2779) The Illicit Adventures Of Rawlinson: British Intelligence In The Final Phase Of The Ottoman Empire

Revised Version Of The Paper Presented In The Seminar On "Spying In The Ottoman Empire", The Skilliter Centre For Ottoman Studies, Newnham College, Cambridge, 29 April 1995.

Bülent Gökay

Historians have usually tended either to ignore intelligence altogether or to treat it as of little importance. Many important accounts of the 20th century political history do not even mention the names of the intelligence services. This can partly be explained by the difficulty of researching the intelligence records. The bulk of the relevant records have been destroyed or else retained indefinitely by the governments. It is not easy to redress the balance. Only a careful search of the papers can produce even a fragmentary run of documents on the topic. There is also a desire not to be regarded as on the same level as the inaccurate sensationalism of many bestselling accounts of espionage.

Intelligence does not win wars. It does not shape foreign policy. Nonetheless, intelligence activities are an inseparable part of the policy-making process. On might think of the intelligence game conducted in the context of various paradigms of international relations. It is one cog in the mighty machine of command, an accessory to help the commander make decisions.

In this paper I will concentrate on a particular example in the field of military intelligence. In general terms, military intelligence is charged with gathering and evaluating information about the enemy vvhilst preventing him from discovering what your own forces are doing. . .

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Ankara University Journal Database

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