkey and Armenia do not have normal diplomatic relations. Armenia has a representative in Istanbul accredited to the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers met in Reykjavik on May 15, 2002 during the NATO foreign ministers meeting. Later, on June 25, 2002 they had a talk in Istanbul on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Turkey has persistently put forth a number of conditions to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia. The current Armenian Administration, however, refrains from taking any step towards meeting these conditions. Since the Sept. 11 terror attacks the USA, who is Turkey’s ally, has increased its influence in the Caucasus and US troops have been deployed in Georgia. Furthermore, Azerbaijan-USA relations too have progressed thanks to the support Azerbaijan has given the USA in the fight on terror. Considering these developments, there is obviously no country in the region –except Russia—with whom Armenia can have a close relationship.[25]  The foreign policy line adopted by Armenia renders the country extremely dependent on Russia and Armenia’s sovereignty has come to be questioned. Normalization of Turkey-Armenian relations would serve Armenia’s interests. But for that, Armenia must first rid itself of the influence exerted by the Armenian Diaspora.

 

There has been another development as well in the relations with Armenia: the exchange of letters between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Armenian President Kocharyan. In the wake of the debates held at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the Armenian problem on April 13, 2005, PM Erdoğan announced that he had sent a letter to President Kocharyan, suggesting that a group consisting of historians and other experts from the two countries should look into all relevant archives to find information related to the 1915 events and report their findings to the international community. President Kocharyan replied to the letter on April 25, suggesting instead creation of an inter-governmental commission to solve all of the unresolved issues between the two countries and to reach a common understanding.

 

According to press reports, some time after the exchange of letters representatives of the two foreign ministries held a series of meetings in a third country. These reports said that from the Turkish side Foreign Ministry Deputy Undersecretary Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü and Turkish Ambassador in Tbilisi Ertan Tezgör were taking part in these meetings.[26] However, in the subsequent three months no news of such meetings has emerged, leading to speculation that the meetings must have been suspended.

 

In a USA and EU-based context, continued efforts are being observed towards normalization of the relations between Turkey and Armenia and establishment of a continuous dialogue between the two sides. Balıkesir Deputy Turan Çömez, a member of the ruling party in Turkey, paid a three-day unofficial visit to Armenia in June 2005. He had a chance to see the current situation in Armenia on the spot, having conversations with people from all walks of life.[27]  However, it is quite obvious that the Kocharyan Administration is far from taking the kind of steps that would meet Turkey’s expectations especially on the genocide allegations and the Karabakh problem. In fact, Kocharyan makes intense efforts to ensure that the progress reports the EU regularly issues on Turkey would include references to the Armenian allegations and the border gate issue. Prior to the latest EU progress report on Turkey (issued on Nov. 9, 2005) too Armenia was observed to be making an intense effort to this effect.

 

V. CONCLUSION

 

The international dimension of the Armenian problem has come to the foreground since the Armenian allegations have been put on the agenda in various countries by the Armenian Diaspora, and, also because Armenia has joined the loop as an “actor” since it gained independence in 1991 in the context of both its relations with Turkey and its ties with the Diaspora. There has been tension between Turkey and Armenia due to the Karabakh problem and, also, because of the Armenian Administration’s efforts to put the genocide allegations on the international community’s agenda. Due to the Diaspora’s efforts to exert an influence, this tension has reached the point where it affects Turkey and Armenia’s relations with third countries. The Armenian Diaspora now has a say in the Armenian Administration and it is a negative influence on the Turkey-Armenia relations. Normalization of relations with Turkey would be in line with Armenia’s interests. With a multi-faceted policy Armenia can ease its dependence on Russia. Being a landlocked country Armenia needs to cultivate normal diplomatic relations with Turkey for the sake of its economic and political stability. However, currently Armenia has a number of political parties that make territorial demands on Turkey, promotes the genocide allegations and conducts an intransigent policy on the Karabakh issue. Armenia’s current policies constitute an obstacle to the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Turkey.

 

When we look at the stance taken by a number of aforementioned countries on the Armenian allegations, we see that even with those countries that do not currently recognize these allegations Turkey may experience troubles in the future. The Armenian lobby’s activities –especially when targeting the US Congress-- are likely to be a continual problem. By engaging in counter-lobbying activities and by launching a diplomatic offensive in major countries, Turkey can counter the Armenian lobby’s activities and prevent these activities from harming Turkey’s bilateral relations. In these efforts Turkey must target influential figures that take part in the decision-making mechanisms. Also, establishing a dialogue with the non-radical segments of the Armenian Diaspora would be important from the standpoint of creating a climate of mutual understanding.

 

VI. REFERENCES

 

VIII. 1. Websites that may prove useful:

 

www.eraren.org

 

www.avsam.org

 

www.karabakh.org

 

www.mfa.gov.tr

 

www.foreignpolicy.org.tr

 

www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr

 

http://groong.usc.edu/news

 

http://www.armenianreality.com

 

http://www.armenianpatriarchate.org.tr

 

http://www.normarmara.com/marmara.htm

 

http://www.agos.com.tr

 

 

VII.2. Books and Articles

 

BOOKS

 

ADALIAN Rouben and Masih Joseph, (eds.), Armenia and Karabagh Factbook, (Washington D.C.:            Armenian Assembly of America, July 1996).

AZADIAN, Edmond. and Hacikyan, Agop J. (eds.), History on the Move: Views, Interviews and Essays on Armenian Issues, (Wayne State University Press, 2000).

CROSSANT, Michael P., The Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict, Causes and Implications, (London: Preager. 1998).

GIRAGOSIAN, Richard, Transcaucasus: A Chronology, (Washington: Armenian National Committee of America, 1992-1997).

GÜRÜN, Kamuran, Ermeni Dosyası [Armenian File], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983).

HOVANNISIAN, Richard G, Armenia on the Road to Independence 1918, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

HUNTER, Shireen T., The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation Building and Conflict, (Washington D.C.: Center For Strategic and International Studies, 1994).

LIBARIDIAN, Gerard J., Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı (The Challenge of Statehood), Translated by Alma Taşlıca, (Ankara: İletişim, 2000).

MASIH, Joseph R. and Krikonan, Robert 0. (eds.), Armenia at the Crossroads, (Harwood Academic publishers, 1999).

SONYEL, Salahi, Turkey’s Struggle For Liberation And The Armenians, (Ankara: Center For Strategic Research, 2001).

YILMAZ, İskender, Gümrü Antlaşması [Gyumri Treaty], (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2001).

 

ARTICLES

 

AKTAN, Gündüz, “TARC: Çıkmaz Sokak [TARC: Blind Alley]”, Radikal, 12 December 2001.

AKTAN, Gündüz, “Turkish-Armenian Dialogue”, Turkish Daily News, 11 July 2001.

ASTOURIAN, Stephan H., “From Ter-Petrosyan to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia”, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, 2000-2001.

BİRAND, Mehmet Ali, “Armenians Work, Turks Look On”, Turkish Daily News, 14 July 2001.

CABBARLI, Hatem, “Armenian Diaspora in Russia: Its Composition and Activities”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: No: 3, September-October-November 2001, pp. 13 1-152.

CORNELL, Svante 0, “Undeclared War”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol: 20, No: 4, Fall, 1997, pp. 5 1-72.

DANİELYAN, Emil, “Turkey/Armenia: Reconciliation Commission off to Rocky Start”, RFE/RL, 13 August 2001.

DANİELYAN, Emil, “Members Deny Knowledge of US Funding For Turkish-Armenian Group”, RFE/RL, 15 October 2001.

DANNREUTHER, Roland, “Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf’, Survival, Vol: 35, No: 4, Winter, 1993, pp. 92-112.

ESEYAN, Markar, “Barış Aritmetiği [Arithmetic of Peace]”, Agos, No: 277, 20 July 2001, p. 9.

FRANTZ, Douglas, “Unofficial Commission Acts to Ease Turkish-Armenian Enmity”, The New York Times, 10 July 2001.

GOBLE, Paul, “Caucasus: Analysis from Washington-Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict Risks Recognition”, RFE/RL, 8 May 1998.

GOLTZ, Thomas, “Armenian Soldiers Massacre Hundreds of Fleeing Families”, The Sunday Times, 1 March 1992.

İLTER, Kemal, “Greece Model Is Used in Setting Up Commission between Turks And Armenia”, Turkish Daily News, 13 July 2001.

İLTER, Kemal, “An Historic Step For Both Turks and Armenians”, Turkish Daily News, 12 July 2001; Sami Kohen, “Barış Zamanı [Time for Peace]”, Milliyet, 11 July 2001.

İYİGÜNGÖR, Aydan, “The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany”, Ermeni Araştırmaları Vol: 1, No: 3, September-October-November 2001, pp. 258-273.

KANTARCI, Şenol, “ABD ve Kanada’da Ermeni Diasporası: Kuruluşlar ve Faaliyetleri [Armenian Diaspora in USA and Canada: Organizations and Activities]”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: 1, No: 3, September-October-November, 2001, pp. 67-118.

KASIM, Kamer, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caspian Oil and Regional Powers”, Bülent Gökay (ed.), The Politics of Caspian Oil, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 185-198.

KASIM, Kamer, ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From Its Inception to the Peace Process’, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: 1, No: 2, June-July-August, 2001, pp. 178-179.

KASIM, Kamer, “Diasporanın Ermenistan Dış Politikasına Etkisi [Diaspora’s Effects on Armenia’s Foreign Policy]”, 2023 Dergisi, 15 April 2002, pp. 42-48.

KASIM, Kamer, “Türk-Ermeni Barışma Komisyonu: Kısa Süren Bir Diyalog Girişimi [Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission: A Short-lived Dialogue Attempt]” Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 2, No: 22, February 2002, pp. 30-36.

KASIM, Kamer, “11 Eylül Terör Eylemlerinin Rusya’nın Kafkasya Politikasına Etkisi [The Effects of the Sept. 11 Terror Attacks on Russia’s Caucasus Policy]”, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol: 9, No: 3-4, 2001 pp. 53-65.

KASIM,            Kamer, “Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission: A Missed Opportunity”, Armenian Studies, Vol: 1, No: 4, December 2001-January-February 2002, pp. 256-273.

KASIM,            Kamer, “Ermenistan’ın Dış Politikası: Ter-Petrosyan ve Koçaryan Dönemlerinin Temel Parametreleri [Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Basic Parameters of the Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan Eras]”, Stratejik Analiz, July 2002, pp. 42-50.

KASIM,            Kamer, “Armenian Community in Australia”, Armenian Studies, Vol: 1, No: 3, September-October-November, 2001, pp. 305-320.

LAÇİNER, Sedat, “Armenian Diaspora In Britain and the Armenian Questions”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: 1, No: 3, September-October-November, 2001, pp. 233-257.

LÜTEM,            Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar [Facts and Comments]”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: 1, No. I, March-April-May, 2001, pp. 10-22.

LÜTEM,            Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: 1, No: 2, June-July-August, 2001, pp. 9-29.

LÜTEM,            Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: l, No: 3, September-October-November, 2001, pp. 7-33.

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 4, December 2001-January 2002, pp. 14-31.

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 5, Spring 2002, pp. 7-27.

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 6, Summer 2002, pp. 7-23.

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 7, Fall 2002, pp. 7-17.

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 8, Winter 2003, pp. 7-36

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 9, Spring 2003, pp. 7-29

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 10, Summer 2003, pp. 7-25

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 11, Fall 2003, pp. 7-27

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 12-13, Winter 2003-Spring 2004, pp. 7-32

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 14-15, Summer-Fall 2004, pp. 7-21

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 16-17, Winter 2004-Spring 2005, pp. 7-81

LÜTEM, Ömer E., “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No: 18, Summer 2005, pp. 7-44

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· Abant İzzet Baysal University, International Relations Department staff member

[1] For the Armenian Diaspora and its activities in the USA, Canada, Australia, Britain, Germany, Russia and Lebanon see: Armenian Studies/Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: 1, No: 3, September-October-November, 2001.

[2] Terms of Reference of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, July 9, 2001, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: l, No: 2, June-July-August 2001, pp. 267-268.ONT><

[3] For a comprehensive assessment of the TARC see: Kamer Kasım, “Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission: A Missed Opportunity”, Armenian Studies, Vol. 1, No: 4, December 2001-January-February, 2002, pp. 256-273.

[4] “ARF Bureau Declaration Regarding the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission”, Asbarez, 14 July 2001. Also see the interview conducted with EDF member Dr. Viken Hovsepian, http://www.asbarez.com!TARC/VH-QA.html

[5] Armenian News Network, Groong, http:frgroong.usc.edu/news/msg, 16 September 2001.

[6] RFE/RL, 8 September 2001. For the interest the US media displayed in the TARC see: Douglas Frantz, “Unofficial Commission Acts to Ease Turkish-Armenian Enmity”, The New York Times, 10 July 2001, editorial. “Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation?”, Washington Times, 17 July 2001.

[7] Armenian News Network/Groong, http:frgroong.usc.edu/news/msg38258. 5 Oct. 2001.

[8] www.bundestag.de/aktuell/bp/2001bp0109083b.html. See: Ömer E. Lütem, “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, Ermeni Araştırmaları, Vol: 1, No 3, September-October-November, 2001, pp. 17-18.

[9] Asbarez On Line, http://www.asbarez.com, 25 July 2001. RFE/RL Armenia Report, 7- 24 July 2001. Noyan Tapan, 13 July 2001.

[10] “Komisyon Ermenileri Böldü [Commission Divides Armenians]”, Agos, No: 280, 10 August 2001, pp. 1 and 11 “Foreign Ministry Respond Reconciliation Grouping”, Asbarez  On line “http//www.asbarez.com” Aug. 2, 2001. Khatchik Derghoukassian and Richard Giragosian described as ‘privatization of foreign policy’ the TARC activities in their article titled, “The Dangers of Privatizing Armenian Foreign Policy”, Armenian News Network/Groong, http:frgroong.usc.edu/ro/ro-20010831htm1, 31 August 2001.

 

 

 

[12] “Armenian President, US Congressman Discuss Reconciliation Commission”, Noyan Tapan, 22 August 2001.

[13] Emil Danielyan, “Turkey/Armenia: Reconciliation Commission Off  to Rocky Start”, RFE/RL, 13 August 2001.

[14] For views from Turkey see: Mehmet Ali Birand, “Armenians Work, Turks Look On”, Turkish Daily News, 14 July 2001. Kemal İlter, “Greece Model Is Used in Setting up Commission Between Turks And Armenia”, Turkish Daily News, 13 July 2001. Kemal İlter, “An Historic Step for Both Turks and Armenians”, Turkish Daily News, 12 July 2001. Sami Kohen, “Barış Zamanı [Time for Peace]”, Milliyet, 11 July 2001.

[15] Markar Eseyan, “Barış Aritmetiği (Arithmetic of Peace]”, Agos, No: 277, 20 July 2001, p. 9.

[16] Stephan H Astourian, , “From Ter-Petrosyan to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia”, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, 2000-2001, p. 20.

[17] Gerard J. Libaridian, Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı, (The Challenge of Statehood), translated by Alma Taşlıca, Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 36.

[18] Ömer Engin Lütem ile söyleşi [Interview with Ömer Engin Lütem], 2023 Dergisi, No: 12, 15 April 2002, p. 29.

 

 

[19] Kamer Kasım, “Ermenistan’ın Dış Politikası: Ter-Petrosyan ve Koçaryan Dönemlerinin Temel Parametreleri [Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Basic Parameters of the Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan Eras]”, Stratejik Analiz, NO: 27, July 2002, pp. 42-49.

[20] Kamer Kasım, “Diasporanın Ermenistan Dış Politikasına Etkisi [Diaspora’s Effects on Armenia’s Foreign Policy]”, 2023 Dergisi, No: 12, 15 April 2002, pp. 42-46.

[21] Kasım, Ermenistan’ın Dış Politikası: Ter-Petrosyan…, pp. 45-46.

[22] For detailed information on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict see: Kamer Kasım, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caspian Oil and Regional Powers”, Bülent Gökay (der.), The Politics of Caspian Oil, London: Palgrave, 2001, s. 185-198. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From Its Inception to the Peace Process”, Armenian Studies, No: 2, June-July-August, 2001, p. 170-185.

[23] For detailed information on this issue see:, Kamil Ağacan, “Genişleyen NATO ve Güney Kafkasya [Expanding NATO and South Caucasus]”, Stratejik Analiz, July 2003, p. 83-87. Hasan Kanbolat, Nazmi Gül, “The Geopolitics and Quest For Autonomy of the Armenians of Javakheti (Georgia) And Krasnodar (Russia) In the Caucasus”, Armenian Studies (Ermeni Araştırmaları), No: 2, June-July-August 2001, p. 186-210.

[24] Kamer Kasım, “Georgia: An Important State For the Stability in the Caucasus”, Journal of Turkish Weekly, 12 September 2005.

[25] See:, Kamer Kasım, “11 Eylül Terör Eylemlerinin Rusya’nın Kafkasya Politikasına Etkisi [Effects of Sept. 11 Terror Attacks on Russia’s Caucasus Policy]”, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi Vol: 9, No: 3-4, 2001 pp. 53-65

[26] cnntürk, 13 July 2005

[27] Radikal, 17 June 2005.

 

SOURCE: IKSAREN