3337) Armenians Or Jews Don't Exist in Hitler’s Famous 1939 Speech

Updated 8th Feb 2011


The English translation of the famous Hitler’s speech of August 22, 1939, where the sentence on Armenians is supposed to be present. Actually, there is nothing on Armenians, not even about Jews . .


Nazi Germany (1933-1945)

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Documents - The Military, Foreign Policy, and War

Hitler’s Speech to the Commanders in Chief (August 22, 1939)

On May 23, 1939, just a day after signing the "Pact of Steel", Hitler told his generals that a German invasion of Poland was now inevitable. The conflict over Danzig and the Polish corridor was mere pretext. Germany could simply no longer do without Eastern European "living space" [Lebensraum] and the attendant raw materials. Hitler therefore declared his willingness to accept the possibility of a declaration of war by England and France. His greatest concern was a possible Soviet intervention on the side of the western Allies. But when, on August 21, 1939, he received Stalin’s agreement to enter into a German-Soviet pact, Hitler saw that the course had been set for war. (Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signed the pact two days later in Moscow.) On August 22, 1939, Hitler invited his generals to yet another situation meeting. On September 1, 1939, the invasion of Poland began.

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Speech by the Führer to the Commanders in Chief on August 22, 1939

I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have some insight into the individual factors on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.

After this we shall discuss military details.

It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only after that against the East. But the sequence of these things cannot be fixed. Nor should one close one's eyes to threatening situations. I wanted first of all to establish a tolerable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which appealed to me, could not be executed, as fundamental points had changed. It became clear to me that, in the event of a conflict with the West, Poland would attack us. Poland is striving for access to the sea. The further development appeared after the occupation of the Memel Territory and it became clear to me that in certain circumstances a conflict with Poland might come at an inopportune moment. I give as reasons for this conclusion:

1. First of all two personal factors:

My own personality and that of Mussolini.

Essentially all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the trust of the whole German people as I have. There will probably never again in the future be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lunatic.

The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If anything happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The Italian Court is fundamentally opposed to the Duce. Above all, the Court regards the expansion of the empire as an encumbrance. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.

The third personal factor in our favour is Franco. We can ask only for benevolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on Franco's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and stability in the present system in Spain. We must accept the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist party with our internal unity.

The other side presents a negative picture as far as authoritative persons are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England and France.

It is easy for us to make decisions. We have nothing to lose; we have everything to gain. Because of our restrictions [Einschränkungen] our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few more years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents will be risking a great deal and can gain only a little. Britain's stake in a war is inconceivably great. Our enemies have leaders who are below the average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.

Besides the personal factors, the political situation is favorable for us: In the Mediterranean, rivalry between Italy, France and England; in the Far East, tension between Japan and England; in the Middle East, tension which causes alarm in the Mohammedan world.

The English Empire did not emerge stronger from the last war. Nothing was achieved from the maritime point of view. Strife between England and Ireland. The Union of South Africa has become more independent. Concessions have had to be made to India. England is in the utmost peril. Unhealthy industrialization. A British statesman can only view the future with concern.

France's position has also deteriorated, above all in the Mediterranean.

Further factors in our favor are these:

Since Albania, there has been a balance of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia is infected with the fatal germ of decay because of her internal situation.

Romania has not grown stronger. She is open to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by petty minds, unsteady, weak men.

All these favorable circumstances will no longer prevail in two or three year's time. No one knows how much longer I shall live. Therefore, better a conflict now.

The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was doubtful, since it was achieved by bluff on the part of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military [machine]. If at all possible, not in a general reckoning, but by the accomplishment of individual tasks.

The relationship with Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was contrary to the views of the people. My proposals to Poland (Danzig and the Corridor) were frustrated by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone towards us. A permanent state of tension is intolerable. The power of initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. The present moment is more favorable than in two or three years' time. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot for ever face one another with rifles cocked. One compromise solution suggested to us was that we should change our convictions and make gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was a danger of losing prestige. Now there still is a great probability that the West will not intervene. We must take the risk with ruthless determination. The politician must take a risk just as much as the general. We are faced with the harsh alternatives of striking or of certain annihilation sooner or later.

Reference to previous hazardous undertakings.

I should have been stoned if I had not been proved right. The most dangerous step was the entry into the neutral zone. Only a week before, I got a warning through France. I have always taken a great risk in the conviction that it would succeed.

Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.

The following special reasons confirm my view. England and France have undertaken obligations which neither is in a position to fulfill. There is no real rearmament in England, but only propaganda. A great deal of harm was done by many Germans, who were not in agreement with me, saying and writing to English people after the solution of the Czech question: The Führer succeeded because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. One factor in this war of nerves is to boost the increase of armaments. But what are the real facts about British rearmament? The naval construction program for 1938 has not yet been completed. Only the reserve fleet has been mobilized. Purchase of trawlers. No substantial strengthening of the Navy before 1941 or 1942.

Little has been done on land. England will be able to send at most three divisions to the Continent. A little has been done for the Air Force, but it is only a beginning. Anti-aircraft defense is in its initial stages. At the moment England has only 150 anti-aircraft guns. The new anti-aircraft gun has been produced. There is a shortage of predictors. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in two or three years. At the moment the English Air Force has only 130,000 men, France 72,000, Poland 15,000. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.

The following is typical of England. Poland wanted a loan from England for her rearmament. England, however, only granted credits in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot make deliveries. This suggests that England does not really want to support Poland. She is not risking eight million pounds in Poland, although she poured five hundred million into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not take any risks.

France is short of men (decline in the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is obsolete. France did not want to embark on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities for fighting against us:

1. Blockade: It will not be effective because of our autarky and because we have sources of supply in Eastern Europe.

2. Attack in the West from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.

Another possibility would be the violation of Dutch, Belgian and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these States, as well as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality with all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Thus in actual fact England cannot help Poland. There still remains an attack on Italy. Military intervention is out of the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Herr von Brauchitsch had told me that I would have replied: 'Then it cannot be done.' It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.

We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland. We must bear in mind our great production capacity. It is much greater than in 1914–1918.

The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not reckon with my great strength of purpose. Our enemies are small fry. I saw them in Munich.

I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. Russia has no interest in preserving Poland, and Stalin knows that it would mean the end of his régime, no matter whether his soldiers emerged from a war victorious or vanquished. Litvinov's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change towards Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversations. Proposal for a non-aggression pact. Then came a comprehensive proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which led to Russia replying yesterday that she is prepared to sign. Personal contact with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a mighty aim, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last moment some swine or other will yet submit to me a plan for mediation.

The political objective goes further. A start has been made on the destruction of England's hegemony. The way will be open for the soldiers after I have made the political preparations.

Today's announcement of the non-aggression pact with Russia came as a bombshell. The consequences cannot be foreseen. Stalin also said that this course will benefit both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.

In reply, Göring thanked the Führer and assured him that the Wehrmacht would do their duty.

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Source of English translation: Speech by the Führer to the Commanders in Chief on August 22, 1939, in United States Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1957-1964. Series D (1937-1945), The Last Days of Peace, Volume 7: August 9 – September 3, 1939. Document 192, pp. 200-04.

Source of original German text: Ansprache Hitlers an die Oberbefehlshaber am 22. August 1939 über seine Absicht, Krieg zu führen und seine politischen Vorbereitungen dazu, sowie Voraussagungen über die Haltung anderer europäischer Staaten und den wahrscheinlichen Kriegsverlauf (Beweisstück US-29), in Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof. Nürnberg 14. November 1945 - 1. Oktober 1946. Volume XXVI, Amtlicher Text – Deutsche Ausgabe, Urkunden und anderes Beweismaterial. Nuremberg 1947. Reprint: Munich, Delphin Verlag, 1989. Document 798-PS, pp. 338-44.

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Source http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org

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Kindly Provided by Maxime Gauin

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References by Sukru Aya

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1)


(Translated from FRENCH text or translation into English)
(Page 225) “HAYASTAN” No.2 – German paper in Armenian Language
(Text in Armenian speaks of definite German Victory)
(Label on the face of the newspaper in French)

February 1945 – The newspaper of the Armenian volunteers always announces final victory (to the left above: their badge decorated of one symbol resembling the swastika)! There are not more than very few copies of these Nazi Armenian newspapers, the most copies have been destroyed by the Armenians. Here is a copy of “Hayastan” which succeeded, survival!

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2)


(Page 226) “HAYASTAN” German paper in Armenian Language, No. 1(125) Year 1945

Translation and summary of the Armenian newspaper ” Hayastan “

The newspaper has three pages

First page

An address to the officers and the soldiers of Armenian volunteers units:
'Good wishes for the New Year, accompanied with the assurance of a certain victory and an absolute liberation of the country.'
A. Mouradian

Second page

Best wishes of General Sarkisjan addressed to Armenian volunteers.
' Congratulations and courage, to the volunteers who for many years, were forced to live far from the country, and those who are dear to them! However, everything depends on volunteers; happiness, as well as the freedom of motherland. It is the trust put in the bellicose ardor and weapons, which will bring freedom and will make possible to celebrate in the liberated country once again.'

Armenian wishes to all volunteers!

' The New Year will be placed under the signature of the battle, reinforced for the release of fatherland. Our volunteers cannot, receive like other friends,letters or parcels from their relatives who stayed at the home. Our parents and our friends in Soviet Union do not have celebration party; they are plunged in a state of distress, they hope and with beating hearts that we come back as liberators. Here, in Germany, the children have the bright eyes of joy in front of presents and decorated Christmas trees. Our children, in the country, have nothing similar. They are hungry and cold and ask their parents when the liberators will arrive. It is because of them that our primordial duty is to implement everything for the freedom of fatherland. They shout revenge for the injustice, which was made towards them, and towards their parents by Bolshevists and it is our duty to avenge them. The old year is about to end, and a new begins.

Something will happen once again! Bolshevism also comes near to its end, and something else will replace it.

You, the Armenian volunteers must be the torchbearers of this new order; it is necessary that you must be victorious.

Full of confidence, we enter the New Year. Victory will belong to us! Long live Armenia! Long live Armenian people! '

Saharuni

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3)


(Page 241) (Photograph)

” DRO ” (Drastamat Kanajan), was born in 1884 in Igdir (which today is the favorable place of departure to the ascent of Ararat). Already at the age of 19 years he joined the party of Dashnaks and fought against Tatars in Sanzegur. He assassinated prince Nacashidsé and the General Alichanov and he ran away to the Ottoman Empire.

After 6 years in security in Turkish banishment, he returns back to the Empire of Tsar, immediately after the start of war in 1914, to fight Turks there. In 1918 he is the leader of the Armenian troops, which attack the neighboring country.

Only 90 kilometers before Tblisi, the Giorgians could push back, the completely unjustified war and the Armenian attack. For the first time, the worldwide opinion was absolutely misinformed by news of massacres, acquainted with the true character of Armenian nationalism. At the end of 1920 Dro became the “Minister of the Defense” of Vratsian’s Armenian government! Together with Hovannes Terterian he signed the capitulation of his motherland in Bolsheviks, and was dictator of the military sovereignty for few weeks.

Stalin was received in Moscow; some time before Dro would have obviously saved the life of the Giorgian Dshugashvili (Stalin).

After a brief stay in Romania, he joined the Nazis and fought as commander of group of soldiers of an Armenian unit on the Crimea and in Caucasus and soon he became the leader of the Armenian Information Service.

He was so-called, the best informed person about the third Reich.

In April, 1945 Americans arrested him, but they soon released him, because American Dashnaks of Boston had intervened in his favor. After a stay in Lebanon and many trips, he died in Boston in 1956.

Because of his eventful and completely immoral life, which was exclusively orientated in an exaggerated and irrational nationalism, in which he submitted everything without having ever made sacrifices himself, “Dro” can be classified as one of the most tragic faces of wrong valuation which has ever existed in the bloody history of the Armenian people.

A typical case of Armenian political madness: Hitler, Himmler and Henjakistes…

This was not all of H.

Political fanatics of all colors, camps of the political ghosts of Armenians joined the “crusade” of the Nazis against their ancient Soviet confederates, with whom they had just shared in brothers Poland and Baltic countries, to die so for absurd phantasm to give rise by Hitlerian help to a National Socialist Great Armenia under the shade of the Great Germany.

The peak of the absurdity of this alliance was reached when in December 1942, General Armenian Dro (Drastamat Kanajan), who was considered to be the Armenian hero par excellence, and the writer Garo Kevorkian visited to the “leader of the Reich “

Mr. Heinrich Himmler and presented him a book of the pastor Lepsius: “The walk to death of the Armenian people “.

It is obvious to think that this upset neither “Dro” nor Himmler, because they were themselves sending people in death!

Himmler having given orders to kill millions, “Dro” nevertheless to thousands, appearing a priori on the list of death of Russians, and about 30.000 Armenians, who followed on the appeal of Mr ” Dro ” and affected to the Nazis!

But Dro, had practice and experience to kill without scruples and Himmler was so impressed by him as after a talk of one hour and a half in prisoners’ camp east of Berlin, that he made him drive in his own car, so that “Dro” could choose his men there.

He visited Armenian units in the oriental front several times, to impress them by his eloquence.

As he knew the Soviet situation particularly well, he was soon taken for the most important German spy, in Soviet matters.

Precisely for his level of incomparable information, it is unpardonable that he forced his Armenian compatriots literally until the last minute in the battle that was a hopeless since a long time, and had no glory. While he was released already after a short time by American occupying force, thanks to his very good relations in United States and died very esteemed, even loved immoderately by his compatriots and after several world tours, in Boston, where the mighty party of Dashnaks still are in command.

Armenian commitment for the national socialist Germany probably had the purpose to delimit Jews in a very clear manner from the Armenians in territories dominated by the Nazis, though many ignorant, among of those who shared… (Rest is unreadable)

(Thanks to Mr. Taner Ertunc for providing photos and French version, translated by A.B. into English)

Sukru S. Aya

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4)

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum    Ph. 90-212-xxxxxxx   
Office of the General Director
100 Raul Wahlenberg Place SW   Letter Mail  Istanbul, February 6th, 2012 
Washington, DC 2002-2126

Gentlemen,

Re: HITLER Quote, my book “The Genocide of Truth Continues…But Facts Tell the Real Story” (P.270)

With further reference to my above book, which was mailed to you last year with a cover letter and for the sake of passing the truth to the future generations, I consider it my obligation as a “decent human – researcher – writer” to share with you the latest information that surfaced very lately.

(1) Please find attached print of the “German history documents” under given reference, which was posted by the blog “armenians-1915.blogspot.com” under # 3337, contents of which are explanatory.

At the end of the article there is a comment sent by Prof. Papazian, who says that the U.S. State Department did not present the “true text”. I just sent a counter comment or reply for him, reading:

Counter Comment on 3337 Mr. Papazian

Are we going to credit "third party information versus authentic authorized sources"?

Sir, never mind what Kevork Bardakjian writes in his book, or what Louis Lochner said and is on the wall of the Holocaust Museum, let us come to the point; please convince us that:

a- The Nuremberg Court was wrong in rejecting document L-3, [the alleged fake text]

b- Carlos Porter is wrong in the documents he displays at www.cwporter/com/gl3.htm with explanations

c- And finally Official U.S. State Department history documents are "fake by preference", because "of obvious reasons" which is a convinceable proof (?) as much as "overwhelming evidence - accepted facts" etc.

He is a University Professor! Does he have the self-confidence or courage to object officially to the U.S. State Department (the same way I am writing to the Holocaust Museum in Washington officially) ?

Kind regards - Aya

(2) I also attach an excerpt from the book “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” on the very same subject. The description and quotes given in this book is in perfect compliance with the original text and adds a few lines on the Nuremberg trial and replies given by Marshall Goering.

May I expect your reputable and dependable Museum, to perform her liability to future generations and exhibit the courage of rectifying a huge distortion read by all visitors to your museum.

Yours cordially,

Sukru Server Aya (Researcher – Writer)

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5)
Excerpted from:

"The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich " A History of Nazi Germany by William L. Shirer (Fawcett Crest Book – 1959 printed in USA) P.705 - 709

THE MILITARY CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 22, 1939

The generals found Hitler in one of his most arrogant and uncompromising moods.

”I have called you together,” he told them, ”to give you a picture of the political situation in order that you may have some insight into the individual factors on which I have based my irrevocable decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence. After that we shall discuss military details.” First of all, he said, there were two personal considerations.

My own personality and that of Mussolini.

Essentially, all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as 1 have.

There will probably never again in the future be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But 1 can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lunatic.”

No official minutes of Hitler’s harangue have been found, but several records of it, two of them made by high-ranking officers from notes jotted down during the meeting, have come lo light. One by Admiral Hermann Boehm, Chief of the High Seas Fleet, was submitted at Nuremberg in Admiral Raeder’s defense and is published in the original German in TMWC, XLI, pp. 16-25. General Haider made voluminous notes in his unique Gabelsberger shorthand, and an English translation of them from his diary entry of August 22 is published in DGFP, VII, pp. 557-59. The chief document of the session used by the prosecution as evidence in the Nuremberg trial was an unsigned memorandum in two parts from the OKW files which were captured by American troops at Saalfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. It is printed in English translation in NCA, III, pp. 581-86 (Nuremberg Document 798-PS), 665-66 (N.D. 1014-PS). and also in DGFP, VII, pp. 200-6.

The original German text of the two-part memorandum is, of course, in the TMWC volumes. It makes Hitler’s language somewhat more lively than do Admiral Boehm and General Haider. But all three versions are similar in content and there ca/i be no doubt of their authenticity. At Nuremberg there was some doubt about a fourth account of Hitler’s speech, listed as N.D. C-3 (NCA, VII, pp. 752-54), and though it was referred to in the proceedings the prosecution did not submit it in evidence. While it undoubtedly rings true, it may have been embellished a little by persons who were not present at the meeting at the Berghof. In piecing together Hitler’s remarks I have used the records of Boehm and Haider and the unsigned memorandum submitted at Nuremberg as evidence.

“ The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The Italian Court is fundamentally opposed to the Duce.

Franco too was a help. He would assure Spain’s ”benevolent neutrality.” As for ”the other side,” he assured his listeners, ”there is no outstanding personality in England or France.” For what must have been a period of several hours, broken only by a late lunch, the demonic dictator rambled on, and there is no evidence from the records that a single general, admiral or Air Force commander dared to interrupt him to question his judgment or even to challenge his lies. He had made his decision in the spring, he said, that a conflict with Poland was inevitable, but he had thought that first he would turn against the West. In that case, however, it became ”clear” to him that Poland would attack Germany. Therefore she must be liquidated now. The time to fight a war, anyway, had come. For us it is easy to make the decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act . . .

Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable to us; in the Mediterranean, rivalry among Italy, France and England; in the Orient, tension . . .England is in great danger. France’s position has also deteriorated.

Decline in birth rate . . . Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse . . Rumania is weaker than before . . . Since Kemal’s death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men. All these fortunate circumstances will not prevail in two to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore a showdown, which it would not be safe to put off for four to five years, had better take place now.”

Such was the Nazi Leader’s fervid reasoning. He thought it ”highly probable” that the West would not fight, but the risk nevertheless had to be accepted. Had he not taken risks – in occupying the Rhineland when the generals wanted to pull back, in taking Austria, the Sudetenland and the rest of Czechoslovakia? ”Hannibal at Cannae, Frederick the Great at Leuthen, and Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Tannenberg,” he said, ”took chances. So now we also must take risks which can only be mastered by iron determination.” There must be no weakening. It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans in high places spoke and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question. The Fuehrer carried his point when you lost your nerve and capitulated too soon.

Haider, Witzleben and Thomas and perhaps other generals who had been in on the Munich conspiracy must have winced at this. Hitler obviously knew more than they had realized. At any rate, it was now time for them all to show their fighting qualities. Hitler had created Greater Germany, he reminded them,
”by political bluff.” It had now become necessary to ”test the military machine. The Army must experience actual battle before the big final showdown in the West.” Poland offered such an opportunity. Coming back to England and France:

The West has only two possibilities to fight against us: Blockade: It will not be effective because of our self-sufficiency and our sources of aid in the East. Attack from the West from the Maginot Line. I consider this impossible. Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium and Swiss neutrality. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Actually they cannot help Poland. Would it be a long war? No one is counting on a long war. If Herr von Brauchitsch had told me that I would need four years to conquer Poland I would have replied, It cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.”

Having disposed, to his own satisfaction, at least, of Poland, Britain and France, Hitler pulled out his ace card. “He turned to Russia. The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich. I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. Only a blind optimist could believe that Stalin would be so crazy as not to see through England’s intentions. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland . . . Litvinov’s dismissal was decisive. It came to me like a cannon shot as a sign of a change in Moscow toward the Western Powers. I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversations.

Finally a proposition came from the Russians for a nonaggression treaty. Four days ago I took a special step which brought it about that Russia announced yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contact with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her . . . A beginning has been made for the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, now that I have made the political preparations. The way would be open for the soldiers, that is, if Chamberlain didn’t pull another Munich. ”I am only afraid,” Hitler told his warriors, ”that some Schweinehund_ will make a proposal for mediation.”


At this point the meeting broke up for lunch, but not until Goering had expressed thanks to the Fuehrer for pointing the way and had assured him that the armed services would do their duty. The afternoon lecture was devoted by Hitler mainly to bucking up his military chiefs and trying to steel them for the task ahead. The rough jottings of all three records of the talk indicate its nature.

_”Dirty dog.”

According to the account in Nuremberg Document C-3 (see footnote above, p. 529), Goering jumped up on the table and gave ”bloodthirsty thanks and bloody promises. He danced around like a savage. The few doubtful ones remained silent.” This description greatly nettled Goering during an interrogation at Nuremberg on August 2S and 29, 1945. ”I dispute the fact that I stood on the table,” Goering said. ”I want you to know that the speech was made in the great hall of Hitler’s private house. I did not have the habit of jumping on tables in private homes. That would have been an attitude completely inconsistent with that of a German officer.”

”Well, the fact is,” Colonel John H. Amen, the American interrogator, said at this point, ”that you led the applause after the speech, didn’t you?” ”Yes, but not on the table,” Goering rejoined.593

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General Dro (Drastamat Kanayan) a National hero?

Drastamat Kanayan (General Dro) was born in Igdır Turkey in 1884. He was the son of Martiros Kanayan, the head of the Kanayan, or “Gago”, family clan in Igdir and Horom Kanayan, Drastamat’s mother. At an early age, Martiros Kanayan enrolled his son to the parish school of Igdir. Drastamat would skip school to hang out near the military barracks of Igdir because of his interest in the military exercises held there. Noticing that he had no interest in books and learning, Martiros Kanayan pulled him out of the village school and enrolled him to the Yerevan Gymnasium school of the Russian Tzar.

Drastamat was no better in the Yerevan Gymnasium school as the grades he achieved were barely enough for a promotion. Like all government schools in the provinces of Russia, there was a policy of Russification that limited education in the Armenian language to religion only. Inspired by stories of General Andranik’s triumphs who commanded Russian forces against the Ottoman Empire and the spread of nationalism by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Drastamat joined a secret youth movement in his school that opposed the Czar’s government and promoted Armenian nationalism.

On June 12, 1903, the Tsarist authorities passed an edict to bring all Armenian Church property under imperial control. This was faced by strong Armenian opposition because it perceived the tsarist edict as a threat to the Armenian national existence. As a result, the Armenian leadership decided to actively defend Armenian churches by dispatching militiamen who acted as guards and holding mass demonstrations. This prompted Drastamat Kanayan to join the ranks of the Dashnaktsutiun in order to defend the churches from being confiscated through public demonstrations and guard duty. Among his first expolits, the assassination of Nakashidze, the viceroy of the Tsar in the Caucasus.

Despite all this when the opportunity arised he served as detachment commander in the Russian Caucasus Army during World War I. He was one of the commanders of the Armenian volunteer units and decorated by the Tsar. In November 1914, he had the second battalion of the Armenian volunteers. At the Bergmann Offensive, the second battalion of the Armenian volunteers engaged in battle for the first time, near Bayazid. In the course of a bloody combat which lasted twenty-four hours, Dro, commander of the battalion, was seriously wounded. From that day to March of the following year, he remained in critical condition, but his battilion led into eleven battles in the neighborhood of Alashkert, Toutakh & Malashkert, until Dro recovered and returned to resume the command. Kanayan had already become a popular military leader after the victories over the Ottoman Empire at the Caucasus Campaign.

At the end of WW1 he was appointed by the Armenian National Council military commissar to the Administration for Western Armenia of the Ararat region. In 1918-1920, Kanayan became the Defence Minister of the short-lived Democratic Republic of Armenia. He was also the supreme commandant of the Armenian army in the short lived Armenian Republic and in 1920-1921 he organized a wide-spread massacre against the Azeri and the Turkish populations in the region. This is documented in the book World Alive by the U.S. Naval officier Robert Steed Dunn who was an eye-witness to those Armenian atrocities. Lieutenant Dunn was the Intelligence officer of Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the American High-Commissioner in the region and also a de facto American Ambassador in Turkey. Between 1919-1921 lieutenant Dunn travelled extensively with Dro and his army in the region, and both made several contacts with the Russian Bolsheviks, the Turkish and the Armenian National forces. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (The Dashnaks) was conquered by the Russian Bolsheviks in 1920, and ceased to exist. With this historical perspective, General Dro’s new task was assigned to him by the Nazi leadership after a quarter of century later which seemed to be a break to fulfill his dream of conquest. During World War II, the Dashnaks saw a good opportunity in the collaboration with the Nazis to regaing their territories from the Russian’s. The expected prize was an Armenian state in a new world created by Nazi Germany. Aid was given in propaganda and intelligence in which the Armenian organizations were active “812th Armenian Battalion of Wehrmacht” under the command of Drastamat Kanayan known by his nickname “Dro”. The legion was trained by SS officers and participated in the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and the Caucasus. Hitler obviously remembered the Armenians who were “racially pure” & fellow “aryans” having secured the services of General Dro (Drastamat Kanayan) as Commander of Nazi SS Waffengruppe Armenien between 1935-44.

This infamous 812th Battalion later developed into a so-called “Armenian Legion” of 20,000-strong with the efforts of Alfred Muradian, a German-Armenian & by Armik Jamalian, the son of the Arshak Jamalian, the Foreign Minister of the short-lived Armenian Republic. The troops of this Legion were trained and led by the SS and its Security Division S.D., and they joined the Nazi Einsatz Gruppen in the invasion of the Crimea and the North Caucasus. These Armenian Battalions rendered valuable services to the Nazi’s as police units for internal security duties in the occupied territories. It was their duties to round up the Jews and the other “undesirable” elements and organize the death marches to the concentration camps.On December 15, 1942, the Armenian National Council was granted official recognition by Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. The president of Council was Professor Ardasher Abeghian, its vice-president Abraham Guilkhandanian and it numbered among its members Garegin Nzhdeh and Vahan Papazian. Until the end of 1944 it published a weekly journal, Armenian, edited by Viken Shantn who also broadcast on Radio Berlin with the aid of Dr. Paul Rohrbach.

The so called Armenian hero’s of resistance against the Turkish so called genocide later became brothers in crime alongside the Nazi’s. After WWII General Dro was arrested by the Americans in Haidelberg & released after 1 month. He was given safe passage into Lebanon & SOMEHOW made his way into the United States. He then surprisingly became a CIA informant & was payed for his new services & assigned by the CIA on the AIN project between 1952-54 with the cryptonym PELOS. He died in 1956 (Boston), his remains were reburied in Armenia with full military & state honours by the Armenian Republic. Although he was a Nazi War Criminal he has been forgiven by his fellow WW1 compatriots, furthermore is the institution of a medal in honour of General Dro in 2001 by the Armenian Republic for “meritorious services towards military education and improvments in service life“. Ironically the only recognition for the 200 000+ soldiers who lost their lives in the Red Army’s Armenian Division fighting against the Nazi’s was a statue of Stalin at Victory Park in Yerevan (Hitler’s soulmate with contradictary ideology, responsible for 25+ million deaths by starvation, abuse, neglect, direct killing during peace time).

Drastamat Kanayan CIA & FBI files
The Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG), in implementing the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act and the Japanese Imperial Government Records Act, has taken the broadest view in identifying records that may be responsive to the Acts. Information relevant to the Acts is often found among files related to other subjects. In order to preserve the archival integrity of the files, the IWG and the National Archives and Records Administration, where possible, have released entire files together, not just those items related to Nazi or Japanese war criminals, crimes, persecution, and looted assets. These records may relate to persons who are war criminals, former Axis personnel who are not war criminals, victims of war crimes or persecution, or civilian or military personnel investigating Nazi activities; the records may also include mention of, or information about, persons having no connection to these activities.

http://armeniangenocidelies.com 

www.archives.gov

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