Turkey – Azerbaijan – Armenia: Erdogan Incriminating Documents Still Hidden in Turkey
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis, March 17, 2009, www.pennsylvaniachronicle.com/articles/view/94901
The document I intend to republish in several parts remained unknown in Turkey until today. The reason for which the Islamist administration has persistently tried to hide this document – and many other similar – is simple; if widely known, correctly interpreted, and adequately publicized, similar documents demonstrate that the present Turkish premier and president did their best to severely damage the national interests of Turkey, jeopardized their nation´s chances to survive, and methodically aligned themselves with the Anglo-French Freemasonic colonialist elites and the effort to recreate a Greater Armenia at the detriment of Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Similar documents would certainly leave Erdogan with very few followers throughout Turkey, driving him to inevitable electoral defeat, impeachment and condemnation for High Treason perpetrated in the name of a lunacy that the uneducated and quasi-illiterate Turkish premier believes as his own …. religion.
In other words, imagining that he defends the interests of Islam, Erdogan simply exposes Turkey to the calamities reserved against all the Turkic nations by the colonialist elites who totally control Paris and London, thoroughly manipulate Yerevan, and successful maneuver Moscow.
The Nagorno Karabakh crisis has little to do with Caucasus territories; it has mostly to do with the Anglo—French plan to avert the rise of a Turkic Union that would merge territories in the North of India and China, from Edirne (Greek – Turkish border) to the Arctic Ocean and to Tamsagbulag (Easternmost point of the Mongolian – Chinese border).
The rise of the rightful, peaceful and mostly (but not exclusively) Muslim, moderate and tolerant, secular and progressive, Union of Uralo-Altaic, Turkic, and Mongolian Peoples would give the Asiatic landmass its proper political and cultural backbone, eliminating the Islamic extremism and primitivism, which – in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Saudi Arabia, in Iran, in Turkey (thanks to Erdogan) and elsewhere – is a comprehensive Western academic and theoretical system projected during the 19th and the 20th centuries, by means political interference, involvement and forceful leverage, on numerous innocent and gullible indigenous peoples who have gradually been attracted to a theoretical and behavioural extremism through colonial maneuvers.
I will be commenting while publishing parts of this document which can easily be found on the web; it is the Report on Nagorno-Karabakh presented to and discussed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It dates back to November 2004, at a moment Erdogan, the Islamist puppet of the Anti-Turkish and Anti-Turkic Western colonial powers, had already been helped by his Freemasonic masters to rise to power in Turkey – only to destroy the administrative – military – academic – judiciary – economic establishment of Ankara, betray the Turkish – Azeri alliance heralded by the assassinated President Turgut Ozal, and act always under the illusion that he would be able to melt all these countries down, creating a vast Islamist state. His Freemasonic masters do not share Erdogan´s dreams; they merely use them, and through them, they manipulative effectively the Turkish prime minister.
Their overwhelming support to his efforts to destroy the Turkish state will be automatically removed, as soon as he marks a success in this regard, and more precisely at the moment when he will be dreaming to go ahead with his fictional Islamic state headquartered at Istanbul. And instead of being the first vizier of his illusionary Caliph, Erdogan will find himself thrown into the rubbish basket of the World History by those who so fervently laud him in Europe´s hypocritical venues and heretic pseudo-lodges.
In a forthcoming article, I will explain what means for Turkey the stance of the Council of Europe concerning the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and I will continue the republication of parts of the document that was kept hidden from all the inhabitants of Turkey.
The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Doc. 10364
29 November 2004
assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10364.htm
Report
Political Affairs Committee
Rapporteur: Mr David Atkinson, United Kingdom, European Democrat Group
Summary
More than a decade after the armed hostilities started, the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains unsolved. Hundreds of thousands of people are still displaced and live in miserable conditions. Considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces. The military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing. Separatist forces are still in control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
The Parliamentary Assembly reiterates that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that state´s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and reaffirms the right of displaced persons from the area of conflict to return to their homes safely and with dignity. The Assembly also supports the OSCE Minsk process for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to pursue a path of reconciliation.
I. Draft resolution
1. The Parliamentary Assembly regrets that, more than a decade after the armed hostilities started, the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains unsolved. Hundreds of thousands of people are still displaced and live in miserable conditions. Considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces and separatist forces are still in control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
2. The Assembly expresses its concern that the military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing. The Assembly reaffirms that independence and secession of a regional territory from a state may only be achieved through a lawful and peaceful process based on democratic support by the inhabitants of such territory and not in the wake of an armed conflict leading to ethnic expulsion and the de facto annexation of such territory to another state. The Assembly reiterates that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that state´s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and reaffirms the right of displaced persons from the area of conflict to return to their homes safely and with dignity.
3. The Assembly recalls Resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council and urges the parties concerned to comply with them, in particular by refraining from any armed hostilities and by withdrawing military forces from any occupied territories. The Assembly also aligns itself with the demand expressed in Resolution 853 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council and thus urges all member states to refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory.
4. The Assembly recalls that both Armenia and Azerbaijan committed themselves upon their accession to the Council of Europe in January 2001 to use only peaceful means for settling their conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Therefore, the Assembly urges both governments to refrain from using armed forces against each other as well as from propagating military action.
5. The Assembly recalls that the Council of Ministers of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) agreed in Helsinki in March 1992 to hold a conference in Minsk in order to provide for a forum for negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the United States of America agreed at that time to participate in this Conference. The Assembly calls on these states to step up their efforts to achieve the peaceful resolution of the conflict and invites their national delegations to the Assembly to report annually to the Assembly on the action of their governments in this respect. For this purpose, the Assembly asks its Bureau to create an Ad hoc Committee with inter alia the heads of these national delegations.
6. The Assembly pays tribute to the tireless efforts of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, in particular for having achieved a cease-fire in May 1994 and having monitored the observance of this cease-fire since then. The Assembly calls on the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs to take immediate steps to conduct speedy negotiations for the conclusion of a political agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict, the implementation of which will eliminate major consequences of the conflict for all parties and permit the convening of the Minsk Conference. The Assembly calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to make use of the OSCE Minsk Process and actively submit to each other via the Minsk Group their constructive proposals for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the relevant norms and principles of international law.
7. The Assembly recalls that Armenia and Azerbaijan are signatory parties to the Charter of the United Nations and, in accordance with Article 93, paragraph 1 of the Charter, ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Therefore, the Assembly suggests that if the negotiations under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group fail, Armenia and Azerbaijan should consider using the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Court´s Statute.
8. The Assembly calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to foster political reconciliation among themselves by stepping up bilateral inter-parliamentary co-operation within the Assembly as well as in other forums such as the meetings of the Speakers of the Parliaments of the Caucasian Four. It recommends that both delegations should meet during each part-session of the Assembly to review progress on such reconciliation.
9. The Assembly calls on the Government of Azerbaijan to establish contacts with the political representatives of both communities from the Nagorno-Karabakh region regarding the future status of the region. It is prepared to provide facilities for such contacts in Strasbourg, recalling that it did so in the form of a hearing on previous occasions with Armenian participation.
10. Recalling its Recommendation 1570 (2002) on the situation of refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the Assembly calls on all member and observer states to provide humanitarian aid and assistance to the hundreds of thousands of people displaced as a consequence of the armed hostilities and the expulsion of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan and ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia.
11. The Assembly condemns any expression of hatred portrayed in the media of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Assembly calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to foster reconciliation, confidence-building and mutual understanding among their peoples through schools, universities and the media. Without such reconciliation, hatred and mistrust will prevent stability in the region and may lead to new violence. Any sustainable settlement must be preceded by and embedded in such reconciliation processes.
12. The Assembly calls on the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to draw up an action plan for specific support to Armenia and Azerbaijan targeted at mutual reconciliation processes and to take this resolution into account in deciding on action concerning Armenia and Azerbaijan.
13. The Assembly calls on the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe to assist locally elected representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan in establishing mutual contacts and inter-regional co-operation.
14. The Assembly resolves to analyse the conflict settlement mechanisms existing within the Council of Europe, in particular the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in order to provide its member states with better mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of bilateral conflicts as well as internal disputes involving local or regional territorial communities or authorities which may endanger human rights, stability and peace.
15. The Assembly resolves to continue monitoring on a regular basis the peaceful resolution of this conflict and decides to revert to considering this issue at its first part-session in 2006.
II. Draft recommendation
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution …. (2005) on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference and recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
i. urge the parties concerned to comply with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), in particular by refraining from any armed hostilities and by withdrawing military forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan;
ii. monitor the compliance by Armenia and Azerbaijan with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the decisions of the OSCE Council of Ministers on this conflict;
iii. report to the Assembly on the efforts undertaken by member states for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council including whether member states refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory in violation of Resolution 853 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council;
iv. recalling its Recommendation 1251 (1994) on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, place experts at the disposal of Armenia and Azerbaijan who could help draw up a political status for Nagorno-Karabakh, if they so wish;
v. allocate resources for an action plan of specific confidence-building measures for Armenia and Azerbaijan;
vi. allocate resources for specific training programmes for teachers and journalists from both countries aimed at better mutual understanding, tolerance and reconciliation;
vii. allocate resources for specific action by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance concerning both countries, in particular with regard to educational institutions and the public media;
viii. instruct its competent steering committee to analyse how far the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes reflects the current requirements of conflict settlement among member states of the Council of Europe and where it should be revised in order to provide an adequate instrument for the peaceful settlement of disputes between the member states of the Council of Europe;
ix. take Resolution …. (2005) into account when deciding on action concerning both countries;
x. forward Resolution …. (2005) and this Recommendation to the governments of member states with a view to supporting them nationally, bilaterally and internationally.
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
Orientalist, Historian, Political Scientist, Dr. Megalommatis, 52, is the author of 12 books, dozens of scholarly articles, hundreds of encyclopedia entries, and thousands of articles. He speaks, reads and writes more than 15, modern and ancient, languages. He refuted Greek nationalism, supported Martin Bernal´s Black Athena, and rejected the Greco-Romano-centric version of History. He pleaded for the European History by J. B. Duroselle, and defended the rights of the Turkish, Pomak, Macedonian, Vlachian, Arvanitic, Latin Catholic, and Jewish minorities of Greece.
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part I
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis March 22, 2009
In a previous article entitled "Turkey – Azerbaijan – Armenia: Documents Incriminating Erdogan, Still Hidden in Turkey"
above, I illustrated some of the reasons for which the theologically extremist, politically Islamist, historically ignorant, intellectually gullible, and diplomatically inexperienced prime minister of Turkey has to be removed in an effort to limit liabilities ensuing from his ridiculous targets, unrealistic dreams, and – above all – dramatic apathy in front of, if not tragic and calamitous compliance with, the colonial powers´ complot against Turkey.
In support of my approach to the (well hidden by the Western mass media and the Erdogan administration) subject of the forthcoming dissolution of Turkey, I brought to surface a critical document that remains widely – and catastrophically – unknown in Turkey, namely the Report presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with respect to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Submitted in November 2004, the Report "The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference" demonstrates clearly that the countries with which Turkey has been allied, and the major powers involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, drastically prevent Turkey from implementing policies pertaining to the interests of Ankara and Baku that are identical; even worse the Erdogan – Gul administration is fully compliant with these powers.
Acting in full concordance on the subject, England and France have induced their unsusceptible partners in the European Union to follow in their footsteps when it comes to the explosive Caucasus crisis. This will prove to be detrimental for Italy, Germany and Poland – to say the least. The same – hidden from most but fully active – axis, pursuing typical 19th century colonial trickeries, has maneuvered Russia into a maelstrom of anti-Islamic and supposedly pro-Christian policies in the Caucasus region in order to manage that Moscow properly defends the ailing tiny state of Armenia, and effectively prevents both, Azerbaijan´s national reunification and Turkey´s merge with the reunified Azerbaijan.
The scheme is similar to what occurred before 100 years when the tsar idiotically considered the Ottoman Empire as his enemy, and thus he achieved to fail first to reach Jerusalem (his final target in the Middle East) and second to survive. Russian naivety cost the tsar his head, and the same will happen with the tyrannical and militaristic regime of the combined interests Putin (Moscow´s anti-Western lobby and the Soviet Secret Srvices) and Medvedev (Zionist capital of the Jewish Diasora), but this is not the point to analyze how Russia would outmaneuver the Anti-Russian trickery of London and Paris.
What matters for Turkey is that the same axis pursues against Turkey their traditional anti-Ottoman policies geared to destroy the Ottoman Empire. It is pure naivety to either imagine otherwise about the Anglo-French interests or assume that any cooperation with them could possibly have no disastrous effect on Turkey.
The colonial machination against Turkey uses Iran, Armenia, the so-called Kurdish leaders, Israel, and the Arabic tyrannies. Obviously, not all of these elements are conscious perpetrators of their policies; many are maneuvered through bribery and colonial style promises (Armenia, the so-called Kurdish leaders, and the Arabic tyrannies) whereas others (Iran) are manipulated and maneuvered without direct contact involved only to be systematically driven to pre-calculated (by the Anglo-French) reactions.
Of course, the first tool of colonial policy toward Turkey is the inducement (I should say seducement) to enter the European Union. Turkey has European vocation but has no European interests; the secular political, academic, financial, military establishment correctly approved of Turkey´s political orientation toward European Union in the 60s and the 70s because this was the correct step in a bi-polar world whereby Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were merely parts of the USSR. The European dream is not valid anymore for Turkey.
The Anglo-French axis, carefully and artificially divided into supposedly pro-Turkish and supposedly anti-Turkish parts (in fact, they are all anti-Turkish), attracts therefore the current Turkish administration to an invalid dream that means nothing for Turkey. Europe is a trash that will never unite except under a tyranny far worse than that of Hitler – whereby Turkey has great chances, if Ankara stops every negotiation now, not be a member – victim like all the rest.
The Anglo-French bias takes the form of inducement for something that presupposes Turkey´s destruction in order to be achieved. To become admitted in the European Union, Turkey should be democratized – they say. Certainly, this is a fallacy; what the Anglo-French elites truly mean by demanding "democratization" is the final demolition of the real, deep, Turkish state.
One may suggest that this sort of administrative machine, the real, deep state, does not correspond to a Western democracy, and this is true, but only in theory. There is real, deep state in England and France as well, simply it is prohibited for anyone there to speak about it, and if some truthful denouncers do so, first their voice is not allowed to be possibly heard, and second they are discredited – through shamefully immoral use of all the existing pejorative terms against them.
There is a point; the real, deep state in France and England is not made of the visible English and the French political, academic, financial, military establishments as such, as is the case in Turkey; for a very simple reason. In England and France, the real, deep state is far deeper and far stronger than in Turkey, and therefore omnipotent and unseen. This does not mean effectively invisible.
Nothing perpetrated by a human being can assuredly go undetected by another human being; for the greatest secret there is always the moment of the de-codification. This is inevitable.
In England and France, the real, deep state consists in the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge that rules in a totalitarian way, imposing their policies by illegally occupying (and therefore hiring) all the important public and private administration positions in every sector. By secretly arranging full implementation of the solidarity rules among their members, they set up a frame within which two people, already known to one another and identified as "brethren" within their secret lodges, establish in public (within a ministry, a university, the army or a company) a cooperation the beginning of which is unknown to the rest; in this way, the secret purpose of the cooperation of the two persons remains unknown to their colleagues, superiors or subordinates, who are kept in mysteries about the agenda that is thus being implemented without any hindrance.
Wherever there is Freemasonic secrecy there cannot be a functional democracy. The existence of a Freemasonic lodge automatically cancels the essence of Democracy, as the will of the many becomes the victim of the secrecy of the few.
To make a comparison, I can merely say, something that is widely known, that several Turks managed effectively to rise in the academia and in the finance, in the army and the public administration, without believing in the ideals of Kemal Ataturk; under Turkey´s secular establishment – provocatively characterized by the Anglo-French as anti-democratic – many Turks, who were opposed to Kemal Ataturk´s ideas, managed to rise in power.
This does not and cannot happen in France and in England; who dares speak in today´s England and France – and further on, throughout the European Union – against the Freemasonic establishment and its vast, immense, deep and ominous apparatus in terms used before 140 years by Popes? No one. Who dares oppose the evil models of social and daily life that have been tyrannical imposed by the puppet regimes of the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge on the Western societies? Who dares denounce the materialism, the conventionalism, the relativism, the conformism, the consumerism, the evil pan-sexism that all have befallen (been imposed) on the Western societies through the secretive techniques of massive insanity, performed by the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge?
Certainly the present article does not consist in an analysis of the Western societies. What I merely wanted to say is this: it is better to live in a sane environment whereby you are not allowed to openly express your opinion for a few subjects because of an apparently non tolerant regime than to be forced – in your unbeknownst – to survive in an insane environment whereby you are allowed to openly say anything you like because all you can say is nonsensical idiocy unable to hit the foundations of the monstrously and inhumanly tyrannical regime that dictatorially transformed all its citizens to besotted beings.
The Anglo-French bias had to be implemented by a fully ignorant and obviously idiotic dreamer who thought himself and his equally besotted friends as possibly able to first work for some time with the Anglo-French, until they get the political control over the real, deep state of Turkey, and then dissociate themselves from the colonial West that they inherently hate.
Erdogan´s back thoughts and anti-secular, anti-laic and anti-democratic schemes have been denounced even before the 2007 elections.
What became recently evident is Erdogan´s vicious anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli hatred, as explicitly manifested in Davos, which merely testifies to his anti-Western complex, being only one of its many emanations.
Even more recently, Erdogan´s rapprochement with Armenia and his government´s expressly anti-Azerbaijan position let us see more clearly; Erdogan´s Islamists are ready to sacrifice Turkey´s national interests (that are automatically aligned with those of Azerbaijan) because they simply do not bother about them. These interests are not part of their agenda that involves the dissolution of Turkey and the merge of Turkey´s territory with a huge Islamic state to be made out of many Middle Eastern Arabic-speaking states, Iran, and Pakistan.
By saying this, I don´t mean that Erdogan and his Islamists are in line with all the other projects and agendas providing for the formation of an Islamic state in the Middle East; they merely represent one of the agendas, and to this agenda of theirs has to be added the calamitous Turkish – Syrian, Turkish – Iraqi, and Turkish – Iranian rapprochements. Certainly Erdogan does not believe that the opening of the Turkish – Armenian borderline will be calamitous for Turkey; neither does he imagine the extent to which he has been cheated by Talabani and Barzani. But 75 millions of Turks will pay in blood for his "mistakes"…….
But this is nothing new; the French and the English colonized Egypt, following Napoleon´s arrival (1798), saying that they do not intend to rule the country, and that the country would be ruled by the Viceroy (Khedive) of the Sultan; only to attack the Ottoman city of Jerusalem 119 years later – from Egypt……
Before that, useless to add, the Viceroy (Khedive) of the Sultan greatly contributed with all the resources of the previously Ottoman province to all the points and details of the colonial Anglo-French agenda.
This was the reason for the invasion of Egypt, and that´s why the Anglo-French deployed a great effort to permanently appease the Sultans, as they appease now Erdogan with the fake promise of the EU acceptance of Turkey.
In fact, thrice and in very brief time, Erdogan´s government betrayed Azerbaijan, which means automatically that Turkey´s government betrayed Turkey itself.
First, with the Iranian rapprochement. Turkey´s interests after 1991 impose the immediate dissolution of Iran at all costs, the subsequent merge of Turkey with South Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan, other (occupied by Iran) lands of oppressed nations, notably Lorestan, Bakhtiaristan, Gilan, Mazandaran, and then Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan into a vast multicultural Union of Turkic Nations.
Second, with the Armenian rapprochement. Turkey´s and Azerbaijan´s interests are identical. It is impossible for Turkey to enter into discussion with Armenia before the full Armenian withdrawal from Nagorno Karabakh that the Armenians invaded through use of Russian soldiers, and kept under their control with the help of Russian threats against Azerbaijan. In fact, there was no Armenian victory in Nagorno Karabakh; there was an Anti-Turkish and Anti-Azeri conspiracy orchestrated by England and France that promised help to Russia´s Yeltsin in case of immediate Russian support of the Armenian thugs.
Third, with the biased stance in the case of the Nabucco pipeline. The issue is certainly vast, but I will further expand in forthcoming articles. Here, I have to simply state that Ankara´s current indifference for the triangular relationship Turkey – Armenia – Azerbaijan only underscores Erdogan´s Islamist lunacy and evil intention to turn the Ayasofya Museum to a mosque and Istanbul to the capital of a transvestite pseudo-caliphate.
As I promised, I continue with the republication of parts of the critical document that was kept hidden from all the inhabitants of Turkey. In a forthcoming article, I will explain what means for Turkey, and for the current illegitimate administration of Ankara, the stance of the Council of Europe concerning the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Doc. 10364
29 November 2004
assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10364.htm
Table of Contents
Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur
Introduction
Historical background
The efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group
Other efforts to settle the conflict
International legal dispute
Essential conditions for a sustainable settlement
Possible action by the Council of Europe and its member states
Appendix I - Maps of the conflict area used by the United Nations
Appendix II - Programmes of visits in preparation of the report
Appendix III - Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council
Appendix IV - Background paper prepared by the Directorate General of Political Affairs for the seminar "Youth and conflict Resolution" (Strasbourg, 31 March – 2 April 2003)
III. Explanatory Memorandum by the Rapporteur
Introduction
1. Until 31 August 2004, Mr Terry Davis was rapporteur on this subject. On 1 September, Mr Davis took up his duties as Secretary General of the Council of Europe and left the Parliamentary Assembly. After several meetings with the parties concerned and several visits to the region, he had submitted a draft report to the Committee before that date, which was discussed at the meeting of the Political Affairs Committee in Paris on 14 September 2004. On 14 September 2004, I was appointed to succeed Mr Davis as rapporteur. This document contains the draft report together with my changes.
2. The title of this report is the "conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference" and concerns the armed conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the Nagorno-Karabakh1 region and its surrounding districts which are under occupation by Armenian forces.
3. The conflict area comprises the territory of the former Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as the total or partial territory of eight surrounding districts of Azerbaijan. The former Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh is not adjacent to the territory of Armenia and is separated from Armenia by other districts. (see Appendix I – map used by the United Nations).
4. For most of the past 15 years, the attention of European states has been focused on conflicts in other regions, and the conflicts in the South Caucasus have not received enough attention and understanding. During the preparation of this report, this situation has changed. Several governments outside the region have launched programmes which can be described as confidence building measures. However, some people in the region have expressed their concern that these efforts need to be coordinated by an international organisation such as the Council of Europe.
5. The conflict concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh region is really a conflict between two principles: territorial integrity and self-determination. On the one hand, the borders of Azerbaijan were internationally recognised at the time of the country being recognised as independent state in 1991. The territory of Azerbaijan included the Nagorno-Karabakh region. On the other hand, the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh (the majority even before "ethnic cleansing" in 1992-1994) claim the right of self-determination. They are supported by Armenia.
6. According to the information given to me, Armenians from Armenia had participated in the armed fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh region besides local Armenians from within Azerbaijan. Today, Armenia has soldiers stationed in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the surrounding districts, people in the region have passports of Armenia, and the Armenian government transfers large budgetary resources to this area.
7. The conflict is long-standing and rooted in history. It became an armed conflict in 1992, and the fighting between Armenians and Azerbaijanis did not stop until 1994.
8. During the conflict and preceding events, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced. More than a decade has passed, and they have not been able to return to their homes. These people often live under miserable conditions. Beyond this pressing humanitarian need, there is also the latent danger of a new outbreak of armed hostilities. This report, the draft Resolution and draft Recommendation are intended to raise awareness of the conflict and assist the efforts for its peaceful settlement.
9. The OSCE2 started dealing with this conflict in 1992 and decided to hold a conference in Minsk on the terms of the final settlement of the conflict. In May 1994, it succeeded in obtaining a cease-fire agreement which stopped the war. Although the subsequent negotiations have not yet succeeded in obtaining a settlement, I pay tribute to the Co-Chairs3 of the OSCE Minsk Group for their tireless efforts. This Rapporteur has great respect for their work.
10. In preparation of this report, the Rapporteur has visited Armenia and Azerbaijan twice and met the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on four separate occasions. Thanks are due to all the authorities involved in these visits and meetings for their good will and co-operation. The programmes of these visits are attached (Appendix II).
Historical background
11. To understand this conflict, it is helpful to look briefly at the history of the area and the situation before the fighting broke out. In fact, history is an important factor. It has frequently been painful for both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and historic events have been widely used in order to justify ethnic hatred, violence and claims over territories in this region. However, this report does not attempt to report exhaustively on the history. It is rather intended to draw attention to a few key facts.
12. From 1987 onwards, ethnic violence increased and coincided with bilateral tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan within the USSR. With the dissolution of the USSR, the hostilities developed into large-scale military actions, which resulted in the death of thousands and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Following these events, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe made a Declaration on 11 March 1992 condemning the violence and attacks directed against the civilian population. After Armenia and Azerbaijan had become participating states in the OSCE in 1992, the OSCE began to deal with this conflict.
13. In the meantime, ethnic Armenians had established a "government" in the Nagorno-Karabkah region with its "capital" in Stepanakert (or Khankendi in Azerbaijani). This "government" is not recognised by any of the Council of Europe member states, nor by the OSCE, European Union and the United Nations. Armenia maintains close political, economic and military relations with them, but does not recognise the area as an independent state and hence has not established diplomatic relations with this "government".
14. A more detailed explanation of the background and history of this region is reproduced in a separate Appendix (Appendix IV in English only) to this document. This Appendix consists of a background paper which was prepared by the Directorate General of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe and was used for a Council of Europe seminar on "Youth and Conflict Resolution" organised in Strasbourg in April 2003. Also attached for information is the written response by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe.
The efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group
15. Unfortunately, but understandably, the OSCE Minsk process has been confidential and limited to the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore, very little information is available to the public in both countries. However, some positions discussed at the bilateral meetings under the OSCE Minsk Group have become the subject of rumour and speculation. It is thus widely believed that the negotiations of the two governments were close to an agreement following the initiatives by the Co-Chairs in 1997, 1998 and 2001, with meetings of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Paris and Key West (USA). The proposed settlements differed from each other, but covered the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the withdrawal of military forces and subsequent security guarantees, as well as the return of refugees and displaced persons.
16. The year 2003 saw virtually no progress in the bilateral negotiations under the Minsk Group as a result of parliamentary and presidential elections in both Armenia and Azerbaijan ending with the presidential election in Azerbaijan in October 2003.
17. At the time of the Rapporteur´s visit to the region in February 2004, the situation could only be described as stalemate. A meeting between President Kocharyan and President Aliyev in November 2003 had not even resulted in a date to meet again. However, there has been a lot of activity since February with another meeting of the Presidents in Warsaw on 28 April 2004 and several meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Bratislava on 18/19 March, Prague on 16 April, Strasbourg on 12/13 May, Prague on 21 June and Istanbul on 28/29 June 2004. At separate meetings with the Foreign Ministers and the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group in Strasbourg on 13 May, the Rapporteur had the impression that, although an agreement could not be described as imminent, the negotiations had gained a new momentum.
18. The current population of the Nagrono-Karabakh region is not included in the negotiation process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk process. The President of Armenia, President Kocharyan, was the first "president" of the self-declared but internationally not recognised "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" and thus may have the confidence of the ethnic Armenian population in that region. However, his successor and the other representatives of the political forces in the region regard themselves as the representatives of the people there and thus want to be involved in any settlement agreement. During the Rapporteur´s visits to Baku, it became clear that the Azerbaijani authorities were only willing to include representatives of the political forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh region if they renounced their desire for secession. The exclusion of these political forces is a weakness of the current process, because in the end, a solution cannot be imposed on them against their will.
Other efforts to settle the conflict
19. During the armed conflict, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) (see Appendix III). These Resolutions called upon Armenia and Azerbaijan to restore peace, protect civilians and liberate the territories occupied in the course of the conflict. The latter applied in particular to Armenia. Regrettably, major parts of these Resolutions have not yet been implemented.
20. Some people argue that the United Nations should become more active in dealing with this issue because it damages the authority of the Security Council for its Resolutions to be ignored. However, the Security Council has resisted all suggestions of becoming more involved and has simply supported the mediation activity of the OSCE.
International legal dispute
21. There is another UN route which could be used by the parties to the conflict if the negotiations sponsored by the Minsk Group do not result in an agreed settlement. Article 36 of the United Nations Charter clearly states that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice. As member states of the United Nations, Armenia and Azerbaijan are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice under Article 9, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter. Both states could, therefore, take their case to the International Court of Justice as another way of achieving a peaceful settlement of a conflict.
22. There is another option. As has already been noted, the conflict resulted in the expulsion of ethnic Azerbaijanis from the occupied territories and the expulsion of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan and ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia, a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons are living far away from their homes. These people have the right to enjoy their property or receive compensation for the deprivation of this right under Article 1 of the first Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. In the case of Loizidou v Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights awarded compensation to an applicant who was judged to have been unlawfully displaced from her home in the course of an armed conflict. Parallels with the persons displaced from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the surrounding territories are obvious.
Essential conditions for a sustainable settlement
23. A sustainable settlement of the conflict must, of course, go beyond a legal settlement. It must be emphasised that this dispute has a second dimension: a conflict between legality and reality. The majority population of the Nagorno-Karabakh region is ethnic Armenian, and this was the case before the conflict. The Azerbaijani population of this region was a minority, and a future Azerbaijani population would probably remain a minority. In addition, there is wide-spread, deeply rooted and strongly propagated and developed distrust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. This distrust cannot be overcome by a court judgment or legal settlement alone.
24. Any settlement would also face the democratic dilemma, which requires the political leadership of both countries to respond to public opinion. The current public opinions in both countries may not yet be ripe for a settlement based on compromise.
25. The often terrible humanitarian conditions of the refugees and displaced persons must also be addressed. These people have a right to return to their homes, but many people do not want to return (especially ethnic Azerbaijanis formerly living in Armenia and ethnic Armenians formerly living in Azerbaijan). The former population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent districts is more likely to want to return because these areas had only been populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis and are nearly depopulated at present. Those refugees who do not want to go back need the means to integrate into the communities in which they have been living since their flight. Where displaced persons want to go back, large efforts are needed for the reconstruction of their destroyed homes. The reconstruction of houses will have to go hand in hand with economic reconstruction and development. In this respect, the international community will be called upon to provide support.
26. If the eventual settlement of this dispute does not envisage immediate secession of Nagorno-Karabakh form Azerbaijan, everyone accepts that Nagorno-Karabkh must have a high level of autonomy. In this connection, the Rapporteur draws attention to the Assembly´s Resolution 1334 (2003) and Recommendation 1609 (2003) on positive experiences of autonomous regions as a source of inspiration. In a detailed report on this subject, Mr Andreas Gross comes to the conclusion that regional autonomy with a high degree of self-government may be a better solution than secession and independence.
27. The conflict has exacerbated a widespread and deeply rooted ethnic hatred and even fear. The historic feelings of distrust and fear have been made worse by the personal experiences of many people on all sides during the armed conflict and the preceding events. For Armenians and Azerbaijanis to live peacefully together, or at least side by side, requires a certain degree of reconciliation. The Council of Europe has developed confidence building programmes and guidelines for action against racism, intolerance and ethnic hatred through its European Commission against Racism and Intolerance as well as in the media and education sectors. Successful events have been launched by the Council of Europe against hate language in the media in other regions. Such action in this region is desperately needed
28. A peaceful cohabitation of both ethnic groups will also require a high presence of security and police forces at the initial stage. In the Rapporteur´s opinion, it will require an international presence which takes into account the experience of such efforts in other parts of Europe.
Possible action by the Council of Europe and its member states
29. For the Assembly, the key question will be how the Council of Europe and its member states can contribute to the settlement of the conflict and its humanitarian consequences.
30. The Council of Europe has great experience in promoting and pursuing confidence building measures. The confidence of everyone living in Armenia and Azerbaijan is essential for positive political progress in the future. Confidence-building measures should therefore become a priority for the Council of Europe.
31. In its country-by-country analysis, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) is responsible for dealing with Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, various sectors of the Council of Europe have developed guidelines and action programmes for more tolerance and mutual understanding. The work of ECRI and the assistance and co-operation programmes of the Council of Europe should be coordinated and reinforced.
32. The Council of Europe is not a humanitarian aid organisation. However, the Council of Europe Development Bank can give loans for projects required for the peaceful settlement of the conflict as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, member states of the Council of Europe could coordinate their bilateral support through the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
Note
Turkey will enter into war with Iran under any circumstances whatsoever; it will be either now, which means under favorable conditions for Turkey, or later, when the Anglo-French trickery has fixed the event, which means under unfavorable conditions for Turkey. In fact, Turkey mobilizing the South Azeris, the Loris, the Gilanis, the Qashqais, the Turkmen, the Bahtiaris and the Mazandaris can invade the entire Western half of Iran, merging with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and eliminating any land access to South Iraq for the Shia Persians.
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part II
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis March 29, 2009
In two previous articles entitled "Turkey – Azerbaijan – Armenia: Documents Incriminating Erdogan, Still Hidden in Turkey"
and "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part I", above, I illustrated some of the reasons for which the theologically extremist, politically Islamist, historically ignorant, intellectually gullible, and diplomatically inexperienced prime minister of Turkey has to be removed by any means and at all costs.
In support of my approach to the (well hidden by the Western mass media and the Erdogan administration) subject of the forthcoming dissolution of Turkey, I brought to surface a critical document that remains widely – and catastrophically – unknown in Turkey, namely the Report presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with respect to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Submitted in November 2004, the Report "The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference" demonstrates clearly that the countries with which Turkey has been allied, and the major powers involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, drastically prevent Turkey from implementing policies pertaining to the interests of Ankara and Baku that are identical; even worse the Erdogan – Gul administration is fully compliant with these powers.
Erdogan´s and Gul´s compliance with Anti-Turkish policies is revealed throughout this document that demonstrates very clearly that international organizations and world instances whereby Turkey participates, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), happen to give credence to racist, anti-Turkish and anti-Turkic propaganda prepared and diffused by both the Armenian state and the Armenian Diaspora. This Anti-Turkish and Anti-Turkic bias reflects a reality that automatically cancels any plans for possible Turkish cooperation with the racist state or even any type of normalization of the bilateral relations.
The document, particularly in parts included in the present and forthcoming articles, demonstrates that there are international organizations ready to accept to consider, discuss and ponder about incredibly biased approaches, as is in the case of the Armenian –Azerbaijani conflict about Nagorno – Karabakh the inclusion of any reference to events occurred in the Ottoman Empire that are fallaciously described by the Armenian racists as ´Genocide´. Nagorno – Karabakh was not part of the Ottoman Empire when the events that are fallaciously called by the Armenians as "genocide" took place.
The insertion of any element pertaining to any purely Ottoman – Armenian issue in a document purportedly produced in order to help solve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict merely testifies to the following:
the intentional and fallacious depiction of the Armenian side as weaker, discriminated and persecuted
the subsequent creation of a false impression depicting Armenians and Azerbaijanis as equally victimized
the malicious conduction of the negotiations in a way that viciously alters the real data and the overall outlook of the issue under the false impression created by the previously mentioned points
the imposition of an unfair and unjust pseudo-solution that makes the evil "equation" between
a. "injustices" made to Armenians in the 1910s (non by the Azeris) and
b. "injustices" made to Azeris in the 1990s.
Through effective swinging, the Armenians take more, the Azeris are forced to accept the policy of faits accomplis, the easily maneuvered Russians are used in order to prevent Azerbaijan from getting back today what the Armenians took back in the 1990s through lawless means and tricks, and of course OSCE´s fairness and justice cannot reach Dagestan whereby tyrannized Dagestanis are shamelessly portrayed by the Freemasonry-controlled mass media of the West as terrorists because this is offered to the Russians in exchange for their besotted support to Armenia, a support that gravely jeopardizes Russia´s real interests in the Caucasus and the Middle East region.
The Islamist Turkish administration is guilty; either they studied the document and failed to reach the correct conclusion or they did not bother to take it into account because they are mere puppets of the Anglo-French Freemasonic establishments that dictate to them their demarches step by step.
Either Erdogan and Gul are ignorant or they function as puppets; under either circumstances, the Turkish people and the Turkish army must resort to concerted action and eliminate them before they open the Armenian border.
I will complete the republication of the document in forthcoming articles. I will also expand establishing parallels between today´s policy of faits accomplis toward Azerbaijan and tomorrow´s policy of faits accomplis against Turkey, after the calamitous Islamist administration opens the Armenian border.
The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Doc. 10364
29 November 2004
assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10364.htm
Appendix I
Maps of the conflict area used by the United Nations
Appendix II
Programmes of visits in preparation of the report
Warsaw, 22 February 2003
Meeting with the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group:
Ambassador Nikolai Gribkov (Russian Federation),
Ambassador Henry Jacolin (France),
Ambassador Rudolf V. Perina (USA),
And
Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
Baku, 14 April 2003
Meeting with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Personal Representative of the President of the Republic, Mr. Araz Azimov
Meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vilayat Guliyev
Meeting with the Head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the PACE, Mr. Ilham Aliyev, and members of the delegation
Meeting with the Chairman of the Parliament (Milli Mejlis), Mr. Murtuz Aleskerov
Meeting with the Minister of Defence, Mr. Safar Abiyev
Meeting with the Minister for National Security, Mr. Namig Abbasov
Meeting with representatives of the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh
Meeting with representatives of opposition parties represented in the Parliament
Baku, 15 April 2003
Meeting with the Chairman of the State Committee on Refugees and IDPs, Mr. Ali Hasanov
Departure to the refugee and IDP camp in Bilasuvar
Meeting with the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Mr. Heydar Aliyev
Meeting with Members of the National Academia of Sciences
Press conference
Meeting with Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference
Tbilisi, 16 April 2003
Meeting with the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in Tbilisi, Mr. Plamen Nikolov
Meeting with the Dutch Ambassador to Georgia and Armenia and the Representative of the European Commission in Tbilisi
Yerevan, 17 April 2003
Meeting with the UK Ambassador in Yerevan, Ms Thorda Abbott-Watt
Meeting with the Head of the Armenian delegation to the PACE, Mr. Hovhannes Hovhannisyan
Meeting with the heads of parliamentary factions and groups
Meeting with the Chairman of the National Assembly, Mr. Armen Khachatryan
Meeting with the Minister of Defence, Mr. Serzh Sargsyan
Meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vardan Oskanyan
Yerevan, 18 April 2003
Visit to areas settled by refugees and meeting with refugees
Meeting with a representative from Nagorno-Karabakh
Meeting with the Personal Representative of the President of the Republic, Mr. Tatul Margaryan
Meeting with the President of the Republic of Armenia, Mr. Robert Kocharyan
Press conference
Amsterdam, 11 June 2003
Meeting with the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group:
Ambassador Nikolai Gribkov (Russian Federation),
Ambassador Henry Jacolin (France),
Ambassador Rudolf V. Perina (USA),
And
Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
Nagorno-Karabakh region, 23 February 2004
Visit to Shushi / Shusha and meeting with refugees
Visit to Stepanakert / Khankendi
Meeting with Mr. Oleg Yesayan and political parties
Meeting with Mr. Arkady Ghoukassyan
Yerevan, 24 February 2004
Meeting with Mr. Tatoul Margaryan, the Personal Representative of the President of the Republic
Meeting with Head of the State Department for Migration and Refugees and refugees in the former dormitory of Yerevan University
Meeting with the Armenian Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly and the political parties represented in the National Assembly of Armenia
Meeting with Mr. Robert Kocharyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, and Mr. Vardan Oskanyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Baku, 25 February 2004
Meeting with displaced persons in Baku
Baku, 26 February 2004
Meeting with Mr. Namig Abbasov, Minister for National Security
Meeting with Mr. Ilham Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Meeting with the Azerbaijan Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly
Meeting with political parties represented in the National Assembly of Azerbaijan
Meeting with Mr. Murtuz Aleskerov, Chairman of the National Assembly
Meeting with Mr. Safar Abiyev, Minister of Defence
Meeting with Mr. Vilayat Guliyev, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Strasbourg, 13 May 2004
Meeting with Mr. Vardan Oskanyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia
Meeting with Mr. Elmar Mammadyarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan
Meeting with the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group:
Ambassador Henry Jacolin (France),
Ambassador Yuri Merzlyakov (Russia)
Ambassador Stephen Mann (USA),
And
Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
Appendix III
Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council
In photocopies
Appendix IV
Restricted
AS/POL (2004) 24 Appendix IV
8 September 2004
Apdoc04_24 app. IV
English Only
The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference
Note:
This appendix reproduces the background paper prepared by the Directorate General of Political Affairs for the seminar "Youth and Conflict Resolution" (Strasbourg, 31 March - 2 April 2003). It also contains a letter by the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe as a response to parts of it which were equally reproduced in an information document for the Committee of Ministers.
The views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect those of the Rapporteur or the Assembly.
Cette annexe reprend le document d´information préparé par la Direction générale des Affaires politiques pour le séminaire "Jeunesse et Résolution des conflits (Strasbourg, 31 mars – 2 avril 2003). Elle comprend également une lettre du Représentant permanent de l´Azerbaïdjan auprès du Conseil de l´Europe répondant à des parties de ce texte qui étaient intégrées dans un document d´information du Comité des Ministres.
Les opinions exprimées dans ce document ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles du Rapporteur ou de l´Assemblée.
January 2003
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
This background paper is prepared for the seminar "Youth and conflict resolution", where participants with personal conflict experience are expected to discuss other, lesser known to them conflicts. To serve its purpose, the paper seeks to present fairly the official positions, but also the historic and psychological burdens, the fears and aspirations of the sides in the conflict. In describing the position of one side, the paper contains textual and graphic information, which is not necessarily acceptable and may be offending to the other side. The views are clearly attributed throughout the text. Presenting them does not imply endorsement by the Council of Europe Secretariat. Where Secretariat views are given, they are clearly marked as "Comment".
Contents
Basic facts . . . . . 25
Ancient history. . . . . 26
Recent history. . . . . 27
The demise of the USSR and the slide into war 31
The Nagorno-Karabakh war . . . 33
Perceptions of the military conflict . . 36
The legal side of the dispute . . . 36
The broader geopolitical context . . 37
Mediation efforts in the N-K conflict . . 40
Negotiating mechanisms . . . 40
Positions of the sides . . . . 41
Settlement options . . . . 42
Problems of Conflict Settlement . . 43
The Council of Europe position . . 44
Map of Nagorno-Karabakh . . . 46
Appendix . . . . . 47
Basic facts
The name Nagorno-Karabakh is a relatively recent combination of the Russian word Nagorno, meaning mountainous, and the Turkic-Persian word Karabakh, meaning black garden. The de-facto authorities of Nagorno Karabakh (hereinafter: N-K) as well as most Armenian sources use the historical name of the region: Artsakh, meaning strong forest. The origin of both names seems to be linked to geographical features: elevation, cooler climate and, in ancient times, forests rich in game and fruit.
Map
Armenian historiographers indicate that present-day N-K comprises one-third of the historic Artsakh territory, just as present-day Armenia covers about one-tenth of traditionally Armenian lands.
Map
For this paper and for conflict-resolution purposes N-K means the territory of the former N-K Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) of the USSR.
N-K has an area of 4.400 square kilometres - for comparison, about twice the size of Luxembourg or half that of Cyprus. There are lowlands, hills and peaks as high as 3724 m. Vineyards, orchards, silkworm and grains are the major agricultural activities. According to the 1989 USSR census, N-K had 186.100 inhabitants of whom 138.600 (73.5%) were Armenians and 47.500 (25.3%) Azerbaijanis. Estimates about today´s population vary from less than 100.000 to 130.000. There are no Azerbaijanis left.
The N-K conflict left estimated 30.000 dead and twice as many wounded combatants and civilians. Over one million people, some 800.000 from them Azerbaijanis, have fled their homes to live refugee lives in tents, railway carriages and mud brick homes.
The "line of contact" between the ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani forces is heavily mined; much of the infrastructure is destroyed or dismantled. Nine years after the 1994 cease-fire, the yearly death toll along the line of contact has diminished, but young persons continue to die in mine blasts or occasional skirmishes.
Because of the conflict, Armenia has no diplomatic relations with two out of its four neighbours, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Prospects for regional co-operation are bleak.
The N-K conflict is the longest-running one in the former Soviet Union. It is a strong barrier to economic development and democratic reform in the whole region.
Hundreds of thousands of broken lives will take at least a generation to heal.
Ancient history
Two largely opposite versions of history shape present-day Armenian and Azerbaijani perceptions as regards the N-K conflict.
The Armenian view is that Artsakh is the cradle of Armenian identity. Back in the 5th century, the first Armenian school was open at the Amaras Church in present-day Martuni District of N-K. Earlier, in 301 Armenia had adopted Christianity and in 405 scholar, preacher and military leader Mesrop Mashtots had created – or according to other sources, revived the forgotten Armenian alphabet.
The Azerbaijani view is that from 4th century B.C. to 8th century A.D. present-day N-K belonged to Caucasian Albania, the most ancient state of Northern Azerbaijan, which adopted Christianity in 313 and had its unique alphabet composed of 52 letters.
In the centuries that followed, the region was subject to influence and conquest by Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Turks and Russians. Armenian historiographers consider this long period essentially as Christian or Armenian resistance against foreign, largely Muslim domination. The Azerbaijani view is fundamentally different: the region was populated by Caucasian Albanian and Turkic tribes ruled by Albanian Mikhranid princes and later by descendants of Hassan-Jalal - Jalalids. In the 15th century, after they lost political and secular power, the Jalalids became spiritual leaders – Patriarch-Catolicos of the Albanian autonomous Church. Under this interpretation, the Albanian Autocephalous Church was subordinated to the Armenian Church only in 1836, resulting in the Grigoriniasation (Armenisation) of the Albanian population.
Photocopies
For their part, Azerbaijani historiographers trace the beginning of Islamisation back to 705 when Arabic tribes conquered Albania lowlands. According to Azerbaijani sources, the Meliks were descendants of the clan of Jalalids, granted the title of Melik by the Jahanshah of Persia in the 15th century; none of them were of Armenian descent. The Albanian title of "Melik" differs from Armenian titles "Ishkhan", "Tar" etc. In their letters to the Russian czar, Karabakh Meliks call themselves "descendants of the Albanian Arshakids".
In the early 1800s, in the wake of Russian-Persian and Russian-Turkish wars, the Karabakh khanate and much of the South Caucasus were transferred to Russia. Azerbaijani historiography considers that migration of Armenians to the South Caucasus began after the Turkmanchay Treaty between Russia and Iran (1828) and Adrianopol treaty between Russia and Turkey (1829), both of which included special clauses allowing for migration of Armenians into the Caucasus. This is when first compact Armenian settlements appeared in Karabakh and Zangezur (the present-day area between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhichevan). Further to the Turkmanchay treaty, Russia created, for the first time in history, an Armenian Oblast (district). It comprised Erivan, Nakhichevan and Ordubad areas.
Comment: Depending on the viewpoint taken on ancient history, N-K can probably be seen as traditionally either Armenian of Azerbaijani land – or both.
Recent history
Comment: the recent history of the South Caucasus is replete with tragic events, which have become powerful myths dominating popular mindsets and political decisions. In this context, the term "myth" does not imply that historic events are questioned - it is used to identify the extent of the influence of these events on current thinking as well as the need to address related perceptions in the conflict resolution process.
For centuries, the Ottoman Empire ruled over numerous Christian minorities, which lived as second-class subjects ("infidels"), a mixed existence of conformism and resistance. In the 19th Century, Christians asserted their identity and struggled for independence - against severe punishment inflicted by the decaying Ottoman power and against the political turbulence resulting from the dispute amongst European Powers over how to divide the Empire.
Unlike other Christian Minorities, who lived mostly on the outskirts of the Empire, there were large groups of Armenians in the big cities of Turkey as well as a sizeable compact population in Asia Minor. Altogether, at the beginning of the 20th century there were some 2.5 million Armenians in Turkey. In the late 19th century, Armenian political movements emerged to claim reform and autonomy: the oldest Ramkavar (1885), the socialist-oriented "Hnchak" (1887) and the biggest party, the only one surviving to this day, "Dashnaksutyun" (1890), also known as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.
Armenian historiographers indicate that in the 1890's, Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) encouraged the first massive anti-Armenian pogroms. The Armenian community welcomed the "Young Turks revolution", which introduced Constitutional rule in 1909. As the Young Turks saw their pro-liberal reforms stall, they turned to pan-Turkic nationalist ideas. Towards 1915, the Young Turk "Committee for Union and Progress", dominated by Mehmed Talat Pasha, Ismail Enver Pasha and Ahmed Djemal Pasha masterminded a plan to take advantage of the First World War events to deport the Armenian population from Asia Minor with a view to "consolidate" Turkey. In this context, historiographers point out, on 24 April 1915, hundreds of Armenian community leaders were rounded up and later murdered. As the Armenians were asked to turn in their weapons to assist the war effort, anti-Armenian xenophobia was fanned. The able-bodied Armenians were drafted and disappeared. The women, children and white-bearded men were told they would be "relocated". Most of the future victims co-operated with the Government programme.
The Armenian view is that, in effect, the "relocation" turned out to be an unpitying death march towards the Mesopotamian deserts amidst murder, rape and starvation. Under the scorching sun, deportees died by the thousands of dehydration and disease. Armenian sources put the death toll at 1.5 million. This tragedy remains burnt forever in the collective Armenian memory. The Armenians refer to it as The Genocide.
Pictures
Armenian deportees: women, children and elderly men. Three generations of deportees sharing a tent
Ottoman Empire, region Syria, 1915. Ottoman Empire, region Syria, 1915
Photos: A Wegner Source: Armenian National Institute
The Turkish view is that there was no Genocide. What happened was a bitter civil war started by Armenian nationalists, in which both Armenians and Muslims died. The figure of 1.5 million Armenian victims is exaggerated; the number of Muslims who died in the same period is close to 3 million.
Comment: the bitter debate about events in 1915 is one of the most difficult issues between Armenia and Turkey. Progress towards reconciliation with this period of their common past would undoubtedly have a beneficial effect on prospect for solving of the N-K conflict.
Picture
The post-war Turkish government held criminal trials and found the Young Turks triumvirate guilty in abstentia. Turkey agreed to let US President Wilson draw the border with the newly- born Republic of Armenia. The US-proposed solution, known as "Wilsonian Armenia" was to include most of the six western Ottoman provinces as well as a large coastline on the Black Sea. Cilicia, or "Little Armenia", a separate region on the Mediterranean (North of Cyprus) was to be a French mandate.
Turkey did not accept the US proposal. During the brief Turkish-Armenian War of 1920, the army of Mustafa Kemal-Ataturk drove the returning Armenians out of "Wilsonian Armenia". In agreement with Soviet Russia, the Kars and Ardahan provinces of Armenia went to Turkey. Thus the present-day borders of Armenia were drawn.
In the Armenian perception, the Genocide and the lost Wilsonian dream merged into a lasting feeling of injustice done to the Armenian people. The "restoration of historic justice" is enshrined in the acting Constitution of Armenia.
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation turned radical. In 1919, its 9th World Congress in Yerevan adopted a sweeping platform, which has remained essentially unchanged - "integral Armenia repopulated by Armenians". The Dashnaks focused on pressuring Turkey into admitting and apologizing for crimes of the past. In this context, a radical´s view, will make little or no distinction between "Turkey" and "the Turks" – including the Azerbaijanis.
In this broad context, Azerbaijani sources trace the first Dashnak anti-Azeri pogroms back to 1905 – when nine Azeri villages in the Echmiadzin region, as well as the villages of Khalaj, Saldashy, Injevan and Gatar were pillaged and burnt. Azerbaijani and Turkish sources maintain that the Dashnaks are responsible for terrorist attacks against Turkish interests, all over Europe throughout the 20th century.
In October 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution ended the involvement of Russia in the First World War and Russia withdrew its troops from the South Caucasus. In May 1918, after a brief spell in the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation, Azerbaijan and Armenia declared independence. Several chaotic and violent years followed, with episodes of the Russian civil war, the Turkish-British military enmity for control of the region and ethnic strife where Armenia and Azerbaijan sought, unsuccessfully, to control N-K. This is also the time when ethnic pogroms, on both sides, took place.
From May 1918 to April 1920, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) existed. Azerbaijani historiographers are proud of this 23-month period. They underline that ADR was the first secular state in the Orient, with the first European-like Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers and other democratic institutions. The ADR was represented at the Paris Peace Conference and at the League of Nations.
Picture
The ADR delegation in Versailles, 1919
Azerbaijani sources attach great importance to the short-lived Batum Treaty of 4 June 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The treaty accorded to Armenia only the Erivan and Echmiadzin districts, some 10 000 sq. km.
From July to September 1918, ethnic conflict raged in Nakhichevan, Karabakh and Zangezur. Azerbaijanis fled the area of Zangezur (according to Azerbaijani sources, their number was 50 000). Subsequently the ADR fought the Soviet Commissars for control of Baku. The takeover of Baku was followed by anti-Armenian pogroms in what some Azerbaijanis viewed as retaliation for earlier anti-Azeri violence.
Map
Source: MFA ADR, 1920
In 1920, the Bolsheviks took over the South Caucasus or, as seen from Moscow, the Transcaucasus. In November 1920, the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee recognized the disputed regions of Zangezur and Nakhichevan as integral parts of Soviet Armenia and granted N-K the right to self-determination. The resolution, which some historians ascribe to a wish to help the Armenian Bolsheviks to take power, was never put into practice. However, N-K Armenians will often quote this episode, as they believe it gives historic legitimacy to their claim to unity with Armenia or sovereignty.
In July 1921, the Bolshevik Party Caucasus Bureau reversed the above decision. N-K was granted a broad autonomy within the newly created Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1923, the N-K Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was established. Russian analysts believe that the final decision was made to appease the Muslim population of the region: in the Bolshevik mindset Azerbaijan, with its larger population and oil resources was assigned the role of a beacon of the revolution in the East and was therefore more important than Armenia.
Armenian historiographers generalize the Soviet period as the time of determined policy of the Azerbaijan SSR to under-fund N-K and prevent the growth of the Armenian population in the region. They point out that, if in 1921 Armenians were 96% of the N-K population, in 1979 the percentage dropped to 75%.
For their part, Azerbaijani historiographers stress that, due to Stalinist ethnic-territorial gerrymandering, the 114.000 sq km of ADR territory (1918-1920) were reduced to the present-day 86.600 sq km. They particularly point out that in 1947, Moscow ordered the resettlement "on a voluntary basis" of one hundred thousand Azerbaijanis from Armenian SSR to the Kura-Araz lowland of the Azerbaijan SSR.
Late in the Soviet epoch, in the winter of 1987-1988, Yerevan re-launched the move for ethnic homogeneity of the Armenian SSR by driving 165 000 Azerbaijanis out of Armenia.
Note
Picture: the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has nothing to do with the Ottoman Empire and the displacement of the Armenians during 1915 – 1916.
Copyright 2009 Ultio, LLC.
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part III
In three previous articles entitled "Turkey – Azerbaijan – Armenia: Documents Incriminating Erdogan, Still Hidden in Turkey"
, "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part I" and "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part II" above, I illustrated some of the reasons for which the theologically extremist, politically Islamist, historically ignorant, intellectually gullible, and diplomatically inexperienced prime minister of Turkey has to be removed by any means and at all costs.
In support of my approach to the (well hidden by the Western mass media and the Erdogan administration) subject of the forthcoming dissolution of Turkey, I brought to surface a critical document that remains widely – and catastrophically – unknown in Turkey, namely the Report presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with respect to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Submitted in November 2004, the Report "The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference" demonstrates clearly that the countries with which Turkey has been allied, and the major powers involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, drastically prevent Turkey from implementing policies pertaining to the interests of Ankara and Baku that are identical; even worse the Erdogan – Gul administration is fully compliant with these powers.
Erdogan’s and Gul’s compliance with Anti-Turkish policies is revealed throughout this document, which demonstrates that there are international organizations ready to accept to consider, discuss and ponder about incredibly biased approaches, as is in the case of the Armenian –Azerbaijani conflict about Nagorno – Karabakh the inclusion of any reference to events occurred in the Ottoman Empire that are fallaciously described by the Armenian racists as ‘Genocide’. Nagorno – Karabakh was not part of the Ottoman Empire when the events that are fallaciously called by the Armenians as "genocide" took place.
The Islamist Turkish administration is guilty; either they studied the document and failed to reach the correct conclusion or they did not bother to take it into account because they are mere puppets of the Anglo-French Freemasonic establishments that dictate to them their demarches step by step. This means that either Erdogan and Gul are ignorant or they function as puppets; under either circumstances, the Turkish people and the Turkish army must resort to concerted action and eliminate them before they open the Armenian border.
Through effective swinging policies, the Anti-Turkish Freemasonic regimes of England and France intend to reproduce the Nagorno – Karabakh experiment in Turkey. The opening of the Turkish – Armenian borders will be followed by an influx of arms smuggled into parts of what the high traitor "president" of Turkey called "Kurdistan".
Subsequently, an explosion in the so-called Kurdistan of Turkey will become the "logical" reason for a certain degree of "autonomy"; later onm, a number of Armenians will try to alter the demographic data in a small area between Erzerum and Agri. At the final stage, they will call for international support to …… save them from a purported "second" genocide!
At this moment, nothing of all this seems possible; on the contrary, things seem to advance towards the opposite direction, and the tiny racist state of Armenia, this evil realm of hatred and rancor, seems predestined to get dissolved and become a province of Turkey - in due course of time. Armenia’s supporters want to use the tiny and impoverished realm in order to cause damage to Turkey that has always been their main target in the East. They have therefore to save Armenia from the rapidly worsening economic collapse; the best way to do so is to force Turkey to open the Armenian border.
Quite contrarily with the colonial powers, Turkey has nothing to win from the reopening of the Armenian border. Any formal recognition of Armenia plays in the Freemasonic game, consisting in a step toward the destruction of Turkey. Those who help the colonial powers in their Anti-Turkish agenda have no reasonable explanation to provide the Turkish public with about their paranoid and treacherous acts. They call their policy ‘peace’ whereas it signals a war at the prejudice of Turkey.
I will complete the republication of the document in forthcoming articles.
The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Doc. 10364
29 November 2004
assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10364.htm
The demise of the USSR and the slide into war
Comment: the early stages of the N-K conflict developed against complex and rapid political changes in the USSR, but also in Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia. Without a deep knowledge of the epoch, many of the positions taken by key decision-makers of the time may seem unconvincing or irresponsible. The perception problem should be kept in mind, as this paper can only give the briefest of sketches about this period.
During Gorbachev’s "glasnost" times, N-K renewed its drive for a change of status. On the basis of a popular petition4, in February 1988, the N-K Supreme Soviet appealed to the Supreme Soviets of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the USSR to allow NKAO to join the Armenian SSR. In June1988, the Armenian lawmakers approved the request; two days later their Azerbaijani counterparts rejected it. Such a clash between Union Republics was without precedent in the USSR. In July 1988, Moscow decided to maintain the disputed region within Azerbaijan, but adopted "special measures for the accelerated development of NKAO". As the situation seemed to get worse, in January 1989, Moscow established direct governance over N-K.
The Azerbaijani view is that these were unjustified measures taken by Moscow under the influence of hard Armenian lobbying (in particular, of Mr. Gorbachev’s family) as part of a sinister plan to wrench N-K away from Azerbaijan.
On 24 February 1988, a direct confrontation between Azerbaijanis and Armenians near Askeran (in N-K, on the road Stepanakert-Agdam)5 degenerated into a skirmish. During the clashes, which left about 50 Armenians wounded, a local policeman, reportedly an Armenian, shot dead two Azerbaijanis - Bakhtiyar Uliyev, 16 and Ali Hajiyev, 23.
On 27 February 1988, while speaking on Central TV, the USSR Deputy Prosecutor General mentioned the nationality of those killed. Within hours, a pogrom against Armenian residents began in the city of Sumgait, 25 km North of Baku, where many Azerbaijani refugees resided. The pogrom lasted for three days. According to reports, phone calls for help to the local police and ambulance services went unanswered. Later, Moscow covered up the Sumgait affair as "hooliganism".
The Armenian view is that the Sumgait pogroms were prepared months in advance and implemented with the tacit approval, if not covert assistance, by the authorities. The Sumgait events conjured up ever-present memories of "Turks killing Armenians". In Yerevan, the "Karabakh Committee" was formed, soon to be headed by future President Levon Ter-Petrosian. In N-K, its counterpart was the "Krunk Committee" - from the Armenian word for crane, a symbol of longing for the homeland.
The Azerbaijani view is that, against the background of the expulsion of thousands of Azerbaijanis from the Meghri and Kafan districts of Armenia, the killing of the two young men triggered the outburst of violence in Sumgait. The violence was two-way: the official investigation reported 32 deaths - 6 Azerbaijanis and 26 Armenians.
In 1988-1989, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) emerged as an alternative to the Communist Party. The Azerbaijani Communist Party, increasingly unable to govern, allowed APF to stage giant meetings in Baku in the summer of 1989 – also as a means to impress on Moscow the need to bring back N-K under Azerbaijani control. The APF used nationalism and the N-K issue to stir up popular support.
By end-1989, the N-K crisis, the Azerbaijani refugee problems and an assortment of local grievances had brought the situation in Baku close to explosion. When the Armenian and N-K legislatures adopted the joint resolution "On the reunification of N-K with Armenia" (1 December 1989), many in Azerbaijan thought that was the last straw.
In January 1990, the sporadic pogroms in Baku took on an organized character. Azerbaijani sources point out that the local militia was disarmed on orders from Moscow, thus preventing it from keeping law and order. The Armenian view is that the city was being cleared of Armenians house by house. The number of fatalities is not known. The Soviet Army Baku garrison, under Moscow commandment, stayed in the barracks.
On 15 January 1990, Moscow lawmakers imposed a state of emergency in N-K. Their Baku counterparts did not give approval, as required by the procedure. A week later Soviet tanks rolled out in Baku. The Soviet Army reportedly used armour and random fire to remove barricades, killing over 130 mostly very young civilians and wounding many times more. In Azerbaijan, this tragedy is known as the "Black January".
By the autumn of 1990, elections had taken place in all three South Caucasian Soviet Socialist Republics, The communists retained power only in Azerbaijan. Russian analysts note that support for Azerbaijan was acquiring added significance for the Kremlin, which aimed at safeguarding the Soviet Union. Indeed in March 1991, Azerbaijan voted "in favour" of the preservation of the USSR.
Starting in April 1991, Soviet forces and Azerbaijani militia stepped up the pressure on ethnic Armenian paramilitaries operating in N-K. Russia had already deployed troops to Yerevan, too. The Armenian side holds Moscow responsible for conducting deportations of Armenians of northern N-K in the spring of 1991. Twenty-six N-K villages were reportedly surrounded and ethnically cleansed by USSR and Azerbaijani forces in operations known as "Kaltso" (Ring), resulting in the killing of more than 150 civilians and the deportation of some 10.000 ethnic Armenians.
For their part, the Azerbaijani side holds Russia responsible for the decisive military assistance to Armenia as well as for episodes of anti-Azeri ethnic cleansing (notably, the role of the Russian 366th motorized regiment in the Khojali massacre).
The Nagorno-Karabakh war
After the August 1991 putsch failed, in September Moscow ordered the Soviet Army units to cease military actions and return to their barracks. On 2 September 1991, the "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" was declared. The newly emerged entity had its own "self-defense forces", which quickly swelled to some 15 000. Violence in N-K increased dramatically. In November 1991, Azerbaijan adopted a law "On Abolishing NKAO". In 1992, the N-K conflict escalated into a full-scale war, which saw episodes of aerial bombardments of Stepanakert, tank battles in the north and trench war along the Iranian border.
In February 1992, almost day-to-day four years after the Sumgait events, the ethnic Armenian forces attacked the only airport in N-K, in Khojali, to the North of the local capital. At the time, the population of Khojali was 7000. The Azerbaijani view is that the taking of Khojali, which left some 150 defenders of the airport dead, was followed by unprecedented brutalities against the civilian population. In one day, reportedly 613 unarmed people were massacred and close to 1300 were captured – many of them while trying to flee through an alleged humanitarian corridor. The Armenian side contests this view and the number of casualties.
The Khojali massacre sparked an exodus of Azerbaijanis and precipitated a political crisis in Baku. Five years later, in 1997, President Aliyev issued a Decree referring to the tragedy as the "Khojali genocide".
In May 1992, Armenian forces overtook Shusha (or Shushi, in Armenian) and the Lachin district of Azerbaijan, establishing a link between N-K and Armenia proper – the so-called "Lachin corridor". The fall of traditionally Azerbaijani Shusha, a fortress reputed for its strong defences, is one of the most controversial events in the war. Azerbaijani political forces and individuals have been accused by their opponents but also by regional actors (Iran) of willingly surrendering Shusha for political reasons of the moment.
In June 1992, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) Chairman Ebulfez Elcibey won the presidential election. Born in N-K, a former dissident having spent time in Soviet prisons, Mr Elcibey became a prominent nationalist. Under his presidency, Azerbaijan launched a fresh military offensive, which eventually turned unsuccessful. In June 1993, the APF was ousted from power by the forces of rebel army colonel Suret Gusseinov. Mr Geidar Aliyev replaced Elcibey.
By October 1993, ethnic Armenian forces succeeded in occupying almost all of N-K, as well as large areas in south-western Azerbaijan. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to other parts of Azerbaijan. The map on the next page represents the official position of Azerbaijan as regards occupied territories and refugees.
In May 1994 Azerbaijan, N-K and Armenia, with the mediation of Russia, Kyrgyzstan and the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly signed the Bishkek Protocol and a few days later, the 1994 Moscow cease-fire, which holds to this day.
Two pictures
Armenian refugee – living in makeshift shelter
Azerbaijani refugee - burning sheep manure for heating, Sabical Camp No 1, 1997
Photo Onnik Krikorian
Photo Betty Blair
Photocopies
Figures about refugees and internally displaced persons are disputed on both sides. Therefore the numbers given below are of indicative value. The total number of Armenians who left their homes in Azerbaijan is estimated at 300.000. Around 30.000 of them were resettled in N-K and the Lachin district. The total number of exiled Azerbaijanis is estimated at 800 000, including some 200.000 refugees from Armenia and around 600.000 internally displaced persons from the zone of conflict. The latter figure counts practically all 50.000 Azerbaijanis from N-K.
Perceptions of the military conflict
The official line of Armenia and the N-K de facto authorities is that Azerbaijan had the stronger army, formed on the basis of the military equipment of the 4th Soviet Army stationed in the Azerbaijani SSR6. Nevertheless, N-K forces won the victory because their soldiers were fighting for their own homes. The Armenian logic is: we won the war because our cause is just. Azerbaijan lost the war and must come to terms with this reality.
Map
Picture
N-K men carrying their dead
In addition, while there are Russian military bases in Armenia and Russian troops guard its borders with Turkey and Iran, Azerbaijan was unfairly placed in 1992 under a "US embargo" under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act - because of Armenian lobbying7. The continuing Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land creates a strong perception of injustice done to Azerbaijan, further aggravated by the feeling that the international community tolerates the status quo.
The Azerbaijani logic is reversely identical to the Armenian one: we will never accept Armenia’s war gains. Our cause is just therefore we will prevail.
The legal side of the dispute
National aspirations. On 1 December 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the N-K legislature adopted a joint resolution "On the reunification of N-K with Armenia". The resolution has not been withdrawn or otherwise invalidated.
On 23 August 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR referred to the above document in the "Declaration of Independence of Armenia". Two out of the six preambular paragraphs of the Declaration read as follows:
"Aware of its historic responsibility for the destiny of the Armenian people engaged in the realization of the aspirations of all Armenians and the restoration of historical justice";
"Based on the December 1, 1989 joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Artsakh National Council on the "Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh,"…
For the Armenian founding fathers, the independence of Armenia is inseparable from the restoration of historic justice and the unification of N-K with Armenia. The acting Constitution of Armenia, adopted on 5 July 1995, elevates these to the rank of national aspirations, in the following reference to the Declaration of Independence:
"Recognizing as a basis the fundamental principles of Armenian statehood and the national aspirations engraved in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia…"
The Azerbaijani side in the conflict points a finger to the Constitution of Armenia to prove that "Greater Armenia" aspirations are at the at the core of the Armenian domestic and foreign policy. They underscore that Yerevan has never really renounced the territorial claims to its neighbours.
Legal history. On 30 August 1991, the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijani SSR declared "the restoration of the state independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1918-1920". According to Armenian lawyers, this act legally nullifies the USSR set-up. Moreover, N-K was not internationally recognized as part of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic of 1918-1920. Therefore, in the Armenian view, Azerbaijan has no legal claim over N-K.
Validity of referendum. On 2 September 1991 the Regional Councils of NKAO and of the Shahumian district (on the Northern tip of N-K) proclaimed a new state - the N-K Republic. On 10 December 1991, a "referendum" on independence took place. On 6 January 1992, the "Parliament" of N-K officially declared independence.
The Armenian side maintains that the N-K independence referendum was conducted in accordance with the USSR law on the "Procedure for Solving Issues of Secession of a Soviet Republic from the USSR" of 3 April 1990. Article 3 of this law provided autonomous regions within the Soviet republics with the right to determine independently, by referendum, whether they wished to remain within the USSR or join the republic seceding from the USSR8. It would however seem that according to this law N-K would have the choice of two options – to remain within the USSR or to join independent Azerbaijan; N-K independence does not seem possible.
The Azerbaijani side points to the USSR Constitution of 1977, namely Article 78 stipulating: «The territory of Union Republics may be altered by mutual agreement of the Republics concerned, subject to ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics».
Unlike the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics, the Autonomous Regions in the former USSR had neither constitutions, nor the right of secession from the USSR.
International law. In their legal disputes, both sides often refer to recognized principles of International Law, such as the right to self-determination and the respect for territorial integrity. Council of Europe experts, in providing legal assistance in a different conflict have examined arguments based on the Soviet legal doctrine, which traditionally treated self-determination outside of its legal context, in effect - much as a political concept. For information, Appendix I contains the relevant excerpts of Document CM/Inf (94) 27 of 2 September 1994 "Expertise on a Special Legal Status for the Gagauzes in Moldova".
The broader geopolitical context
The Caspian basin, very rich in oil and extremely rich in natural gas, has traditional problems in bringing the energy to the consumer markets. The shortest and cheapest route is to the South through Iran. This route (both existing pipelines and projects) is opposed, mainly by the US, on political and strategic grounds. Idem for the (more recent) Eastern route through Afghanistan. All Westward pipelines bring the oil and gas to Black Sea terminals, notably Novorossiysk. Novorossiysk also serves the bigger part of the oil coming from Northern Russian energy fields. The figure on the next page gives the main pipelines and their capacity in thousands of barrels per day.
Photocopy
Analysts agree that Russia has both an economic and a strategic interest to keep control over the Westward flow of Caspian energy. A project named Blue Stream is underway to lay a 24-inch gas pipeline on the bottom of the Black Sea to link Novorossiysk with the Turkish coast in order to bypass the Bosphorus.
The pipeline project, which has given rise to most controversy during its 10 years of gestation, is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project (BTC). Construction is now scheduled to begin in March 2003 and the first oil is to flow in 2005. BTC consists of a 1777 km-long, 42 inch-oil pipeline and a 700 km-long gas pipeline, also known as the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline. The gas will run parallel to the oil, but the pipeline is shorter as it will link to the existing Turkish gas distribution system.
The main problem of the BTC project is instability in the region. The energy route will pass some 60 km from Chechnya and 10-15 km from Armenia and N-K. The pipeline was also seen as too long and costly, but that was largely offset with the confirmation of the commercial viability of the huge Shah Deniz gas site (400 billion m3, 100 km South of Baku).
Map
The BTC carrying capacity will be one million barrels per day. That is double the size of any of the existing pipelines. The gas pipeline will carry 7 bn m3 per year by 2006 and later – double that volume. To give an idea of the scale of what is at stake: the projected oil demand of OECD countries (minus Mexico) by 2020 is close to 50 million barrels per day, with the countries in question producing themselves around 20 million barrels per day. In other words, BTC capacity will be equal to 1/30 of the oil needs of the industrialized world.
Georgia supports the BTC, from which it stands to gain yearly some 70 million usd. in transit fees. As long as the present stalemate in relations of Armenia with Azerbaijan and Turkey continues, the BTC stands to isolate further Armenia.
Map
Because of the N-K conflict, the BTC will bypass Armenia
Turkey and Azerbaijan obviously favour the project. However, the BTC will bypass two regional powers with compelling interest in oil and gas – Russia and Iran.
Whereas Iran has direct access to Asian oil markets, whose forecast growth exceeds tenfold the projected oil demand increase in Europe and the US, Russia will be particularly affected. Most of its energy exports come to Novorossiysk from oil fields in Northern Russia, increasingly expensive to exploit, through aging pipelines with lesser debit. Experts predict that several years after BTC becomes operational, market forces will squeeze smaller the Russian share of the energy trade, itself a major income source for the budget of Russia.
Pundits recall that back in 1993, Russia supported Mr Aliyev against Mr Elcibey, who was seen as much more anti-Russian. In June 1993, the month Mr Aliyev came to power, he suspended a deal with a Western consortium (BP, Amoco, Pennzoil and others) to develop three Azerbaijani oil deposits. This agreement was crucial for the Baku-Ceyhan project. Fifteen months later, on 20 September 1994, when President Aliyev had consolidated his power, he signed "the deal of the century", prompting a failed coup d’etat attempt in Baku and Ganja (where supporters of the ousted 1e Minister Suret Gusseinov took part). Russia opposed the deal, quoting the unresolved delimitation of the Caspian Sea bed.
According to US analysts, after September 2001, Moscow realised Russia cannot rely only on close relations with Armenia to guarantee its regional interests against growing US presence. Five days after the Baku-Ceyhan launching ceremony, Presidents Putin and Aliyev signed a treaty on the division of the Caspian Sea bed. Russian companies are considering participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. In January 2002, Baku rented to Russia the Gabala radiolocation station (RLS), close to the city of Mingacevir in central Azerbaijan. The Gabala RLS was the last but one of nine facilities the Soviet Union built to ensure its early warning capability. Put in operation in 1988, the up to 350 MW station is capable of monitoring the Persian Gulf, much of Africa and can "see" as far as Australia.
Map
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project
Note
Picture (http://www.buzzle.com/img/articleImages/259524-501429-2.jpg ): Under the pretext of self-determination for the Armenian majority of Nagorno Karabakh (in red colour), Armenia – supported by the Freemasonic regimes of England and Francem and the easily maneuverable regime of Moscow – invaded almost one fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory (in green colour). Despite these detrimental events, the racist state of Armenia is not denounced but fervently supported by the West as a tool of destruction of Turkey, Iran and the entire Islamic World.
By Prof. Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis, Published: 3/30/2009
Prof. Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis 52, Greek citizen of Turkish origin, currently resident in Cairo, Egypt
Date and Place of Birth: 21 November 1956, Athens - Greece
http://www.buzzle.com/authors.asp?author=973
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part IV
In four previous articles entitled "Turkey – Azerbaijan – Armenia: Documents Incriminating Erdogan, Still Hidden in Turkey"
, "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part I" , "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part II" and "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part III" , I illustrated some of the reasons for which the theologically extremist, politically Islamist, historically ignorant, intellectually gullible, and diplomatically inexperienced prime minister of Turkey has to be removed by any means and at all costs.
In support of my approach to the (well hidden by the Western mass media and the Erdogan administration) subject of the forthcoming dissolution of Turkey, I brought to surface a critical document that remains widely – and catastrophically – unknown in Turkey, namely the Report presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with respect to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Submitted in November 2004, the Report "The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference" demonstrates clearly that the countries with which Turkey has been allied, and the major powers involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, drastically prevent Turkey from implementing policies pertaining to the interests of Ankara and Baku that are identical; even worse the Erdogan – Gul administration is fully compliant with these powers.
Erdogan’s and Gul’s compliance with Anti-Turkish policies is revealed throughout this document, which demonstrates that there are international organizations ready to accept to consider, discuss and ponder about incredibly biased approaches, as is in the case of the Armenian –Azerbaijani conflict about Nagorno – Karabakh the inclusion of any reference to events occurred in the Ottoman Empire that are fallaciously described by the Armenian racists as ‘Genocide’. Nagorno – Karabakh was not part of the Ottoman Empire when the events that are fallaciously called by the Armenians as "genocide" took place.
The Islamist Turkish administration is guilty; either they studied the document and failed to reach the correct conclusion or they did not bother to take it into account because they are mere puppets of the Anglo-French Freemasonic establishments that dictate to them their demarches step by step. This means that either Erdogan and Gul are ignorant or they function as puppets; under either circumstances, the Turkish people and the Turkish army must resort to concerted action and eliminate them before they open the Armenian border.
Quite contrarily with the colonial powers, Turkey has nothing to win from the reopening of the Armenian border. Any formal recognition of Armenia plays in the Freemasonic game, consisting in a step toward the destruction of Turkey. Those who help the colonial powers in their Anti-Turkish agenda have no reasonable explanation to provide the Turkish public with about their paranoid and treacherous acts. They call their policy ‘peace’ whereas it signals a war at the prejudice of Turkey.
With the present article, I complete the republication of the critical document.
The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Doc. 10364
29 November 2004
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10364.htm
Mediation efforts in the N-K conflict
Iranian mediation. Iran made a short-lived effort in March - May 1992, when two meetings took place in Tehran, the second one on presidential level. In March, the first ever cease-fire between the belligerents was achieved, but it only lasted days.
According to Iranian analysts, the effort failed for a number of reasons, one of them being that Tehran was not perceived as impartial. Iran, a traditional rival of Russia and Turkey in the region, was thought to have an interest that the newly emerging Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia survive as independent "buffer states" between itself and Russia, while keeping them in balance by pressuring the stronger side. In the N-K conflict, this would imply constraining Armenian military advances.
Iran shares the same religion with all neighbouring countries except Armenia, but has the greatest affinity with the Azerbaijanis who, like the vast majority of Iranians, are Shiite Muslims (until Azerbaijani independence, Iran was the only State representing Shiite Muslims). On the other hand, Armenians are traditionally hostile to Iran’s rival Turkey, while Iran and Armenia have not had problems in recent history.
Iran has a sizeable Azerbaijani minority – the second largest in the country. The Azerbaijani Popular Front had a pro-Turkish orientation. At one point the APF openly appealed to Iranian Azerbaijanis to secede and join Azerbaijan. While allegations that Iran provided arms to Armenia were not proven, it is certain that Yerevan today enjoys very good relations with the Iranian neighbour.
In a little known episode, in September 1993, when Armenians launched an attack on Nakhichevan, Iranian troops crossed the border, with the official purpose to guarantee the security of the jointly managed dams on the Araz river and to establish camps for Azerbaijani refugees (Iran says it hosts over 4 million refugees from Azerbaijan and Iraq). After this event, there was no further military action in Nakhichevan.
Russian mediation. In October 1993, President Yeltsin of Russia proposed to his counterparts from the three South Caucasian states to adopt a declaration calling for the unblocking of lines of communication, joint protection of the borders of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with Turkey and Iran and .setting up of Russian military bases for this purpose. Presidents Ter-Petrosian and Shevardnadze agreed, but President Aliyev maintained that a declaration of this type could not be adopted until the Armenian forces had withdrawn from the occupied Azeri territories.
Earlier, in September 1991, President Yeltsin and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan visited Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan. Following the visit, the first direct negotiations took place in Zheleznovodsk, Russia, with the participation of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as the N-K leadership.
Negotiating mechanisms
The UN Security Council adopted, in 1993, four resolutions on the N-K conflict9. They called for cessation of military activities and hostile acts, withdrawal of forces and resumption of negotiations, condemned the violation of the then established cease-fire and the excessive use of force in response thereto. The UN Security Council also referred to the forces that overtook the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan as "local Armenian forces" and urged the Armenian government "to exert its influence" on the Armenians of N-K.
The Minsk process goes back to March 1992, when the CSCE Helsinki Meeting requested the Chairman-in-Office to convene a conference in Minsk on N-K peaceful settlement. The meeting named eleven States to participate in the conference. The conference never took place, but the name of the Belarusian capital remained attached to the process and the would-be participants became known as the Minsk Group. N-K was to be invited to the conference as an interested party. The formula "elected and other representatives of N-K" refers to the de facto authorities and the Azerbaijani refugees.
In 1994, the OSCE Budapest Summit "strongly endorsed the mediation efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group and expressed appreciation for the crucial contribution of the Russian Federation and the efforts by other individual members of the Minsk Group". In order to harmonize these into a single co-ordinated effort, a Co-Chairmanship for the process was established – Russia and Finland. In 1997, the Co-Chairmanship was revised to its current composition: the United States, Russian Federation and France.
The Minsk Group receives assistance from the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office, who resides in the region and a High-Level Planning Group made up of military experts seconded by OSCE participating States. The latter is a dormant body, which would come into action if and when the multinational OSCE peacekeeping force recommended by the Budapest Summit is established.
The Minsk Group has put forward several peace plans, which have been rejected as they were not seen to deal acceptably with major concerns of one or another party to the conflict,
Direct negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan at the highest level go back to the Zheleznovodsk meeting mentioned above. President Aliyev and Kocharyan have met nearly 20 times, with no breakthrough or decisive step forward in sight.
In December 2002, the OSCE Porto Ministerial meeting "welcomed the continuing meetings of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan and of their Special Representatives" and "encouraged the parties to continue their efforts, with the active support of the Co-Chairmen, aimed at reaching a just and enduring settlement".
Positions of the sides
Comment: the viewpoints of the parties to the conflict remain opposed as to the causes of the conflict, the way in which it should be resolved and which problems should be addressed first.
The key elements of the positions can be summarized as follows:
Pictures Flag 1 – Azerbaijan
Occupied territories must be liberated as a precondition for serious negotiations;
- with territories occupied, there can be no regional co-operation or "business as usual";
- the return of the refugees must be addressed at an early stage of the negotiations;
- Azerbaijan is prepared to grant N-K "the highest level of autonomy known in the world", or "in concrete terms – the status of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation";
- as the conflict is settled, Azerbaijan will re-establish normal relations with Armenia - (In Armenian terms – will lift the blockade).
Pictures Flag 2 – Armenia
- the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey is illegal and must be lifted;
- Armenia has no territorial claims to Azerbaijan;
- N-K must be recognised as a party to the conflict and of the negotiating process;
- The occupied territories will be returned to Azerbaijan once the conflict is settled;
- The Lachin corridor must remain under Armenian sovereignty but will be compensated to Azerbaijan by equal territory from other parts of N-K;
- Armenia stands ready to develop regional co-operation and confidence-building measures.
Pictures Flag 3 – Nagorno Karabakh
* N-K has already covered its part of the road to compromise by renouncing the claim to union with Armenia and agreeing to be independent;
- N-K sovereign existence does not depend on international recognition, because N-K has (1) a territory and (2) population as well as (3) elected, organized and functioning authorities and is (4) capable of assuming and fulfilling international obligations.
Settlement options
The content of the proposals for settlement officially remains a secret. Nevertheless it is not difficult to see that any solution has to be one of or a mix of elements from the following main options:
(1) restitution of the status quo ante;
(2) self-rule of N-K within Azerbaijan;
(3) "common state" or a confederal/federal set-up (this option remains very unclear);
(4) independence or merging with Armenia for N-K with either
(5) a swap of territories or
(6) exchange of corridors in order to ensure continuity between Armenia and N-K on one side and Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan on the other side.
In 1996, the OSCE Lisbon summit elaborated three principles for settling the N-K conflict:
- territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan;
- N-K legal status to be based on self-determination and highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan;
- guaranteed security for N-K and its whole population.
The above principles could not be adopted by consensus due to Armenian disagreement.
According to Azerbaijani sources, in 1997, on the margins of the Second Council of Europe Summit, Presidents Aliyev and Kocharyan reached an understanding based on a swap of territories. Subsequently Armenia allegedly rejected the arrangement, which had also become known as the Sadarak agreement. The Armenian view is that a swap of territories is not possible as it would cut Armenia off its border with Iran.
In April 2001, further to their travel to Strasbourg on the occasion of the joint accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe, the two presidents met in Paris upon the invitation of President Chirac of France. Reportedly, an agreement was reached, referred to as the Paris principles. Subsequently, in a weeklong negotiation in a proximity format10 in Key West, US, the Paris agreement was put on paper. The bargaining seems to be about exchange of corridors, the Lachin corridor linking Armenia with N-K and the Meghri corridor linking Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan.
Photocopy and Map
In October 2002, there were vague press reports about new Azerbaijani proposals – notably, to divide contested lands with international mediation, with some localities choosing by referendum whether they belong to Armenia or to Azerbaijan. The same reports indicated that Baku had reiterated it would never accept that N-K become a new sovereign state.
Problems of Conflict Settlement
Comment: the following summary is based on writings by experts in conflict-prevention and negotiation.
The extent of historical mistrust between Azerbaijanis and Armenians is difficult to evaluate. Whereas both sides may be exaggerating at present, serious violent episodes date back at least to the end of the 19th century. At the same time, as recently as 1990, far more Armenians lived in Baku than in N-K. During the N-K war, Armenians maintained life-saving relations with Iranian Azerbaijanis.
Some experts argue that, generally speaking, in the South Caucasus the definition of ethnicity as well as the link between ethnicity and territory may be not so strong as in other regions where nation-building took place earlier and in different circumstances.
Armenians are mistrustful of all Turkic-speaking Muslims, whom they tend to view as a single people ("Turks"). Most Azerbaijanis and Armenians seem to believe that the N-K conflict is not simply between Governments or the military, but between their two peoples.
The internally displaced persons, in particular in Azerbaijan and especially those from N-K are known to be a bitter and intensely radicalised force, and have been responsible for attacks on Armenians in Baku. Here again, the problem may be exaggerated. Some observers believe that Baku is not doing enough to help refugees integrate – as integration would mean accepting the Armenian war gains.
Security problems.
Azerbaijan cannot feel secure while Armenians occupy seven of its provinces. However, if Baku forces were to re-establish control of Azerbaijani territories, the Armenian perception about the south-eastern part of their country would be one of vulnerability. In addition, Yerevan has particular worries about its long border with Turkey. Last October, Armenian Defence Minister Sarkisian told the press that the newly created joint Russian- Armenian military unit is to serve, inter alia as a deterrent against a possible Turkish incursion. Generally, security perceptions are a particular concern for Armenia and represent one of the main stumbling blocks in the attempts to find a settlement.
The state of democratic reform. Ethnic Armenians find it difficult to trust a government in Baku that they may perceive as authoritarian, corrupt, and intolerant of minorities; Azerbaijanis, for their part, cannot bring themselves to trust the government of a state they believe is constructed on a strictly ethnic basis - a state that acts as if it believes Armenia is for ethnic Armenians alone.
Domestic politics.
The way the N-K conflict has interlocked the actors in internal political life both in Yerevan and Baku may be the single biggest obstacle to solution. President Kocharyan, himself native of N-K, came to power after his predecessor Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign by N-K hardliners opposing his moves towards settlement. Some analysts note that, against the background of economic difficulties, Yerevan has little to deliver for the time being, except a war that was won and a national dream. In Azerbaijan, the predecessors of President Aliyev are seen to have lost the war. Partly for this reason, the present-day political opposition in Baku often takes a harder line on the conflict than the Government. President Aliyev, a native of the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, can hardly afford to be seen to give in to Yerevan.
Once, a high-ranking official from the region put the political problem in a nutshell: both in Armenia and Azerbaijan, N-K is both a source of power and a threat to power.
Guarantees.
N-K is very sensitive to the question of guarantees. N-K recalls the British guarantees of 1918-1920, which did not prevent the application of force by the first Azerbaijani Republic, and the "guarantees" of the Soviet Union, which permitted what Stepanakert sees as the de-Armenianization of Nakhichevan.
Regional issues.
Several analysts indicate that the conflict is unlikely to find a lasting settlement before the regional powers – Russia, Turkey and Iran – adapt to geo-political changes. In the post - 11 September world, these geo-political shifts are not necessarily a zero sum game where gain by one side is another side’s loss.
Common interest in settlement.
From 1988 to 1994, the GDP of Azerbaijan fell 73%. Azerbaijan needs to have the N-K conflict solved to gain stability for development based on oil wealth. According to experts, Azerbaijan has enough energy deposits to finance two generations of economic growth. There would be the immediate economic gain of a large segment of the population – the refugees and IDPs – returning to regular economic activity. Experts also caution that oil-based development is only guaranteed in a country with stable democratic institutions ("will Azerbaijan develop like Norway or like Nigeria").
From 1988 to 1994 Armenia saw its GDP fall by 60%. Particularly in Armenia, the economic situation was further aggravated by the 1999 Russian financial system crisis. For Armenia, not having diplomatic relations with two out of four neighbours is clearly an abnormal situation. Restoring regular relations with the outside world would not only bring transport costs back to normal but would also enable Armenia’s longer-term comparative advantages – the Diaspora support with its networking and lobbying power and capability to raise investment. There are expert calculations suggesting that Armenia could experience a short term increase of up to 40% of GDP. Some analysts broadly compare the Armenian "Diaspora factor" to the Azerbaijani "oil factor". In this context, the "Norway vs. Nigeria dilemma" is also valid for Yerevan.
The Council of Europe position
Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe simultaneously on 25 January 2001. For the first time in its history, the Organisation invited two new members with a bitter unresolved conflict between them. This was made possible by the prevailing understanding, both in the Parliamentary Assembly and in member States’ Governments that the accession of Azerbaijan and Armenia could help to establish the climate of trust needed for a solution to the N-K conflict.
Picture
The Political Affairs Committee held hearings on the N-K in 1998 and 1999. While voting positively on their accession demands, the Parliamentary Assembly asked Armenia and Azerbaijan to commit themselves, with regard to the N-K conflict:
- to continue efforts to settle the conflict by peaceful means only;
- to settle international and domestic disputes by peaceful means and according to the principles of international law (an obligation incumbent on all Council of Europe member states), resolutely rejecting any threatened use of force against its neighbours;
- (for Armenia) to use its considerable influence over the Armenians in N-K to foster a solution to the conflict;
The Presidents, Speakers of parliaments, Prime Ministers and the chairmen of the political parties represented in Parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan confirmed these commitments in writing.
The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan wrote separately to reiterate their countries’ commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement of the N-K on the basis of a compromise acceptable to all concerned. President Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan’s accession to the Council of Europe would be a major contribution to the negotiations process and stability in the region.
Comment: the commitments regarding N-K are spelled out in less detail compared to domestic law and human rights obligations. Nevertheless, the Organisation regards them as seriously as any other commitments. They are subject to monitoring procedures.
In September 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolutions 1304 and 1305(2002) on the honouring of obligations by Armenia and Azerbaijan, where it:
- recognized that Armenia and Azerbaijan maintained regular high-level contacts with a view to reach a suitable and peaceful solution to the conflict,
- acknowledged in particular the positive influence of Armenia on the Armenians in N-K,
- voiced concern with the prevailing frustration in Azeri society at the deadlocked negotiations on the conflict, which is more and more frequently expressed,
- expressed hope that the negotiation process - including a recent meeting of the Presidents would soon lead to an acceptable settlement of the territorial conflict in line with the principles of the Council of Europe and international law,
The Assembly has appointed Mr. Terry Davis (UK, Soc) Rapporteur on N-K.
The Committee of Ministers monitoring Group, also known as "GT-Suivi Ago" follows regularly N-K conflict settlement efforts. It asks questions in writing, urges Yerevan and Baku to build confidence and, generally, impresses on the two countries the position of the member States’ Governments.
In April 2002, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, further to a visit to the South Caucasus region, reported, "the most difficult challenge the member States face are their unresolved conflicts. Indeed, the conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia undermine the European efforts to assist Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and threaten to effectively put limits on the process of democratisation".
In January 2003, the Enlarged Bureau of the Committee of Ministers’ Deputies held an exchange of views with the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group and the Special Representatives of the two Presidents.
Within the framework of its assistance activities, the Council of Europe can bring to the sides in the conflict the European experience of post-conflict reconciliation and "work on the past". It can also promote regional co-operation as one of the means of post-conflict rehabilitation, and it can apply the Organisation know-how in working with the civil society for awareness raising and confidence-building. If a solution requires legal expertise, the Council of Europe, through the Venice Commission, remains prepared to help the Minsk Group work out the legal aspects of N-K status and protection of minorities.
Comment: In the end, Nagorno-Karabakh is part of the shared history and common suffering of the Armenian and Azerbaijani people. A common solution must be found for a better future.
By Prof. Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis Published: 3/30/2009
www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/96388
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