1816) "How Easy And Empty One Has To Be To Become A Professor"

Dear All,
How easy and empty one has to be to become a professor. If any one can relay attached excerpts to those people, let them read first and not recycle same mistakes.

Sukru Server Aya

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"During the war, the Caucasian Armies, including Armenian volunteers, had crossed the Turkish frontier and had occupied three of the six Armenian provinces. Now with the disintegration of the Caucasian Front, not only these provinces but also that of Yerevan in the Russian Caucasus was in danger. Who would defend them against the Turks? Moreover, Armenians did not know what objectives they were being asked to fight for. They were uncertain and worried about their future. About 150 000 Caucasian Armenians had loyally fought in the Czarist armies.... But in the re-conquered portions of Armenia, Armenian landowners had been evicted and Tatar and Cossack settlers put in their place... Thus, it was mainly in order to stimulate further the war efforts of the Armenians on the fast-disintegrating Caucasian front that the British leaders found themselves necessarily having to make generously sympathetic statements about the liberation of Armenia....The future of Armenia before organizing the recruitment of new volunteers… Lord Bertie pointed out to Boghos Nubar that Persian, Mesopotamian and Caucasian fronts were all parts of one campaign on which the future of Armenia depended. He asked him to intervene with the Catholicos at Etchmiadzin and the Petrograd Committee." #3
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23.Croom Helm, London, pg97

"Full of optimism, the Russian-Armenians, in addition to contributing more than 200 000 men to regular Czarist armies, formed seven volunteer contingents specifically to assist in the 'liberation of Turkish Armenia'. The partisan tactics of the volunteers, and their knowledge of the rugged terrain, proved invaluable to the Russian war effort. This is also confirmed by two Armenian leaders. Avedis Aharonian, president of the Armenian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, stayed on Feb. 26th, 1919…At the very beginning of the war, our nation not only forgot all the grievances against Czarist rule, and rallied wholeheartedly to the Russian flag, in support of the Allied cause, but our kinsmen in Turkey and all over the world, offered to the Government of the Czar (the Russian Embassy archives in Paris prove this) to establish and support Armenian legion, at their own expense, to fight side by side with the Russian troops under the command of Russian generals…" #4*
Salahi Sonyel, The Great War & the Great Tragedy of Anatolia, T.T.K., pg. 93-94

"Boghos Nubar drafted a telegram to the Armenian leaders in the Caucasus, to be transmitted by the British authorities through the Catholicos at Etchmiadzin. It was indispensable, he stated, to increase the number of Armenian soldiers in the Caucasus and raise volunteers in order to resist Turkish offensive on the liberated Armenian provinces and eventually join hands with the British Army in Mesopotamia.... 'British officers will be sent' to help organize the Armenian and Georgian forces, he added.... Robert Cecil, specified that the Allies were bound to protect if possible the remnant of the Armenians, not only to safeguard the flank of the British-Mesopotamian forces in Persia and the Caucasus, but also because an Armenian autonomous or independent state, 'united if possible' with a Georgian state, was the only barrier against development of a Turanian movement that would extend from Istanbul to China." #6*
Salahi Sonyel, The Great War & the Great Tragedy of Anatolia, T.T.K., pg. 99

"The Armenian Army was no match for Kaz?m (Karabekir)'s and retired in disorder towards the Arpacai, followed in panic by droves of civilians dreading, not wholly without reason, rape and robbery and massacre at the hands of the Turks…The Armenians, having appealed in vain to Chicherin and received empty assurances from President Wilson of mediation and 'adjustment of differences', sued an Armistice. Early in December, at Alexandropol, the Turks and Russians signed the Treaty of Gumru, the last international agreement to be contracted by the Nationalist Government. It restored to Turkey her traditional eastern frontier along the banks of the Aras and Arpa Chai. The Russians were thus free to annex the rest of Armenia. Their cavalry entered Yerevan, their horses treading softly through the snow without a shot fired or a sound from the crowds. From the balcony of the Parliament building there were speeches with fervent quotations from Lenin and Marx, cries of 'Long live Soviet Armenia'! " #13
Lord Kinross, Atatürk - The Rebirth of a Nation, Weidenfelt and Nicolson, London pg. 244

"In fact, the military authorities in Britain consistently and persistently refused in 1915 to provide arms and training to the Armenian volunteers in the Diaspora, and especially in the U.S.… Volunteers in Egypt would be joined by volunteers from the Armenian communities in America, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. A landing in Cilicia, they stressed, could also help the Allied war effort. It could completely isolate Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia and could deprive the Turkish Government of its important reservoirs of military forces….They could not be 'indifferent and inactive'. They would have no difficulty in holding the Taurus, Anti-Taurus and Amanus mountains especially now that the Turks were fully occupied with the Russians on the Caucasus and the Anglo-French in Gallipoli. But they needed the authorization of the British Government, arms that could be spared, permission to congregate in Cyprus, assistance in transport and a small Allied contingent. In Buenos Aires, 300 Armenian volunteers asked the British Consul for acceptance as fighting units." #14*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23 Croom Helm, London, pg.91


"Whenever proposals by Armenian volunteers in the Diaspora to help their compatriots in Turkey were referred to the War office, the reply of the Army Council was invariably a short refusal… Thus the zeal and enthusiasm of the Armenian communities in the Diaspora, to take part in the great war effort and rescue their compatriots in Turkey, were wasted. A landing in Cilicia, were it successful, might have also provided the Allies, bogged down in Gallipoli, with some relief from the Turkish pressure. On Sept. 7th, 1915, the French Admiral of the Syrian coast cabled the High Commissioner in Cyprus that 6 000 Armenians were 'bravely' fighting against the Turks at Jebel Musa near the Bay of Antioch. On request, the Admiral had supplied them with munitions and provisions, but they had asked for the removal of their 5 000 old men, women and children to Cyprus." #15*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23 Croom Helm, London, pg.92

"The Cilician city of Zeitun pledged to assist a Russian advance on the area provided they were given the necessary weapons: to the British they promised help in the event of a naval landing in Alexandretta. The rebels made a similar offer to the British Ambassador to Bulgaria, Sir Bax-Ironside in March, 1915. Although these activities were an exception to the otherwise loyal conduct of the Ottoman-Armenian community, they confirmed the standard Ottoman stereotype of the Armenians as a troublesome and treacherous people. These views were further reinforced by Enver's crushing defeat in Sarikamish and the later setback in northern Iran, where an expeditionary force that occupied Iranian Azerbaijan in January, 1915 under the command of Halil Pasha, Enver's uncle, was forced out by the Russians several months later. In both instances (non-Ottoman) Armenians were implicated in the Russian war effort, but particularly galling to Enver was the mass participation of Russian-Armenians in the Battle of Sarikamish, which dealt a devastating blow to hit pan-Turanism dreams, That Enver would never forget. Before long the Ottoman-Armenians were subjected to the ultimate punishment inflicted on rebellious Middle Eastern population since Assyrian and Babylonian times: deportation and exile." #16*
Efraim & Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand, Harvard U. Press, pg. 154

"Thus Britain could neither organize the Caucasian -including the Armenian- forces, nor give them effective help." #17*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23 Croom Helm, London, pg.103

"By early-1918, the Armenian Corps consisted of two divisions of Armenian rifles, three brigades of Armenian volunteers, a cavalry brigade and some battalions of militia... Yet all this time the Armenians were 'shedding blood' for their existence around Yerevan. 'How can you abandon us?' Alexander Khatisian (the Head of the Armenian Delegation in Batumi, and later a Prime Minister) asked Noi Zhordania, the Georgian Menshevik leader." #18*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23 Croom Helm, London, pg.104

"The Treaty of Batum, by which the fighting stopped, was signed between the 'Republic of Armenia' and Turkey on June 4th, 1918. It stipulated that Armenia would have an area of 10,000 km²; Ottoman troops and material would be transported unhindered over Armenian territory; and the Ottoman Army would reserve the right to use its own forces if the Armenians proved incapable of maintaining order and facilitating transportation. Turkish cannons were installed four miles from Etchmiadzin and four miles from Yerevan. During the desperate days in May, 1918, when Yerevan and Etchmiadzin -the very heartland of Russian Armenia- were threatened, the Armenians were able not only to stop the advance of the Turks at the Battles of Sardarabad, Bash-Abaran and Karakilisa, but even to repulse them." #19*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23 Croom Helm, London, pg.105

"Furthermore, various Armenian groups outside the republic's frontiers, went on fighting the Turks even after the Treaty of Batumi. Thus General Andranik (Ozanian) the 'quiet, dignified and soldierly' hero of the Turkish-Armenians, the officer for whom the British War Office had 'a good deal' of respect, had been fighting the Turks the whole way back to Erzurum to Karabagh. He 'absolutely refused' to make peace with the Turks, minuted a member of the Foreign Office staff. Denouncing both signatories and the Treaty of Batumi for handing over the Armenian Plateau to Turkey, Andranik continued his fight in Zangezur. Likewise, in Baku, it was the nationalist Armenians, in an unholy alliance with the local Soviet, which to a large extent kept the Turks out of the oil center until Sept. 16th, 1918, that is only about a month before the Armistice of Mudros was signed. For Caucasian Armenia, there was first of all immense human burden of the thousands of refugees, the remnant of the decimated population of Turkish Armenia. There was also, initially, the necessity to defend the long Erzincan-Van front, a distance of nearly 250 miles. Other difficulties in poor communication, lack of experience as a regular army, suspicion between Russian-Armenians and Turkish-Armenians and especially inability to maintain lasting discipline, dissipated their strength. But despite these inauspicious conditions and mistakes, the Armenian forces took over the Caucasian front after the breakdown of the Russian Army, and as Lord Cecil acknowledged, 'for five months', from February - June, 1918, 'delayed the advance of the Turks', thus rendering an important service to the British Army in Mesopotamia The British authorities were aware that their promises to organize and finance the Caucasian and Armenian forces were not realized. Boghos Nubar's and General Shore's special requests for strong military missions were particularly unfulfilled." #20*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23 Croom Helm, London, pg.106

"At the beginning of the war, about 150 000 Russian-Armenians were enlisted in the Russian armies. In addition, seven groups of volunteers operated on the Caucasian front. Besides these, Boghos Nubar had been instrumental in the formation of the Legion d'Orient, at the 'request' of the French Government and with the agreement of the British Government in late- 1916. It was composed mainly of his own compatriots from the Armenian Diaspora. Throughout the war, the Armenians were sustained in their war effort by the statement of sympathy of the Allied statesmen…. Czar Nicholas II had told Catholicos Gevorg V, 'tell your flock, Holy Father, that a most brilliant future awaits Armenians', in response to the Catholicos' appeal to liberate the Turkish-Armenians and take them under Russian protection. By the Russo-Turkish Reform Scheme of Jan. 26th, 1914, Turkey had recognized the privileged position of Russia in the Armenian question…Of course, Armenians did not know then that the Czar was 'not all keen to incorporate' the Armenian provinces and did not wish to have much to do with Armenians, as the Russian ambassador had told Sir Arthur Nicholson, the Under-Secretary of foreign Affairs, during a conversation in 1915. Nor did they know that during the Sykes-Picot negotiations, Russia had insisted that Sivas and Lesser Armenia should go to France and in return she should get the Kurdish populated Hakkiari-Mush in the east. The reason had been Czarist Russia's desire to have 'as few Armenians as possible' in the Russian territory and to be relieved of Armenian 'nationalist responsibilities'…" #21*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23 Croom Helm, London, pg.108

"During the war, Britain, France and Russia had held a number of discussions about the future of the Ottoman Empire. In 1916, the British and French representatives, Sir Mark Sykes and Georges Picot had agreed that their two countries would divide up the Arab-speaking areas and that the Turkish-speaking parts, France would have a zone extending north into Cilicia from Syria. The Russians, who had already extracted a promise that they would annex Constantinople and the straits, gave their approval on condition that they got the Turkish provinces adjacent to their borders in Caucasus. In the Supreme Council on Oct. 30th, Lloyd George and Clemenceau quarreled angrily over Britain's insistence on negotiating the Turkish truce on their own. Lloyd George told Clemenceau: 'Except for Great Britain no one had contributed anything more than a handful of black troops to the expedition in Palestine, I was really surprised at the lack of generosity on the part of the French Government. The British had now some 500,000 men on Turkish soil. The British had captured three or four Turkish Armies and had incurred hundreds of thousands of casualties in the war with Turkey. The other Governments had only put in a few nigger policemen to see that we did not steal the Holy Sepulchre!' " #24*
Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919, Random House - New York, pg. 374

"It was now 'certain that no Power will accept a mandate for Armenia'. The break-up of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Turkish Empires, the defeat of the Central powers and the withdrawal of the U.S. from Europe in 1919 had created for the victorious Allies and especially Britain, a vast political vacuum. The Allied and especially the British leaders suddenly found themselves with unprecedented worldwide responsibilities shaping the destinies of millions of people and settling the frontiers of a host of countries. The result was an exaggerated sense and awareness of immense power and prestige. Thus during the London Conference of the Allied Representatives in February, 1920, when the Kemalists attacked the French forces and massacred between 15 000 - 20 000 Armenians, Curzon was outraged. He told an Allied meeting that it was 'impossible' for the Allies to tolerate this 'insulting defiance' by the Turks, and that all three powers should join in exacting 'the appropriate penalties'. Likewise, Lloyd George expressed his grave concern about the 'prestige' of the Allies throughout the Turkish Empire and the 'dignity' of Great Powers. But with armies melting fast, Britain's military strength was shrinking. British authority, prestige and power, unsupported by military capability, were illusory and certainly insufficient to impose the Turkish Treaty in its entirety." #26*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.187

"Less than three months after the dispatch of British troops to the Caucasus, Lloyd George's Cabinet decided on their withdrawal. The British Command in the Caucasus, caught up in the local territorial disputes, had made demands for more and more troops… Involvement had grown. Yet, the Cabinet was not prepared to incur these additional responsibilities. On Jan. 30th, 1919, Lloyd George formally asked the Supreme Council in Paris that the military representatives of the Allied powers should meet 'at once' and present a report as to the most equitable and economical distribution among the powers of the 'burden' of supplying military forces for maintaining order in the Turkish Empire and Transcaucasia pending decisions of the Peace Conference. On Feb. 5th, the military representatives agreed that Italian troops should replace the British in Transcaucasia and Konia. It was in order to catch the war-weary public mood that Lloyd George had apparently promised, during 1918 elections' an immediate demobilization and return to a peace footing, and Sir Henry Wilson accused him of conducting a 'cursed campaign' for 'vote-catching'. A quick demobilization would satisfy an electorate which was fatigued and pacific and a Treasury urging the necessity for retrenchment. Even from the earliest stage, Balfour had opposed the policy of assuming responsibilities in the Caucasus. He was really frightened at the responsibilities which the British were taking upon themselves: 'Who has to bear those responsibilities? The War Office and the Treasury are mainly concerned. Where are they going to find the men or the money for these things? I do not know. Those matters are never considered.' " #27*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.159

"Great reductions could 'only be obtained by reductions in men'. So, the British armies melted fast. On the day of the general Armistice (Mudro, Oct.30. 1918) the total strength of the army was 3 615 000; on Sept. 16th, 1919 it had dropped to 904 164. Yet another reason for the withdrawal was Lloyd George's wish, as recorded by Sir Henry Wilson in his diary, to force the pace in the settlement of Asia Minor; to force President Wilson to take his share in garrisoning or in naming the mandatory. There was also his view that the British troops in the Caucasus should reinforce those in Constantinople and Asia Minor, ready to counter any possible move by the Italians (who were basing their territorial claims on the wartime Treaty of London of April, 1915)." #28*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.160

"The Allied leaders had simply to make use of any possible source of manpower.. A few days later the Bolshevik Revolution had occurred resulting in Armistice, the withdrawal of Russian forces from occupied Turkish territory, a separate peace, and the creation of an enormous vacuum in the balance of power in Eastern Turkey and the Caucasus. Harold Nicolson minuted: 'The Russian Revolution has changed the whole aspect of the Armenian question'… Henceforth, British statements about the actual liberation of Armenia simply became unrealistic utterances…. As already mentioned, six Armenian battalions had refused to go to the Persian front for 'political reasons', and the Armenian Committee in Petrograd had decided not to press for the formation of military units until the 'future political status' of Armenia had been decided upon. #29*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.111

"Allies too were contemplating peace with Turkey. The Armenian Military Defense Committee in the Caucasus, evidently in a panic, told the British Consulate at Tbilisi that were Armistice with the Turks to be concluded, Armenia would be in danger of 'returning under the Turkish rule'. It was against this background and mainly to stimulate the Armenian war effort that the British leaders made their 'pledges' to the Armenians from December, 1917 onwards. They were designed on the one hand to induce the Armenians to go on fighting with a tottering Caucasian Front and on the other hand to avoid too much commitment. 'Liberation from the Turkish yoke' implies either annexation by another power or some form of self-government." #30*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.112

"Balfour answered: 'Yes Sir, His Majesty's Government are following with earnest sympathy and admiration the gallant resistance of the Armenians in defense of their liberties and honor, and are doing everything they can to come to their assistance'… (Robert Cecil, Asst. Foreign Secretary) also referred to the Armenian soldiers 'still fighting' in the ranks of the British, French and American armies, and to the part they had borne in General Allenby's great victory in Palestine." #32 *
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.115

"Britain was best placed to provide immediate aid. At the end of 1918, British forces from Mesopotamia had moved into the Caucasus on the Caspian side to occupy Baku and its oilfields. British intentions, though, even to the British themselves, were not clear. Access to Caspian Sea oil, protecting a possible route to India, keeping the French out, furthering self-determination: all were reasons for British to occupy the Caucasus. The British troop withdrawal nevertheless continued, and, lest Denikin be upset, Britain held off on granting the Caucasian republics recognition, Only in January, 1920, when it was clear that the White Russians were finished and that the Bolsheviks were poised to sweep southward, Britain finally recognized the little states and send them some weapons. The War Office took the opportunity to offload surplus Canadian Ross rifles, famous for their ability to jam even under perfect conditions." #33*
Margaret MacMillan Paris 1919 - Random House, New York, pg.194

"When the Ottoman Empire entered the war, Enver Pasha, one of the triumvirate of Young Turks who had ruled Constantinople since 1913, sent the bulk of its armies eastward, against Russia. The result, in 1915, was a disaster: the Russians destroyed a huge Ottoman force and looked set to advance in Anatolia just when the Allies were landing at Gallipoli in the west. The triumvirate gave the order to deport Armenians from Eastern Anatolia on the grounds that they were traitors, potential or actual. Many Armenians were slaughtered before they could leave; others died of hunger and disease on the forced march southwards. 'Say to the Armenians' exclaimed Orlando, 'that I make their cause my cause'. Lloyd George promised that Armenia would never be restored to the 'blasting tyranny' of the Turks. Fine sentiments, but they amounted to little in the end, At the Peace Conference, even heartfelt agreement in principle faltered in the face of other considerations. Armenia was far away; it was surrounded by enemies and the Allies had few forces in the area. Moving troops and aid in, at a time when resources were stretched thin, was a major undertaking; what railways were had been badly damaged and the roads were primitive. Help was away, but Armenia's enemies were close at hand. Russian armies, whether they were White or Bolshevik, were advancing southward and would not tolerate Armenia or any other independent state in the Caucasus. "#35*
Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919, Random House - New York, pg. 378

"In Paris, Armenia's friends were lukewarm and hesitant. The British, it is true, saw certain advantages for themselves in taking a mandate for Armenia: the protection of oil supplies coming from Baku on the Caspian to the port of Batumi on the Black Sea, and the creation of a barrier between Bolshevism and the British possessions in the Middle East. On the other hand, as the War Office kept repeating, British resources were already overstretched. The French Foreign Office, for its part, toyed with ideas of a huge Armenia under French protection which would provide a field for French investment and the spread of French culture. The Italian like the French, preferred to concentrate their efforts on gains on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey and in Europe. That left the Americans. Wilson's judgment had deteriorated that, on May 14th, when Armenia came up to the Council of Four, he agreed to accept a mandate, subject, he added, to the consent of the American Senate. This ruffled the French because the proposed American Mandate was to stretch from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, taking in the zone in Cilicia promised to France under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Although no one suspected it at the time, no arrangement made in Paris was going to make the slightest difference to Armenia. If all the claims, protectorates, independent states and mandates that were discussed actually had come into existence, a very odd little Turkey in the interior of Anatolia would have been left, with no straits, no Mediterranean coast a truncated Black Sea coast and no Armenian or Kurdish territories in the northeast. #36*
Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919, Random House - New York, pg. 379

"But the position of these powers as regards the Armenian clauses was somewhat false. That position fatally based on an illusion of power and authority when in reality the Allies lacked effective means - the will and forces- to implement the Treaty of Sevres. Should the Turkish Government refuse to carry it out, according to their report, the Allies needed for such a task 27 infantry divisions in all, while they only had on the spot 19 divisions. In more detail they stated that the territory of the future Armenian state was occupied by '4 Turkish infantry divisions with large stocks of military materials' and that these divisions could be reinforced by large numbers of irregulars. On the other hand, Armenia, in view of 'feeble strength' at her disposal - 15 000 men, insufficiently armed and without war material - was 'nor in position' to establish her sovereignty and to resist possible attacks from Turkey or Azerbaijan. The General Staff concluded that the British Government could enforce the proposed peace treaty, only if it was prepared to face 'a further call for troops'. But… even the existing armies were only too impatient to return home. In 1919, there had been open riots at some military camps to protest against slowness of demobilization. In addition, military expenditure became a major target for economies." #37*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, pg.183

"In August, 1920, the Ankara Government reached an agreement with Soviet Russia on the establishment of diplomatic relations, and seven months later signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendship with Moscow. Within this framework, the Soviets accepted the National Pact in its totality, including delimitation of Turkey's frontiers, repudiated all treaties concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Czarist Russia (including the Capitulations, which had been restored by the Treaty of Sevres), and promised to extend military aid to Nationalist Turkey in its struggle against 'imperialism'. Having secured his northern front, Kemal could concentrate his efforts on the Armenian problem. In the Treaty of Sevres Turkey had recognized the independence of Armenia, created on the ruins of the Russian, Empire. But in late-October, 1920, as Wilson was about to announce the award of large tracts of Turkish territory to Armenia, Kemal's forces invaded the country, defeated the Armenian army, and advanced as far as Alexandropol. The following month, Russian forces invaded northern Armenia and declared the formation of a Soviet Government there. In the ensuing Treaty of Gumru (also known as Leninakan), concluded on Dec. 3rd, 1920, Armenia surrendered all its territorial gains to Turkey, including the strategic fortress of Kars and Ardahan and repudiated all claims on Turkish territories." #38*
Efraim & Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand, Harvard U.Press pg. 335

"In September, 1920, less than a month after the Treaty of Sevres had promised an independent Armenia incorporating part of Turkey, Ataturk's forces attacked from the south. Despite their best efforts and the attacks of their tiny air force of three planes, the Armenians were gradually forced back. When Aharonian, the Armenian poet who had spoken for his country in Paris, tried to see Curzon in London, he was brushed off with a letter. 'What we want to see now is concrete evidence of some constructive and administrative ability at home, instead of purely external policy based on propaganda and mendicancy', wrote Curzon. On Nov. 17th, the Armenian Government signed an Armistice with Turkey which left only a tiny scrap of country still free. Five days later, a message arrived from President Wilson. Under the Sevres Treaty, he had been asked to draw Armenia's boundaries; he decided it should have 42,000 km² of Turkish territory. With a nation abandoned by the world and crushed between two enemies, the Armenian prime minister said, 'Nothing remains for the Armenians to do but choose the lesser of two evils'. In December, Armenia became a Soviet republic; the Bolshevik commissar for nationalities, Joseph Stalin, was active in bringing it to heel. The following March, the Treaty of Moscow between Turkey and the Soviet Union confirmed the return of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. The border has lasted to this day. Kurdistan was finished, too. By March, 1921, the Allies had backed away from the vague promises in the Treaty of Sevres. The 'existing facts' were that Ataturk had denounced the whole treaty; he had successfully kept part of the Armenian territories within Turkey; and he was about to sign a treaty giving the rest to the Soviet Union. Kurdish nationalists might protest, but the Allies no longer had any interest in an independent Kurdish state." #39
Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919, Random House, New York, pg. 449

"The British withdrawal presented, therefore, an opportunity for the Kurds, Tatars and Turks of these disputed territories, to try to sabotage and invalidate, with active help of Turkish officers and arms, any territorial arrangement which might favor Armenia. In their turn Armenian bands in Kars, 'without discipline and not under effective control' apparently pillaged insurgent Moslem villages and committed atrocities. They argued to Lt.Col. Rawlinson that in order to take control of the region it was necessary that they should disarm the population. But the authorities in Yerevan had neither the time nor the money to organize a properly disciplined army. The Armenians felt themselves separated from the Turkic peoples by the blood of hundreds of thousands of their kinsmen systematically murdered during the war. These mutual relations were apparently discussed in Paris. On March 4th, 1919, Stephen Bonsal, the distinguished American journalist serving as secretary to president Wilson, referred in his diary to the 'blood-curdling' atrocities committed against Armenians by the Turks which he had seen with his 'own eyes' in Turkey. 'No, I do not close my eyes to the crimes which the Armenians have committed…from time to time when the rare occasion presented against the diabolical Kurds and the Turkish irregulars… Indeed I approve of them'." #40*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.163

"Commander Luke considered the agreement as a betrayal of trust on the part of Armenia and an act of treachery against Britain. As he reported to Curzon, he had referred….'in strong terms to the painful impression which this act on the part of Armenia, amounting in effect to a betrayal of trust, was bound to make on His Majesty's Government, who would… feel that they had been ill-paid for their help to Armenia in the matter of munitions and otherwise.' Again he stressed that: '… the Armenian Government's consent to the Bolshevik occupation of Nakchievan, which opened their road into northwest Persia and into Turkey, almost amounted to an act of treachery against Great Britain, and especially deplorable at the time when Armenia had just received a large consignment of British munitions' ". #41*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.206

"General T. Nazarbekian, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armenian armed forces, also considered the late arrival of British arms as one of the causes of Armenia's military reverses. Armenians were being attacked on all sides, by the Azeris, the Turkish Nationalists, the Russian Bolsheviks, and, within the disputed territory, by the Molokans and the Kurds. Moreover, Armenia was hampered by a lack of financial resources, of fuel, and of means of transport. But besides the misleading Treaty of Sevres, the Allies could give neither goodwill nor effective diplomatic assistance. In the summer of 1920, Armernia was fatally isolated in the Caucasus. (General Milne) even suggested a word of 'warning' to be given to the Armenian Government as regards Colonel Katheniotes, an officer in the Greek Army. According to Katheniotes' plan, volunteers would be raised among the Greeks of the Black Sea coast to help Armenia occupy Trabzon, in return for the ultimate grant of some sort of autonomy to the Greeks in such parts of the coast which might come under Armenian sovereignty. The warning to Armenia was duly given by Commander Luke who believed that the plan merely seemed to be a vehicle to resuscitate the Pontic Republic - a Hellenistic state which had existed in the Old Ages. Thus Armenia was urged not to make concessions to the Soviets. But from nowhere in the Allied camp did she receive even diplomatic help." #42 *
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.207

"Kemal 'gladly' accepted the offer of mediation. He added that the Turkish Government had postponed military operations in the provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi on receipt of Chicherin's note. In 1920, Armenian troops moved into Olti, a district rich in coal, on the Russian side of the pre-war Russo-Turkish frontier, as a preliminary step towards the Treaty of Sevres. Bekir Sami claimed that Olti formed part of the Ottoman Empire under the Treaties of Brest-Litvosk and Batumi. He therefore requested the withdrawal of the Armenian troops 'without any delay'. The Armenian Government however, rejected both treaties as bases for the relations between the two countries. The district was an incontestable part of the Armenian republic. Having signed the Peace Treaty with Turkey, Armenia would await the decision of the President of the U.S. and was not crossing the former Russo-Turkish frontier. Thus, in the summer of 1920, Armenia based her claims on the Treaty of Sevres; Kemalist Turkey on the Treaties of Brest-Litvosk and Batumi although Brest-Litvosk had been renounced by Soviet Russia in the autumn of 1918. In September, 1920, Commander Luke reported to the Foreign Office that at least four battalions of Kaz?m Karabekir's troops crossed the 1914 Russo-Turkish frontier, and by a surprise attack had driven the Armenians back 30 versts east of Oltu. The Armenians had suffered heavily. Having captured Olti, the Turks were advancing in large numbers towards Kars with the object of seizing the district. Armenia was certainly being squeezed by anti-Allied powers: Turks attacking on the west, Bolsheviks pressing on the north and hostile Azerbaijan maneuvring on the east." #43*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.209

"It seems that by making excessive territorial claims and by using delaying tactics, the Armenian Government was naively -and dangerously- playing for time. Encouraged by the British, the Armenian leadership was following a frightening policy of illusion. Within the next 20 days Armenia lost everything to the Turks. On Nov. 7th, an Armistice was signed between the Armenian Government and Kaz?m Karabekir on the latter's terms. Karabekir perceived that since 1919, British power was ebbing in the Caucasus, and had argued, with chilling realism, that no assistance whatever would come to Armenia." #44*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.217

"… the Armenian Government had finally to sue for a fresh Armistice on Nov. 18th, Alexander Khatisian was appointed to negotiate peace with the Kemalists. The Armenian Government realized that it was obliged to make peace either with Turks or Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks assured the Armenians that they could settle the Turkish trouble immediately if Armenia 'will denounce'(?) the Turkish Peace Treaty. The Armenian Government wanted to adopt a course which would, so far as possible, meet with the 'approval of Britain'. Replying, Curzon stated that Britain could not be a party to a treaty with the Nationalists, but considered that the alternative of a treaty with Soviet Russia was 'doubtless worse'. Earlier two members of the Foreign Office had similarly indicated that a peace with the Turks was 'clearly preferable'. The offer was rejected. Armenia finally agreed to the 'half loaf' left by Turkey as she believed that the 'whole loaf' offered by Bolshevik Russia would mean 'the loss of all sympathy in Europe'." #45 *
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.218

"The crushing Treaty of Alexandropol left Armenia with a territory of 27,000 km²: Kars and Surmalu, including Mount Ararat would go to Turkey; Nakhichevan and Zangezur would become Azerbaijani protectorates; Armenia would be permitted to have a detachment of only 1 500 soldiers equipped with 20 machine-guns and eight cannons; compulsory military service forbidden. Turkey would have the right to supervise goods entering Armenia. Finally, Armenia would declare the Treaty of Sevres null and void; the representatives of the Allies should leave. The only Armenian state permitted by Karabekir was a tiny protectorate wholly dependent on Turkish goodwill. The renunciation of the Treaty of Sevres by Armenia had been the pre-condition for Turkish negotiations. But it had also been the only major condition asked by Soviet Russia in return for her mediation in securing the pre-war Russian frontier. She had in addition agreed to recognize her independence. The offer was rejected. Had it been accepted, Kars and Surmalu might have been within Armenian territory, the war might have ended earlier and Karabekir's troops would not have wrought death and destruction as thoroughly as if they were committed to annihilation." #46*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.219

"Thus it failed to draw on the support of all sections and classes and especially could not attract Armenian capital from the Diaspora… they had no resources in men or money, a member of the Foreign Office minuted. Moreover, although there was often much provocation on the part of the Tatar population within the frontiers of Armenia, the administration at times unable to prevent Armenian bands from committing excesses in Moslem villages. The result was their alienation and an increase in the hostility of both Azerbaijan and Turkey. Significantly, Baldwin twice characterized this faith as 'blind': Armenia …held a blind strange faith in Great Britain, who had made so many promises to help her and who had once beaten the Turks. And again, that Armenia 'had a blind faith in England and anyone English'." #47*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.221

"Writing in 1921, Wilson insisted that Britain should have a strong friendly Turkey, 'stretching from Smyrna to Baku' on her side. Evidently there was no room for Armenia in his plan. With such views prevalent among General Staff, what were the arms sent to Armenia in the summer of 1920? H.W. Harcourt wrote on Dec. 1st, 1920: … 'the utility of the shipment was largely destroyed by the fact that the War Office took this opportunity to unload on the Armenians the Canadian Ross rifles -marksmen's rifles- which had been tried in France and proved useless for general field service." #48*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23, Croom Helm, London, pg.229

"But the Foreign Office easily found the justification needed for explaining Britain's unwillingness and inability to help Armenia effectively. (William Haskell) on his way back home to the U.S. he had called at the Foreign Office to tell D.G. Osborne that: 'The country is a desert and the people nothing but professional beggars… There is no administrative or political capacity in the country, no money, and no resources to develop. Foreign Armenians who have amassed fortunes…. Will neither contribute nor return to the national home'. Osborne prepared a brief for his seniors that: 'His Majesty's Government is not a charity organization and that instead of perpetual appeals for foreign pity and assistance we should like to see evidence of some self-reliance and political ability in Armenia; that the continued existence of Armenia as an autonomous state is dependent on Armenian efforts and capacity and cannot be based on foreign armies and foreign money'." #49*
Akaby Nassibian, Britain & the Armenian Question 1915-23 Croom Helm, London, pg. 212

"The extremist activities of the Dashnak Party are well-portrayed by Ian M. Smith, British Vice-Consul in Van, and by R. McDonelI. The latter wrote about this party as follows:
They raised money by terror among their own people, and spent large sums on arms and ammunition...; they fomented hatred of the Moslems... For the Dashnaks there could be no peace without conquest; no decision will satisfy them, whose aspiration is an Armenia stretching from Yerevan to the Mediterranean Sea." #53*
Salahi Sonyel, The Great War and the Great Tragedy of Anatolia, T.T.K., pg.77

"In a letter dated Oct. 28th, 1914, Garabet Hagopian, the chairman of the Armenian Patriotic Association in London, informed British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey that the Armenian people had not been idle spectators, but when the war broke out, they offered up special supplications in their Churches for the success of the land and sea forces of the British Empire. Armenians serving in the Russian lines with the Caucasian army were giving a good account of themselves, while a number of them were serving with the French Army as volunteers.. He went on to observe that after the war was resulting in the glorious victory of the Allies, Russia should be given a mandate to take charge of the eastern provinces of Turkey, and establish a really efficient and honest administration under which it might be possible for the Armenians to freely exercise their duty and privileges as Christians and as pioneers of a true civilization. Moreover, the Archbishop of Canterbury and many other British dignitaries including Armenophiles such as Lord Bryce, Lord Robert Cecil, and others, admitted that during the war the Allies definitely encouraged the Armenians to join as volunteers in fighting the Allied cause, and supplied them with munitions of war." #54*
Salahi Sonyel, The Great War and the Great Tragedy of Anatolia, T.T.K., pg.94-95


"http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2006/08/924-le-petit-journal.html
(Picture: Armenians massacring Moslems in Zeytun) Translated explanation from French
"Le Petit Journal:
European Protection.
In July, 1895, the insurrection that took place in Zeytun lasted up to January, 1896 and tens of thousands of Turks lost their lives…Under European pressure the responsible were not punished and the Turkish Government had to stop the military campaign…The consuls of six European countries went to Zeytun and took the leaders of the insurrection under their protection and sent them out of Turkey. Under foreign pressure the government had to pardon them, and lower taxes.

The Petit Journal is a denial of the French to the members of congress who at that time (1915-17) had published 1 300 000 Armenian victims.

Extracts from French military reports regarding atrocities committed by the Armenian Legion against Turks in Cilicia' from General du Hays, Les Armees Francaises au Levant, 1919-39, Tome I: L'Occupation Francaise en Syrie et en Cilicie sous le Commandment Britanique, November, 1918 - December, 1919 (Ministere de la Defense, Etat Major de l'Armee de Terre, Service Historique Chateau de Vincennes, 1938) pgs. 123-128

'(General Hamelin) clearly saw that to send the Armenian legionnaires to Cilicia and Alexandretta was to supply powder and detonator to the situation. Incidents and disorders followed with little delay. On Jan. 3rd, 1919 in the small village of Euzerli, near Dörtyol a quarrel broke out between the Armenian Legionnaires and the Turkish civilians. One Turk was killed and there were eight wounded on both sides. The legionnaires then assaulted the village and seven civilians were killed… The gravest incident took place at Alexandretta during the night of the Feb. 16th -17th. Following a quarrel between (Senegalese) riflemen and Armenian legionnaires, gunfire was exchanged and a legionnaire was wounded. Then the legionnaires of the battalion which had just been formed and was poorly disciplined and weakly organized, spread out in the town, assaulted the Turkish inhabitants and pillaged and burned two houses… The 4th Battalion of the Armenian Legion was then disarmed…some were distributed among the other forces, but some 400 were returned to Port Said… Numerous incidents took place this time, so at the start of March, 1919, the British commander requested that the entire Armenian Legion be removed from Cilicia and sent to Morocco. However the regulations of the Legion did not permit it to be sent outside Cilicia. The only solution in this situation, therefore, according to General Hamelin, to gradually dissolve it through selection and losses in battle. Finally to make some use of the Armenian legionnaires, the 21st Corps ordered that they be taken out of the villages and stationed instead along the railroad to guard it. But after new incidents took place, orders were issued to remove them from the railroad as well. The spirit and the morale of the Armenians became worse and worse, there were large numbers of desertions, and General Difieux, who had commanded the Legion for some time concluded that the only solution was to dissolve the Legion because it had caused so many difficulties. The order of dissolution was given in August, to take effect in September, 1920" #55*
http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2006/08/924-le-petit-journal.html

"Five days after Russia declared war on Turkey, Francis Blyth Kirby, the former acting British Vice-Consul at Rostow-on-Don, wrote to the British Foreign Office from London, that before leaving his post, a wealthy Armenian prince named David Chernoff had told him that the Armenians in Russia and Turkey were extremely anxious that war should break out between these two countries, in which case they would avenge themselves on the Turks for all the wrongs they claimed to have suffered at their hands. He also stated that 60 000 Armenians in the Caucasus, and on the frontier, had already volunteered to fight the Turks in the event of war breaking out, and were begging the Russian Government to supply them with arms. He believed that a revolution would break out among the Armenians generally, if they could rely on the support of Russia under whose protection they hoped to obtain the freedom of their country… " #65*
Salahi Sonyel, The Great War and the Great Tragedy of Anatolia, T.T.K., pg. 97

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Turkey Has Always Been The Biggest Danger For Armenia
16.07.2007
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ “At the moment Turkey’s foreign policy is targeted at Northern Iraq and improvement of relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, what includes development of communications and military-strategic partnership,” Professor of international relations and politics of the Universidad de San Andrés in Buenos Aires, Dr Khachik Ter-Ghukassian said in an interview with PanARMENIAN.Net.

If Turkey’s succeeds in realizing its plans Armenia will be isolated from the world, according to him. “Curiously enough, such state of things is not convenient for the U.S. which insists on opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. However, normalization of relations without preconditions is a dangerous tendency. Turkey doesn’t open the border proceeding from political reasons: the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the Armenian Genocide and absence of fixed border with Armenia. The only legal basis for demarcation of borders is the Sevr Treaty. No agreement signed after Sevr, namely the Kars and Moscow treaties, do not have juridical effect, since the signatory powers stopped their existence as elements of international law. The Sevr Treaty was signed August 10, 1920. Borders with independent Armenia had to be marked by a neutral mediator, namely the United States, according to it,” he said.

“At that we should not forget that Turkey has always been the biggest danger for the Armenian people. This opinion should be shared by the whole nation, both in Armenia and Diaspora. On the other hand, opening of borders can tell on Armenia’s economy. Georgia, where the local industry was destroyed because of the abundant flow of cheap Turkish goods, can serve as an example. Certainly, Armenian economy can’t compete with the Turkish, but we will have an outlet to the world, at least. Although, we are not ready to make a reality of the scenario we will be offered,” he said.