935) Defused AUTONOMY ! (Goal or Pretext ?) by Sukru Server Aya

 

For reasons hard to understand, most historians and writers (and particularly the scholars defending the Genocide tale) make no mention that the Ottomans were so friendly with Dashnaks, that they hosted their Congress in August in Erzurum and in anticipation of the war with Russia, they  openly  offered the independence and autonomy the Dashnaks and Hunchaks have been fighting  for some three decades.

 

Actually, for any person that has done some reading of relevant history, it is easy to understand that this rejected offer is the breaking point  of the developments that followed. Since not too many historians made reference to this reality, the reader may make his own judgment after having read different sources.

 

 

 “Thus idealistic statements concerning British war aims, including the liberation of Armenia, became a substitute for effective help. In their turn, the Armenians themselves were anxious for some clear assurances about their future. The Bolsheviks had publicized the Allied agreements to the portioning of historic Armenia, between Tsarist Russia and France. Disappointed, the Armenians asked for assurances. These the British leaders readily gave under war conditions. For over a century, the conflicting policies of Britain and Russia in the Middle East were considered the main cause of the misfortunes of the Armenians in Turkey. When, however, Britain and Russia entered the war on the same side, it had seemed that a new era would down for the Armenian people. Not only had Russian Armenians, as citizens of the Russian Empire, enlisted in the Russian army, but they had also formed volunteer forces mainly composed of Armenians from Diaspora (the Balkans, France and United States) and had borne the brunt of some of the heaviest fighting in the Caucasus. M. Philips Price, the special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, had captured in his diary the mood of these volunteers in the basin of Van at the beginning of the war. Every one felt the presence of the spirit of Armenia, for which they were fighting. Across the border, in Turkey, the general Congress of Dashnakstsutiun, sitting in Erzerum in the autumn of 1914, had been offered autonomy by Turkish emissaries, if it would actually assist Turkey in the war. The Congress had replied that the Armenians, as Ottoman subjects, would faithfully do their duty individually, but as a nation they could not provoke revolts in the Russian Empire. It was following this refusal, described as ‘courageous’ by Robert Cecil, that the Ottoman Armenians had been systematically murdered by the Turkish Government in 1915.” # 1

 

The Dashnaks  never realized the golden opportunity offered to them by Turks, which had not satisfied their ambitions and some five years later, having lost so many lives in wars, carnations, marches, famine, diseases and  calamities of all sorts,  their rewarding from  W. Wilson  was only:

 

 

 “Much of their work had been among the Armenians, so they had reported at first hand the massacres during the war. Back in the United States large sums of money had been raised for Armenian relief. House had cheerfully chatted with the British about ways of carving up the Ottoman Empire, and Wilson had certainly considered its complete disappearance. The United States had never declared war on the Ottoman Empire, which put it in a tricky position when it came to determining the empire’s fate. The only one of Wilson’s Fourteen Points that dealt with it was ambiguous: “The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be   assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.” What were the Turkish portions ? Who should have autonomous development? The Arabs? The Armenians? The  Kurds? The scattered Greek communities?

Before the Peace Conference started it was generally assumed that, at the very least, the United States would take a mandate for Armenia and the straits. Not every was pleased. British admirals, having got rid of the Russian menace, did not want to see a strong United States at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. India Office was also concerned. Mehmet VI was not only the Ottoman Sultan but also the caliph, the nearest thing to a spiritual leader for all Muslims. “ # 2

 

 “In it Boghos Nubar repeated that he had received a ‘formal assurance’ that after the victory of the Allies the Armenian ‘national aspirations would be satisfied’. He was worried about deportees, still exposed to the vengeance of Turks, in the deserts of Mesopotamia. Boghos Nubar knew that the three Armenian vilayets  of Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis would be probably annexed to Russia, but the other vilayets reunited with Cilicia, would devolve to France. It was for this, Armenia having an access to the Mediterranean, that he asked for an autonomy of the largest kind, and for which he had obtained ‘a formal promise’.” # 3

 

 “Thus the abandonment of Armenia was total and complete in respect of protection and help: but not in respect of advice and guidance. Britain had neither the power nor the will to protect Armenia and the Caucasian republics. Nevertheless, she discouraged them from coming to terms with either Soviet Russia  or Kemalist Turkey, the only states with real power in the Caucasus. After his visit to that region in October-December 1920, C. Leonard Leese, the Organizing Secretary of the British Armenia Committee and special correspondent of  Manchester Guardian  revealed that an offer by Kemalist Turkey in the spring of 1920, to negotiate directly with Armenia, was declined by the latter ‘after consultation with the British Chief  Commissioner for Transcaucasia’. ‘Russia  alone had forces to intervene’ Arnold Toynbee, back from his long trip in the East, told a meeting.” # 4

 

 “ And Armenia rejected all Soviet Russia’s proposals of mediation to fix her frontiers with her neighbors and, in particular the frontiers of Turkish Armenia’, Chicherin  claimed. To the end, the British representatives faithfully tried to carry out Curzon’s instructions: ‘The rescue, if possible, of … Erivan from the Influence of Soviet Government’.” # 5

 

“The new Dashnaksuthiun planks were Armenian autonomy and election of representatives from their party to the Ottoman Parliament. - Militancy and independence again became the platform of Dashnaksuthiun. – Two American missionaries and twenty evangelical Armenian Pastors died. Five missionary women were fortunate to survive a week’s siege at Hadjin. – British and American warships helped restore order as relief activities began among thousands if refugees. Young Turk investigation brought execution of several Armenians and Turks and compensation to injured Armenians. The government also proclaimed the innocence of Armenians generally and their loyalty to the central authority. – Each millet was a religious community receiving more faithfulness from its adherents than did the central Turk administration. Millets handled marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other personal civil matters and nourished separate languages, courts, tax collections, and cultural and educational institutions. After 1863 the Armenians even had their own legislature, which met biennially in Constantinople under the Gregorian Patriarch. As Westernization penetrated the Ottoman Empire, chiefly through French thought, the millets became nuclei for European-style, territorial nationalism. “# 6 

 

 “The Dashnaks western section met at Erzurum and rejected proposal of the Porte. The proposal stated that if Russian and Turkish Armenians would cooperate with the Committee of Union and Progress in event of an Ottoman-Russian war, the minority people would receive autonomy under the Empire for three Turkish-Armenian vilayets – Erzurum, Van, Bitlis – and for two Russian-Armenian provinces – Kars and Erivan... Soon after this meeting at Erzurum, the Russians appealed to the Dashnak-led Armenian National Council in Tiflis. The Tsar promised autonomy to six Turkish-Armenian vilayets as well as the two Russian – Armenian provinces. Earlier a Tsarist minister of foreign affairs reportedly had confided Russia’s aim: “We need Armenia, but without Armenians”. Primarily because of trust in France and Great Britain as associates of Russia. The Armenian National Council accepted the Tsar’s offer. – After a prodding by Germany, hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Turks called for a Holy War. Such an act by the rather irreligious Young Turks was partly cynical, to unify Arab and Turkish Muslims to appeal to Russian Muslims.-  When Enver’s forces moved across the Russian-Turkish border through the Bardiz pass, Russian-Armenian volunteers held them up at Sarikamish. This Armenian effort gave a Russian military unit to group and defeat the Turks. After this failure, The Committee became convinced that Turkish Armenians were traitors, that not only should the police imprison and execute them but the Army should shoot them.” # 7

 

 “The best that could be said of the Armenians’ Loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was that it was conditional. The responses of their community leaders in 1914 were characterized by attentisme, and the possibility of a rising in the Turkish rear was one, which the Russians were ready to exploit. Significantly, the first note of international protest was prepared by Sazonov as early as 27 April, although it was not published until 24 May. In it he claimed that the populations of over a hundred villages had been massacred. He also said that the killings had been concerted by agents of the Ottoman government.

This became the crux. On 25 May 1915, Mehmed Talat the minister of the interior, announced that Armenians living near the war zones would be deported to Syria and Mosul. His justifications for the decree were rooted in the needs of civil order and military necessity, and it was sanctioned by the Ottoman council of ministers on 30 May. The latter included provisions designed to safeguard the lives and property of those deported. But three days earlier the council had told all senior army commanders that, if they encountered armed…” # 8

 

“…if the Armenians - the Turkish as well as the Russian Armenians - would give active cooperation to the Turkish armies, the Turkish government under a German guarantee would promise to create after the war an autonomous Armenia (made up of Russian Armenia and the three Turkish vilayets of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis) under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire.

…The commander of the Ottoman army reported that the Dashnaks at the Erzurum congress had adopted the following plans:

1.To preserve loyalty in tranquility pending the declaration of war, but to carry on with the preparations for arming with weapons being brought from Russia and others to be obtained locally.

2. If war is declared Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman Army will join the Russian army with their arms.

3. If the Ottoman Army advances to remain calm.

4. Should the Ottoman army then retreat or come to a standstill position, to form armed guerilla bands and begin programmed operations behind army lines.” # 9

 

 “…it is known that Minister of War Enver sent a personal note to the Armenian patriarch, in which he asked him to restrain the militants and their expressions of support for the Allies...

…The salvation of the Turkish Armenians is possible only by delivering them from Turkish domination and by creating an

autonomous Armenia under the powerful protectorate of great Russia. The tsar replied: ‘Tell your flock, Holy Father, that a most brilliant future awaits the Armenians.’ Hovannisian, who reports this exchange, comments: ‘Though soothing and comforting to the political mind of the Armenians, such statements disturbed the few who feared that the declarations would only deepen the suspicion of the lttihat government toward its Armenian subjects.’ “  # 10

 

 “When giving the result of his arbitration on November 1920 President Wilson, stressed that he had examined the question, as he put it, with a mind ‘to the highest interests of justice’ and in the light of the ‘most trustworthy’ information available. He decided that 42.000 square kilometers of territory should be added to the Republic of Armenia from Turkish Armenia. Armenians were vibrant with patriotism all over the world. Kajazuni, would a few years later, comment with the wisdom of experience: ‘The Treaty of Sevres had dazzled the eyes of all of us, restricted our power to think, clouded our consciousness of reality’. “ # 11

 

 “… It would therefore be undesirable, for the time being, to provoke an Armenian rebellion in Turkey. He added, however, that, in the event of war, he would expect the Armenians to carry out his orders. On receiving the Viceroy’s reply the Catholicos wrote to Tsar Nicholas II that the Armenians hoped for Russian protection. The Tsar replied as follows: ‘Tell your flock, Holy Father, that a most brilliant future awaits the Armenians’ However, Russia was not really interested in the Armenians; it was prepared to use them only as tools in its expansionist policy. Meanwhile, Dr. Zavriyev, who directed the foreign relations of the Dashnakists, visited Vorontsov-Dashkov and confidentially promised him the help of his party and the Armenian people, in the event of war with Turkey. R. McDonnell of the British Foreign Office notes that it was Vorontsov-Dashkov who, on the outbreak of war, ‘made very considerable use of the (Dashnak Society) for secret service purposes in Turkey; and for creating disturbances and opposing the Turks in Asia minor.’ … ”  # 12

 

 “… According Papasian, in August 1914 the Young Turks suggested to the Dashnak congress that they should implement their agreement of 1907, and incite the Caucasian Armenians to a rebellion against Russia. The Dashnakists did not accept this suggestion, but declared that, if war broke out between Turkey and Russia would support Turkey as loyal subjects; but that they would not be held responsible for the actions of the Russian Armenians.

Another version of this is that the Ottoman leaders met with the Dashnakists in Erzurum in the hope of getting them to support the Ottoman war effort when it came, with the promise of Armenian autonomy. The Turkish branch of the Dashnakists promised that, if the Ottomans entered the war, they would do their duty as loyal citizens in the Ottoman armies, but that they did not know what the Russian Armenians would do. A booklet published in 1921 by the British Armenia Committee, and entitled The case for Armenia, admits, however, that the Armenian leaders of the national congress of the Ottoman Armenians, sitting at Erzurum in the autumn of 1914, declared that, as a nation they could not work for the cause of Turkey and its allies. Nevertheless the Armenians failed to live up to their individual promise, since, even before this meeting had taken place, a secret Dashnak congress held in Erzurum earlier had already decided to use the coming war to undertake a general attack against the Ottoman state’.” # 13

 

 “It is also interesting to note here that, a secret circular of the Ottoman War Office reported that Ottoman Armenian leaders, Papasian and Vramian, both belonging to the Dashnak party, had gone to Erzurum, taking with them the resolutions of the congress held in Istanbul. The circular referred to a meeting held in Erzurum with the participation of Dashnakist delegates from the Caucasus, at which the understanding reached with the Russians about the latter’s promise that the Armenians would be given independence on territories to be annexed from the Ottoman Empire, was discussed. The meeting approved the Russo Armenian agreement and resolved as follows: the Armenians would preserve their loyalty in peacetime, pending the declaration of war, but would carry on with their preparations and with arming themselves with weapons brought in from Russia and obtained locally. If war was declared, Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman a would join the Russian armies with their weapons. If the Ottoman army advanced, they would remain calm and loyal. If the Ottoman army retreated, or carne to a standstill, they would form armed guerrilla bands and begin programmed operations behind the Ottoman lines.” # 14

 

 “As a result of this reform movement the Armenian millet was given a constitution that was sanctioned by the Sultan on 17 March 1863. It was ‘a remarkable document institutionalizing a high degree of autonomy’ according to Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis. It inaugurated a ‘golden age’ for the Armenian millet, some of whose militant leaders began to abuse their new privileges and strove for the establishment of an imperium in imperio. The Russians, who were not happy with the reforms, as they believed these would spread to their own Armenian subjects, used the Armenian constitution as a pretext to intensify their interference in Ottoman Armenian affairs…” # 15

 

(German Head of the General Staff, Felix Guse's Article.)

“According to Joseph Pomiankowski, during the war more than 40 German officers served within the Ottoman Army. One of them was Felix Guse, who was Chief of the General Staff of the 3rd army. Staying for more than 3 years in such an important post made it possible for Felix Guse to study the country and its people closely, and to deepen his information on events and developments. Besides Guse’s memoirs, which have been translated to Turkish, there is an article written by him entitled “1915 Armenian Rebellions and its Results”. In this article Guse stresses that false evaluations on the Armenian issue are widespread. He refers to his own experiences and he underlines them with quotations from significant sources. By doing this, he presents a realistic approach to the Armenian issue.   

The Tashnaks did not want separatism from the Ottoman Empire while the Hunchaks started turmoils in the population, which led to the massacres that the Armenians committed towards the Turks at the end of the 19th century.
I witnessed in 1914 in Sivas that the requests of the Armenian Community were fulfilled immediately, whereas the Armenians were simply opposing everything. The Armenian leader Pasdermadjian admitted in his book that the Armenians were secretly arming themselves. At the Tashnak Congress in Erzurum in 1914 Turks offered the Armenians autonomy when they joined the Turkish side and stopped supporting the Russians. The solution that the Turkish government found against the Armenian rebellions was the population-relocation, which intended to resettle the Armenians of Anatolia to Mesopotamia away from the war zones. Of course there were some difficulties during the relocation. But the fact that land and places to live were given to the relocated population, shows the goodwill of the Turks. This goodwill might have been at a minimum in the European sense, still for Eastern standards Turks did the best to comfort the Armenians. During the relocation there were losses, but so-called reports of some Armenians were nothing but propaganda. In these reports exaggeration and repetition of some events can bee observed.”   # 16

          

“Russia, too, while happy to use Armenian support, was no more anxious than were the Ottoman government to see the lands of eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus formed into an independent Armenia state. There was no place for an autonomous Turkish Armenia in the postwar plans of Russia, On the contrary, the region was marked for annexation as an integral unit of the Romanov Empire and for its possible repopulation by the Russian peasants and Cossacks. Hence, in the middle of 1916 Armenian hopes were rudely shaken. The Russian authorities abruptly ordered the demobilization of the Armenian volunteer units, proscribed Armenian civic activity, and imposed stringent press censorship, which left the Armenians aghast.” # 17

 

“Boghos Noubar, president of the Armenian National Delegation, was more revealing when he added:

          …At the beginning of the war, the Turkish Government had offered to grant to the Armenians a sort of autonomy asking

           from them, in exchange, volunteers to rouse the Caucasus against Russia. The Armenians rejected this proposal and

          placed  themselves without hesitation, on the side of the Entente Powers, from whom they expected liberation”…  # 18

 

“Bryce himself called at the Foreign Office early in March 1915 with the suggestion that Russia should be approached to announce that it would be prepared to agree to an autonomous Armenia eventually instituted under Russian protection. Such a declaration would please the Armenians, Bryce believed, and stimulate them to afford assistance to the Allies in conflict with Turkey. In April he was encouraging the Armenians to rise against Turks in Cilicia.” # 19

 

In the light of the above explanations of different sources, the sincerity of the Dashnaks in their struggle for INDEPENDENCE and AUTONOMY  becomes foggy.

 

May be below comments of prominent  Armenians such as Katchaznouni and Lalayan,  was telling  what really  they were and are still  looking for, such as:

                              

“Tashnak editorials and editors, do not expose themselves as enemies of peace, but deliriously want war” These lines belong to Armenian communist periodical “Banvor” (Kysabar, Cairo Nov.11,1935)   # 20

 

“Since the fragments of Tashnaks are addicted to alcohol, gambling and alike, their need for large sums of money is obvious,  <to protect  immigrants> was the basic and may be the most important item of the Tashnaksutyun budget. The subject is the following:  Tashnak Party, systematically collected donations for their own oblations. A short while ago, Agaronyan had collected in USA a substantial amount, equivalent to 15 million marks. Of course, he did not use this money to even slightly ease the situation of the Armenian refugees. He did not even distribute this money to starving crowds; but further acted unjustly when dividing this spoil with his comrades”. # 21

 

Remembering that tender hearted people in USA, Britain. France and Russia were so much effected by the editorials of Christians butchered by Muslims, and they generously contributed to the slot boxes of the churches, some even giving their rings, this is a typical paradox, as regards how feelings of innocent good hearted people were being exploited and (may be still) milked.

 

“Lying, cheating, playing tricks and distorting the truth are their outstanding features. Like other bourgeois parties, they cannot live without these. Therefore, this anti-revolutionist party of Armenian bourgeois  is trying to show itself as a revolutionist and people’s party.”  # 22

 

 “ Zavriev, the head of the International Relations Department of the Dashnagzoutiun Party, in a letter he sent to the ambassadors of the Tsarist  Russia in London and Paris in 1915, exposes the role played by Armenians in World War I:

Since the first days of the present war, the Russian Armenians have been in expectation of joining the war. This situation gives rise to the hope that the Armenian question will be taken up at the end of the war, and it will definitely be solved. For this reason, Armenians cannot hold back from participating in the prospective events and thus must take their place in the war, most passionately.”  # 23

 

 “As is known, the Russian government donated 242.000 rubles at the beginning of the war to make preparations to arm the Turkish Armenians and to incite revolts in the country during the war. Our volunteer units need to break the defense line of the Turkish forces and to unite with the rebels and to create anarchy on the front and behind the lines and by these means help the Russian armies pass through and capture Turkish Armenia.”  # 24 

 

“ It would be useless to argue today whether our bands of volunteers should have entered the war or not. Historical events have their irrefutable logic. In the fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer units organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselves from fighting. This was an inevitable result of a psychology on which the Armenian people nourished themselves during an entire generation: that mentality should have found its expression, and it did so.” # 25

 

“According to a memorandum drawn up by R. McDonnell of the British Foreign Office, the Dashnakists bought arms and ammunition in Russia, and sent them through the Caucasus and Persia to Turkey. They collected men and privately trained them. They planned and carried out every kind of agitation and assassination, including the murder of the wealthy Armenians who refused to contribute to their funds. The extremist activities of the Dashnak party are well portrayed by Ian Smith, British  Vice-Consul in Van, and by R. McDonnell. The latter wrote about this party as follows:

They raised money by terror among their own people, and spent large sums on arms and ammunition…; they fomented hatred of the Mussulmans… For the Dashnaks there could be no peace without conquest; no decision  will satisfy them, whose aspiration is an Armenia stretching from Erivan to the Mediterranean sea  “ # 26

 

Arms trade was the sweet part of the business. Gun manufacturers in industrialized countries

(USA, Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Russia) happily sold their products to their agents, who distributed them through the ringleaders and final retail through clergymen to communities, preaching to buy an arm, even if it takes to sell the last coat they had. Mature women too were being armed, and there become a very large community totally armed, (some cash-happy, others waiting for the signal to be trigger happy) community was formed impatient to make use of the arms and ammunition they stocked.

 

The present continuation of this “stale stew of lies”, is closely related to “the ongoing benefits from marketing these falsifications for some of the forerunners. Just to give two tiny examples from the present, it is worth while to notice that a court case of ownership and collection goes on in Paris between the Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate, who owned some real estate donated by an Armenian in Cyprus, worth some  $ 150 millions back in 1922, by an Armenian born in Turkey at Kaiseri. Since at that time there was war between Turks, Armenians, French, British and others and the Istanbul Patriarchate was not in a position to accept anything, the donor  had empowered  “AGBU” (Armenian General Benevolent Union) in Cairo, to mend things on behalf of Istanbul Patriarchate, wishing that his properties were used for building a school, orphanage, hospital etc.  The <care taker>

sold this property  <they did not own> for a substantial value in Cyprus, spent a tiny bit of it for some construction in Armenia, and sat on the money they put their hands on. This matter was in the newspapers column in Turkey and has not been denied. This is how >benevolence works” !

 

 

In the WEB site “Three Monkeys” there was a mid=2004 interview by Andrew Lawless, with the forerunner Prof. Dennis Papazian, on the subject “When is Genocide not Genocide”… The following is the excerpt:

“Why is it important to recognize the events as Genocide > It’s widely recognized that atrocities were committed against the Armenians in 1915, why is official recognition important?

- Recognition opens all sorts of legal doors for restitution. It can be shown that the present Turkish state is the legal successor of the state of the Ottoman Empire, particularly that of the Young Turk government which carried out the Armenian Genocide. While no significant session of land can be expected, there is every possibility of some sort of financial restitution. For example, my family owned tracts of land along the Bosporus, land which would be invaluable today, I personally would like to get my hands on some of that money. It is not wrong for a victim to seek restitution”.

 

As it will be seen in other chapters of this book, the “very essence of the cause” was not “autonomy or freedom”; on the contrary, it was militancy, plundering and extortion from others, where lives of all were easily expandable.

 

 

Sukru Server Aya

 

Reference Notes:

 

1.  Akaby Nassibian, “BRITAIN AND THE ARMENİAN QUESTION”, 1915-1923” Croom Helm,  London   –  (ISBN0-7099-1820-8)

      p.107

2.  Margaret Macmillan, “PARIS 1919”, Random House – New York, (ISBN0-375-76052-0) p. 376

 

3. Ibid,   p.110

4.  Ibid,   p.215

5.  Ibid,   p.216

 

6. Joseph L. Grabill, “PROTESTANT DIPLOMACY AND THE NEAR EAST”, ( ISBN 0816605750),  Univ. of  Minnesota Press   

    1991, p. 50

 

7.  Ibid,   p. 59

8.  Hew Starchan, THE FIRST WORLD WAR, Penguin, 2004, (ISBN 0 14 30.3518 5)   p.112

 

9. Guenther Lewy, THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES IN OTTOMAN TURKEY, University of Utah Press  (ISBN 10:0-87480-849-9),

     p. 100

 

10. Ibid,   p. 101

 

11. Akaby Nassibian, “BRITAIN AND THE ARMENİAN QUESTION”, 1915-1923” Croom Helm,  London   –  (ISBN0-7099-1820-8)

       p. 181

 

12. Salahi Sonyel, THE GREAT WAR, AND THE GREAT TRAGEDY OF ANATOLIA, T.T.K.,, (ISBN 975-16-1227-6) p. 82

 

13. Ibid,   p. 83

14. Ibid,   p. 85

15. Ibid,   p. 9 -10

 

16. http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/ ,  734

 

17. Salahi Sonyel, THE GREAT WAR, AND THE GREAT TRAGEDY OF ANATOLIA, T.T.K.,, (ISBN 975-16-1227-6)  p. 136

 

18. Ibid,   p. 84

19. Ibid,   p. 20

 

20.  A.A. Lalayan, TAŞNAK PARTİSİ’NİN KARŞI DEVRİMCİ ROLÜ (1914 - 1923), Kaynak Yay.  (ISBN: 975-343-444-8)   P. 25

 

21.   Ibid,   p. 48

22.   Ibid,   p. 66

 

23. Hovhannes Katchaznouni,  DASHNAGTZOUTIUN HAS NOTHİNG TO DO ANYMORE, Kaynak Yay. (ISBN:975-343-453-7)    p.  17

 

24. Ibid,   p. 17

25. Ibid,   P. 37

 

26. Salahi Sonyel, THE GREAT WAR, AND THE GREAT TRAGEDY OF ANATOLIA, T.T.K.,, (ISBN 975-16-1227-6)  p.  77